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Abstract
This dissertation constitutes a challenge to the orthodox interpretation of Thomas
Hobbes’s theory of punishment. The tradition understands Hobbes to reject the view that
subjects authorize the sovereign to punish them for transgressing the law. Instead, the
tradition understands Hobbes to identify the right to punish with the sovereign’s right of
war, a natural right that only the sovereign retains upon the institution of a
Commonwealth. On the traditional account, the right to punish is not an essential
attribute of sovereignty; rather, the right to inflict punishment belongs, not to the office of
sovereignty, but to the natural person who holds the office.
This dissertation challenges the orthodox interpretation by arguing that the right
to punish, for Hobbes, is not exceptional. The right to punish, like all rights of
sovereignty, is artificial; it is a right that belongs to the office of the representative of the
Commonwealth. The challenge to the tradition is posed through attending to three central
issues that establish the rudiments of a theory of punishment: i) the foundation of the
state’s right to punish; ii) the rationale or justification of the practice of punishment; and
iii) the principled constraint on the state’s right to punish. Attention to the first issue
reveals Hobbes to hold the view that no person possesses a pre-political right to punish.
The right of nature serves as the foundation of the right to punish; however, the two
rights are not identical. The right to punish is an artificial right exercised by an artificial
person. Attention to the second issue reveals that the rationale of punishment, for Hobbes,
is not to deter crime through coercive measures but, rather, is found in prospective
subjects’ covenanting to hold themselves accountable to law in order to establish the in

iii

foro externo obligatory status of the law. Attention to the third issue reveals that
Hobbes’s appeal to the laws of nature prohibiting cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity as an
argument against the punishment of the innocent is best understood as an appeal to
maintain legitimacy in punishment, legitimacy grounded in the authorization of the
sovereign to punish transgressors.

Keywords
Thomas Hobbes, Theory of Punishment, Authorization, Artificial Rights, the Right to
Punish, the Right of War, Deterrence, Guilt and Innocence.
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Introduction
Political authority, according to Thomas Hobbes, is best understood as the product of a
social contract. Subjects authorize (or are understood to have authorized) the sovereign;
as Hobbes claims, “[f]rom this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the rights
and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent
of the people assembled.”1 The right to make law, the right of judicature, the right to
censor opinions, the right to levy taxes, etc., are all conferred upon the sovereign by the
consent of the people assembled. The rights of sovereignty are all artificial rights; that is
to say, the rights of sovereignty are the product of political artifice, crafted by those who
are to be ruled. The right to punish is the exception, however; or is so according to the
traditional view of the source of this particular right. The right to punish, according to the
tradition, is not an artificial right but, rather, a natural right.
With a rare exception,2 scholarship on his juridical and political theory attributes
to Hobbes the view that the sovereign does not acquire the right to punish through the
authorization by prospective subjects. Instead, the sovereign obtains the right to punish
simply by not relinquishing any natural rights.3 As one commentator puts it, “[t]he source

1

Leviathan, 18/2, 88. References to Leviathan are by chapter and paragraph(s) in the G.C.A.
Gaskin (1996) edition, followed by page number(s) in the original (1651) edition. References to
De Cive are by chapter and paragraph(s) followed by the page number(s) of the Howard
Warrender English edition. All emphases are in the original works unless otherwise noted.
As far as I am aware, only Clifford Orwin, “On the Sovereign Authorization,” 31, attributes to
Hobbes the view that the right to punish is a right by the authority of him who is punished.
2

See, e.g., Deborah Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, 38 & 150; Norberto Bobbio, Thomas
Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, 141; Glenn Burgess, “On Hobbesian Resistance Theory,”
75; Mario A. Cattaneo, “Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment,” 280 & 288; Claire Finkelstein, “A
3
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of the sovereign’s right to punish is in the vacuum created by the abandonment of the
personal right to inflict pain on aggressors, a vacuum which is filled by the sovereign’s
exercise of his power.”4 The orthodox interpretation of Hobbes’s view of punishment is
that he identifies the sovereign’s right to punish with the unsurrendered right of nature of
the natural person who occupies the office of the sovereign: as another commentator puts
it “[Hobbes] thus made the right of domestic punishment the same kind of thing as the
right to wage foreign war.”5
I argue that the orthodox interpretation of what Hobbes takes to be the basis of the
right to punish misrepresents Hobbes’s theory. The principal aim of this dissertation is, in
essence, to lay the groundwork for a revisionist project of Hobbes’s theory of
punishment. I aim to provide an account of the proper basis by which we can understand
his theory. I argue that Hobbes’s conception of authorization—a process by which a
representative is commissioned to act on the behalf of another person—plays a
fundamental role in his theory of punishment. The importance of the role authorization
plays in his theory, I argue, bears out in three central issues of punishment that Hobbes

Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense,” 356; David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral
and Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes,146-149; Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social
Contract Tradition, 117-22 & 190-191; David Heyd, “Hobbes on Capital Punishment,” 123-124;
Dieter Hüning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish,” 229-232; Alan Norrie, “Thomas Hobbes and the
Philosophy of Punishment,” 302-308; Alice Ristroph, “Respect and Resistance in Punishment
Theory,” 613-617; Alan Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 238-239; Thomas S. Schrock,
“The Right to Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” 868-873;
Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: Defying the Leviathan, 98; Johann P. Sommerville,
Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 58; Richard Tuck, Natural Rights
Theories: Their Origin and Development, 125; Howard Warrender, The Political FPhilosophy of
Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation, 197; J.W.N. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas s: A Study in
the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories, 97; Yves Charles Zarka, “Hobbes and the
Right to Punish,” 81-83.
4

Heyd, “Hobbes on Capital Punishment,” 123-124.

5

Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 125.
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addresses: i) the foundation of the right to punish, ii) the rationale of the practice of
inflicting and threatening to inflict punishment, and iii) a principled constraint on the
exercise of the right to punish. There are, obviously, many more issues to which one must
attend in order to convey a particular thinker’s “theory” of punishment.6 Nevertheless, a
proper understanding of these three issues, it seems to me, is (indirectly, if not directly)
necessary before addressing other issues related to a particular thinker’s theoretical
approach to the problems of punishment. Attending to Hobbes’s thinking on the
legitimacy of the death penalty, for example, would be fruitless without a proper
understanding of the foundation of the right to punish, the rationale of the institution of
punishment, and the principled constraint on the exercise of the right to punish; in other
words, if the right to punish is simply the right of war, the rationale of punishment is
simply to coerce, through terror, conformity to the sovereign’s will, and the only
principled constraint on the legitimation of punishment follows from the sovereign’s
obligation to the laws of nature, then it seems that there is a theoretical grounding for the
legitimacy of the state deliberately taking the life of a subject.
But there is, I think, a more pressing reason to attend to these three particular
issues that Hobbes addresses. Due to their centrality to a theory of punishment, scholarly
attention to these three issues have, more than any others, played a role in perpetuating
the misunderstanding of Hobbes’s theory of punishment. We can trace the orthodox
interpretation of Hobbes’s rejection of authorization as the basis for the sovereign’s
6

Thus, we would, eventually, want to answer such questions as i) does punishment require
proportionality, and if so, how is proportionality of punishment to crime determined? ii) does
mercy have a role to play, and if so, in what way, if any, is it limited by justice or equity? iii) does
capital punishment have a special character of its own and, if so, is it a legitimate penalty? iv)
does restitution have a role to play and, if so, how is it related to punishment? These are only a
few questions that one must answer to capture a theory of punishment. Hobbes, not surprisingly,
has very interesting things to say with regard to these questions.

4

acquisition of the right to punish back to a common reading of the lengthy second
paragraph of Chapter 28 of Leviathan, “Of Punishments and Rewards.” Here Hobbes
asks the important question: “by what door the right or authority of punishing, in any
case, came in[?]”7 Hobbes argues that subjects cannot “gift” the sovereign the right to
punish. The reason most commonly offered in the literature why subjects cannot gift the
sovereign the right to punish is that an antinomy arises in the social covenant between
prospective subjects granting the sovereign the right to punish and prospective subjects
retaining the right to resist punishment; as one commentator claims, “[b]ecause a person
cannot alienate his right to self-defense when he authorizes the sovereign, Hobbes
concludes that the right of the sovereign to punish ‘is not grounded on any concession, or
gifts of the Subjects.’”8 It is in response to the purported antinomy that Hobbes is taken to
reject subjects’ authorization of the sovereign to punish them as the source of the
sovereign representative’s right to punish: as another commentator puts it, “[f]orced to
grope for a novel account of the right to punish by his own novel declaration of the right
to resist, Hobbes conceives of the right to punish as the right of war.”9
In the first article of my dissertation, “The Right to Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s
Leviathan,” I address the common interpretation of the source of the sovereign’s right to
punish that is central to Hobbes’s theory of punishment. For Hobbes, the principal idea of
authorization is representation. Representation entails that those who authorize a
person—understood as an artificial person—to act on their behalf take upon themselves

7

Leviathan, 28/2, 161.

8

Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 191; emphasis added. Hampton is here
quoting, in part, Leviathan, 28/2, 161.
9

Schrock, “The Right to Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” 873.
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responsibility for the representative’s acts. Hobbes’s definition of punishment, provided
in the first paragraph of Chapter 28, explicitly holds authorization to be key: “A
PUNISHMENT, is an evil inflicted by public authority [...].”10 An act done by public
authority, for Hobbes, is done by a representative of the people. Of the eleven inferences
that Hobbes draws from his definition of punishment as an “evil inflicted by public
authority,” seven explicitly mark a distinction between punishment and hostility.11
Hobbes, in the paragraphs adjacent to the second, distinguishes punishment (as an act of
authority) from hostility (as an act of war). The traditional interpretation of the second
paragraph attributes to Hobbes first the claim, then the denial, and then the claim again
that the authority to punishment follows from subjects’ authorization of the sovereign to
punish them for transgressing the law. I argue that no such denial occurs in the second
paragraph; Hobbes does not hold such blatantly inconsistent views.
Hobbes claims that prospective subjects cannot “gift” the sovereign the right to
punish; but the reason is not that an antinomy arises in the social covenant between
prospective subjects granting the sovereign the right to punish and prospective subjects
retaining the right to resist punishment. Rather, prospective subjects cannot “gift” the
sovereign the right to punish because no person possesses a pre-political right to punish;
no infliction of violence in the state of nature can be understood as reinforcing a moral
order among persons. That persons do not possess a pre-political right to punish,
however, does not preclude the possibility of subjects granting the sovereign the right to
punish. I argue that the authorization of the sovereign to punish transgressors of the law
does not, for Hobbes, require a “gift” of the right to punish. Prospective subjects
10

Leviathan, 28/1, 161.

11

See Leviathan, 28/3, 5-7, & 10-13, 162-163.
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authorize the prospective sovereign to exercise his (or their—if sovereignty is instituted
as an assembly) unsurrendered right of nature. Because there is no pre-political right to
punish, the prospective sovereign’s unsurrendered right of nature provides what Hobbes
calls the foundation of the right to punish. But the sovereign representative’s right to
punish is not identified as the right of nature (right of war). I argue that the right to punish
is, for Hobbes, an artificial right exercised by an artificial person.
I argue that Hobbes holds the view that through the authorization by prospective
subjects the sovereign representative acquires the “right or authority of punishing.” This
prompts us to attend to a question that is naturally overlooked by the tradition: given that
the sovereign is authorized by prospective subjects to punish them for transgressing the
law, to what end, according to Hobbes, do prospective subjects establish the institution of
punishment? The aim of the second article of my dissertation, “Hobbes on the Rationale
of Punishment,” is to provide an answer to this question.
The tradition, as noted, holds that the right to punish is not specially established
through the social contract. As one commentator notes, “[Hobbes] gives a separate
explanation for the sovereign’s right to punish; it is part of his right of nature and thus
independent of the rights transferred to him in the social contract.”12 Because the right to
punish is “independent of the rights transferred to him in the social contract,” an answer
to the question of the justification of punishment is, on the traditional view, independent
of any appeal to the rationale for the sovereign’s possession of the right to punish.
According to Hobbes, the seventh law of nature requires “that in revenges (that is,
retribution of evil for evil), men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the

12

Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, 16.
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greatness of the good to follow.”13 The “good to follow” that justifies punishment, on the
traditional view, is implicit in the rationale for exercising the natural right to retributive
violence, namely, to ensure one’s own future security through deterrence. Accordingly,
on the traditional view of Hobbes’s theory of punishment, the rationale for inflicting (or
threatening to inflict) punishment is simply to deter subjects from acting contrary to the
will (command) of the person who does not renounce any natural rights. As one
commentator claims, in “Hobbes’s general theory of criminal punishment [...t]he general
justification for applying punishments for law violations is a purely forwardlooking one:
to prevent crime, primarily by deterrence.”14
The orthodox view that Hobbes is a straightforward deterrent theorist bears out in
another related view commonly attributed to Hobbes: most, if not all, citizens require the
threat of punishment as a necessary coercive step to motivate conformity to the law. As
one commentator puts it, “[m]utually beneficial covenants find their initial justification in
the fact that it is prudentially rational for individuals to agree to them [...] and their
continuing justification in the fact that it is prudentially rational for individuals to adhere
to them (because violations are subject to the sovereign’s wrath).”15 In other words, on
the traditional view, it is mutually beneficial for prospective subjects to renounce the
right of nature, but it is individually beneficial to not exercise the renounced right
because doing otherwise would prompt the sovereign to respond with the exercise of his
unsurrendered natural right to violence.

13

Leviathan, 15/19, 76.

14

Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 250.

15

Richard Nunan, “Hobbes on Morality, Rationality, and Foolishness,” 44-45.
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In the second article of my dissertation, I argue against the noted reading of
Hobbes. Given that Hobbes holds that prospective subjects grant the sovereign the right
to punish,16 I argue that we ought to avail ourselves of the rationale of punishment within
(and not independent of) the context of the social covenant that institutes a sovereign
representative. According to Hobbes, the social covenant that institutes a juridical
authority is void without the authority to enforce the law; as Hobbes states, “covenants,
without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.”17 The
covenant that holds the authority of the law over renounced natural rights would be
invalid, not because most persons do not desire the law to be binding but, rather, because
reasonable suspicion of non-performance invalidates covenants. I argue that, for Hobbes,
the rationale for each prospective subject granting the sovereign the right to punish him
for transgressing the law is to overcome the reasonable suspicion that invalidates the
social covenant that establishes the authority of the law. Put another way, the grant is
collateral each person puts up in order to overcome the ubiquity of diffidence—mutual
distrust—in the state of nature.
Hobbes holds that each person is obliged to the laws of nature in two ways: in
foro interno obligation, which always binds one conscience, and in foro externo
obligation, which binds one’s action only when there is sufficient security. The rationale
As noted above, in Chapter 18 of Leviathan, “Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution,”
Hobbes contends that mutual authorization by prospective subjects is the means by which “all the
rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of
the people assembled” (Leviathan,18/2, 88). The right to punish, we must appreciate, is included
in the catalogue of rights conferred upon the sovereign, a list of which Hobbes provides in the
same chapter. Hobbes maintains, “to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with
riches or honour; and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy,
every subject according to the law he hath formerly made” (Leviathan, 18/14, 92; emphasis
added).
16

17

Leviathan, 17/2, 85.

9

for establishing the institution of punishment, for Hobbes, is to converge the two modes
of obligation; and the rationale for threatening punishment is to maintain the convergence
of the two modes of obligation. Deterrence, for Hobbes, does not provide the principal
rationale for punishment but, rather, a secondary means to maintain such convergence.
Hobbes notes, “though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot
distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating,
self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned.”18 The issue of
the rationale of the practice of punishment is, first and foremost, epistemological; the
issue of motivation is subsumed under the epistemological concern. The threat of
punishment bridges the epistemic gap between persons, thus, shores up the motivation for
each subject to conform his actions to the law. Specifically, subjects, when made aware
that each other subject is made aware what will happen to those who transgress the law,
will be motivated to conform to the law. We should not understand the threat of
punishment, for most subjects, to work as a coercive measure; rather, for most subjects,
the general threat of punishment is the necessary last step in making the law in foro
externo obligatory.
The issue of the principled constraint on the sovereign’s right to punish is the
focus of my third article, “Hobbes on the Punishment of the Innocent.” Guilt, for Hobbes,
is a necessary requirement for punishment; as Hobbes claims, “there can be no
punishment of the innocent.”19 There are two schools of thought on what accounts for
Hobbes’s claim. The first school holds that Hobbes espouses a logical doctrine; the
second school holds that Hobbes espouses a normative doctrine. According to proponents
18

De Cive, Author’s Preface to the Reader, 33; emphasis added.

19

Leviathan, 28/22, 165

10

of the first view, Hobbes’s claim that “there can be no punishment of the innocent” is an
elucidation of the term “punishment.” As a representative of the first school argues,
“Hobbes saw that by definition, punishment is retributive or penal. There can be no
punishment properly called, where there has been no transgression of the law and such a
description cannot therefore be applied to actions against the innocent.”20 According to
proponents of the second view, the principle that guilt is a necessary requirement for
punishment is, for Hobbes, grounded in three laws of nature. As a representative of the
second school contends, to punish the innocent “is to wage war on subjects; it is an act of
hostility, not of punishment, and reintroduces the state of war that sovereignty served to
supercede.”21
In the third article of my dissertation, I argue that the first view just sketched is
mistaken. I argue that the second view has merit in that it acknowledges Hobbes’s
concern as normative and not logical, but it fails to explain why the punishment of the
innocent is an act of hostility or why the punishment of the innocent risks reintroducing
the state of war.
I argue that the attribution of “logical retributivism” to Hobbes—a theory whose
proponents understand punishment to be retributive by definition— to account for his
claim that “there can be no punishment of the innocent” requires us to i) disregard that,
for Hobbes, the distinction between punishment and hostility draws on an account of
punishment as based on the authorization of the sovereign to punish transgressors of the
law and ii) ignore the prescriptive role the laws of nature play in his theory of
punishment. The attribution of “logical retributivism” to Hobbes, in particular, requires
20

Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 184.

21

Edward G. Andrew, “Hobbes on Conscience within the Law and without,” 218.
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us to disregard Hobbes’s appeal to the laws of nature as providing an argument against
the punishment of the innocent.
Hobbes argues that the laws of nature are “articles of peace” and that, by
breaching the laws of nature prohibiting cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity, the punishment
of the innocent introduces war. In response to the proponents of the second view, who
argue that the laws of nature ground the principle that guilt is a necessary requirement for
punishment, I argue that to understand the claim that cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in
punishment—the punishment of the innocent—introduces war we must understand i)
what it is about cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in particular that, for Hobbes, make
them relevant to the issue of the punishment of the innocent and ii) why Hobbes holds
that cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in punishment is an act of hostility and an invitation
to war. I argue that proponents of the second view are correct in holding that cruelty,
ingratitude, and inequity in punishment leads to war; however, they are unable to explain
why the punishment of the innocent leads to war without appealing to subjects’
authorization of the sovereign to punish them for, and only for, transgressing the law.
Accordingly, I argue that each of Hobbes’s three appeals to the laws of nature, offered as
arguments against punishing the innocent, are best understood as arguments to maintain
legitimacy in punishment—legitimacy based on each subject’s authorization of the
sovereign to punish him if he transgresses the law.
I argue that inequity in punishment betrays the trust for which the sovereign is
authorized to distribute punishments for transgressions of the law and causes subjects to
reject the sovereign as the arbiter of justice. I argue that ingratitude in punishment betrays
the expectation of protection under the law for which the sovereign is authorized to

12

punish transgressors of the law and causes subjects to regret the gift of sovereign
authority. Lastly, I argue that cruelty in punishment betrays the purpose for which the
sovereign is authorized to punish transgressors of the law, thereby annulling the in foro
externo obligation to the law. I argue that Hobbes’s appeals to maintaining the trust,
expectation, and purpose in punishment attends to each subject’s authorization of the
sovereign to punish him for, and only for, transgressing the law. The punishment of the
innocent would be contrary to domestic peace because it would be viewed as an
illegitimate exercise of sovereign authority. Hobbes’s appeals to the laws of nature, on
my account, are best understood as appeals to maintaining legitimacy in punishment.
Hobbes claims that when a subject is punished, “he is author of his own
punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do.”22 Those
who address Hobbes’s theory of punishment discount or dismiss entirely the significance
that we ought to attach to this claim; as one commentator remarks, “[o]ne would expect
him [Hobbes] to consider the ruler’s right to inflict pain upon his subjects also as a new
right created by authorization. But Hobbes did not argue in this way.”23 Hobbes, I
contend, does argue in this way. We can hardly overstate the significance of Hobbes’s
claim. The authorization by prospective subjects of the sovereign to punish transgressors
of the law grounds the all-important distinction Hobbes draws between punishment and
hostility—this is the distinction between violent acts performed by the representative of
the Commonwealth and violent acts performed by a natural person. As Hobbes maintains,
“it is of the nature of punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the

22

Leviathan, 18/3, 89; emphasis added.

23

Hüning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish,” 231
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authority only of the representative itself.”24 The authorization by prospective subjects of
the sovereign to punish transgressors also grounds the all-important distinction Hobbes
draws between the retributive response to crime and the retributive response to treason—
this is the distinction between retributive responses to those who continue to recognize
the sovereign’s authority (including the authority to punish) and those who no longer do
so; as Hobbes maintains,
harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy falls not under the name
of punishment, because seeing they were either never subject to the law,
and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been subject to it, and
professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgress it,
all the harms that can be done them must be taken as acts of hostility. […]
For the punishments set down in the law are to subjects, not to enemies;
such as are they that, having been by their own act subjects, deliberately
revolting, deny the sovereign power.25
The authorization by prospective subjects of the sovereign to punish transgressors of the
law provides the conceptual foundation of Hobbes’s theory of punishment. We cannot
avoid the conclusion that we miss something of vital importance for understanding his
theory of punishment if we fail to attend to Hobbes’s claim that a subject punished “is
author of his own punishment.” Or so I shall argue.
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Article 1

1

The Right to Punish in Thomas Hobbes`s Leviathan

1.1 Introduction
There is an ambiguity in Thomas Hobbes’s account, in Leviathan, of the source of the
sovereign’s right to punish.1 The ambiguity stems from the fact that Hobbes appears to
claim both that the prospective sovereign is granted the right to punish by prospective
subjects and that the prospective sovereign is not granted the right to punish by
prospective subjects. With the former, we understand that the acquisition of the right to
punish follows from a process of authorization—a process by which a representative is
commissioned to act on the behalf of another person. With the latter, we understand that
the possession of the right to punish is merely the product of the mass relinquishment of
rights—the prospective sovereign, that is, the person who occupies the office of
sovereignty, alone does not relinquish any natural rights.2

1

References to Leviathan are by chapter and paragraph(s) in the G.C.A. Gaskin (1996) edition,
followed by page number(s) in the original (1651) edition. All emphases are in the original work
unless otherwise noted.
2

Hobbes draws a distinction between the relinquishment of a right and a transfer of a right. See
Leviathan, 14/7, 65. To relinquish a particular natural right is to oblige oneself to not interfere
with all other indeterminate persons’ exercise of that right. To transfer a particular natural right is
to oblige oneself to not interfere with the exercise of the right by the particular person or persons
to whom you transferred. Some commentators view the transaction of the right to punish as a
renouncement, while others view it as a transfer. Hobbes, we should note, seems to claims that
the right to punish is the product of a renouncement of rights: “And this is the foundation of that
right of punishing which is exercised in every Commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the
sovereign that right; but only, in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own as he should
think fit for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only”
(Leviathan, 28/2, 162). However, both interpretations are, arguably, consistent with Hobbes’s
claim; that is, one could argue that a person may “lay down” a right to a particular person. We do
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The orthodox interpretation of Hobbes’s account is that he rejects the view that
the sovereign’s acquisition of the right to punish follows from the authorization of the
sovereign by prospective subjects to punish them for transgressing the law. Following
from remarks in the second paragraph of Chapter 28 of Leviathan, “Of Punishments and
Rewards,” Hobbes is almost unanimously understood to identify the right to punish with
the unrelinquished right of war of the natural person who occupies the office of the
sovereign and, accordingly, the infliction of punishment is understood to occur outside
the bounds of a juridical relationship between the sovereign and subject condemned.
In this paper, I argue against the orthodox interpretation. The identification of the
right to punish with the unrelinquished right of nature—right of war—misrepresents
Hobbes’s treatment of punishment in Leviathan. The traditional view, which I recount in
section 1.2 of this paper, is that Hobbes’s identification of the right to punish with the
right of war is a response to a purported antinomy generated between subjects granting
the right to punish to the sovereign and subjects retaining the right to defend themselves
from harm. The tradition generally recognizes that, for Hobbes, rights do not have
corresponding duties; thus, the sovereign’s exercise of the right to punish does not require
the condemned subject to assist in his own punishment. However, according to the
orthodox interpretation, the inevitable conflict between the exercise of rights is not where
the problem with the right to punish lies; the grant of the right to punish itself is—or,
rather, would be—vitiated by the retention of the right to resist violence. Because Hobbes
holds the absolute primacy of the right of self-defense, the right to punish, according to
the tradition, is not granted to the sovereign. The right to punish is merely left to the
not need to resolve this interpretative issue presently. With regard to the right to punish, both
interpretations involve identifying the right to punish with the sovereign’s unrelinquished natural
right of war.
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person who occupies the office of sovereignty by the mass relinquishment of nondefensive natural rights.
In section 1.3 of this paper, I argue that there is, for Hobbes, no antinomy between
prospective subjects granting the sovereign the right to punish and retaining the right to
resist violence. The latter does not pose an obstacle for the former. There is no antinomy
within the social covenant for the simple reason that Hobbes does not hold that the right
to resist the sovereign enters through the social covenant. Rather, as I argue in section
1.3, the right to resist violence (of all kinds) is retained because it is inalienable, not
because prospective subjects refuse to alienate it. The inalienable character of the right to
resist does not pose a problem for granting the sovereign the right to punish.
But not only is there no antinomy in the social covenant, the purported solution to
the antinomy attributed to Hobbes in the second paragraph of Chapter 28 is incompatible
with Hobbes’s treatment of punishment in adjacent paragraphs of the chapter and
throughout Leviathan. In section 1.4 of this paper, I argue that the purported
identification of the sovereign’s right to punish with the right of war of the person (or
persons) who occupies the office of sovereignty is incompatible with both i) Hobbes’s
definition of punishment, provided in the first paragraph, as an act inflicted by authority,
and ii) the inferences he draws from the definition of punishment, provided in the third to
the thirteenth paragraphs, as distinguished from an act of hostility.
What remains to be addressed is an explanation of the second paragraph of
Chapter 28. In section 1.5 of this paper, I argue that Hobbes’s answer to his inquiry “by
what door the right or authority of punishing, in any case, came in”3 is that prospective
subjects authorize the person or persons who will hold the office of sovereignty to
3

Leviathan, 28/2, 161.
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exercise the unsurrendered natural right to perpetrate violence. The natural right to
perpetrate violence that the person who will hold the office of sovereignty does not
relinquish serves as the foundation of the right to punish, but it is through authorization
that the sovereign representative’s perpetration of violence is understood as the political
right to punish. I argue that Hobbes has only one account, and not two competing
accounts, of the sovereign’s right to punish.4 The two claims noted above—the
acquisition of the right to punish follows from a process of authorization and the
possession of the right to punish follows from the non-relinquishment of natural rights by
the person or persons who will hold the office of sovereignty—are not at odds with one
another. Rather, the two claims outline the process by which the sovereign representative
acquires the right to punish—a right that does not exist prior to the establishment of civil
society. Because there is no pre-political right to punish, the unrelinquished right of
nature of the person who will occupy the office of sovereignty provides what Hobbes
calls the foundation of the right to punish. But the sovereign representative’s acquisition
of the right to punish follows from a process of authorization. The right to punish, for
Hobbes, is an artificial right exercised by an artificial person.

1.2 The Traditional View
In Chapter 18 of Leviathan, “Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution,” Hobbes
contends that mutual authorization by prospective subjects is the means by which “all the
rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the
Two Hobbes scholars provide analysis of Hobbes’s account of the sovereign’s right to punish
that acknowledges authorization. See F.C. Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An
Interpretation, 156-159; and Alan Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 238-239. However,
both view Hobbes as offering two distinct and incompatible accounts of the grounds of the
sovereign’s right to punish.
4
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consent of the people assembled.”5 The right to punish is included in the catalogue of
rights conferred upon the sovereign, a list of which Hobbes provides in the same chapter.
Hobbes maintains, “to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or
honour; and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy,
every subject according to the law he hath formerly made.”6
However, when Hobbes, later in Chapter 28, “Of Punishments and Rewards,”
addresses the question of the foundation of the sovereign’s right to punish, “a question to
be answered, of much importance,”7 he appears to rescind his earlier account of the right
to punish as based on the authorization of the people assembled. Hobbes claims that “no
man is supposed bound by covenant not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be
intended that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person.”8 As
such, according to Hobbes, “before the institution of Commonwealth, every man had a
right to everything [...] And this [right to everything] is the foundation of that right of
punishing which is exercised in every Commonwealth.”9 In explaining how the sovereign
comes to possess the right to punish, Hobbes claims, “the subjects did not give the
sovereign that right; but only, in laying down theirs [the right to everything],
strengthened him to use his own […] so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him

5

Leviathan, 18/2, 88.

6

Leviathan, 18/14, 92; emphasis added.

7

Leviathan, 28/2, 161.

8

Leviathan, 28/2, 161.

9

Leviathan, 28/2, 161.
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only.”10 The right to punish, seemingly contrary to Hobbes’s earlier remarks in
Leviathan, is not a right conferred upon the sovereign. Accordingly, as Richard Tuck puts
it, “[Hobbes] thus made the right of domestic punishment the same kind of thing as the
right to wage foreign war.”11 The tradition concurs,12 as Hobbes is generally regarded as
identifying the right to punish with the right of war.
Hobbes, in Chapter 28 of Leviathan, is understood to rescind the sovereign’s
authorization by prospective subjects to punish them for transgressing the law as the
means by which the sovereign acquires the right to punish. An antinomy purportedly
arises in the social covenant between prospective subjects granting the prospective
sovereign the right to punish and prospective subjects retaining the right to resist
violence. As Jean Hampton claims, “[b]ecause a person cannot alienate his right to selfdefense when he authorizes the sovereign, Hobbes concludes that the right of the

10

Leviathan, 28/2, 162.

11

Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, 125. Tuck is here
referring to Hobbes’s position in De Cive, but adds “and in Leviathan he was to move even
further in this direction.”
See, e.g., Deborah Baumgold, Hobbes’s Political Theory, 38 & 150; Norberto Bobbio, Thomas
Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, 141; Glenn Burgess, “On Hobbesian Resistance Theory,”
75; Mario A. Cattaneo, “Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment,” 280 & 288; Claire Finkelstein, “A
Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense,” 356; David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral
and Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, 146-149; Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social
Contract Tradition, 117-22 & 190-191; David Heyd, “Hobbes on Capital Punishment,”123-124;
Dieter Hüning, “Hobbes on the Right to Punish,” 229-232; Alan Norrie, “Thomas Hobbes and the
Philosophy of Punishment,” 302-308; Hanna Pitkin, “Hobbes’s Concept of Representation--II,”
913; Alice Ristroph, “Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory,” 613-617; Thomas S.
Schrock, “The Right to Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” 868873; Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance: Defying the Leviathan, 98; Johann P.
Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 58; Howard Warrender, The
Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation, 197; J.W.N. Watkins, Hobbes’s
System of Ideas s: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories, 97; Yves
Charles Zarka, “Hobbes and the Right to Punish,” 81-83.
12
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sovereign to punish ‘is not grounded on any concession, or gifts of the Subjects.’”13 We
find that many in the tradition concur,14 as Hobbes is understood to view the retention of
the right to self-defense as vitiating the grant of the right to punish.
Because the social contract cannot account for the purported contradictory
relationship between granting the right to punish and retaining the right to resist violence,
it is assumed that one right must be sacrificed to the other: either the inalienability of the
right to resist is untenable or the right to punish cannot be conceived as an essential right
of the sovereign representative but, rather, a right belonging to the natural person (or

13

14

Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 191; emphasis added.

Not all commentators who endorse the orthodox interpretation attempt to provide an
explanation for Hobbes’s purported identification of the right to punish with the right of war. For
those who attempt to provide some kind of an explanation, we find that the identification of the
right to punish with the right of war in some way follows from the absolute primacy Hobbes
assigns to the right of self-defense. See, e.g., Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 147: “no man can
be supposed to authorize another to punish him, or kill him […] but no man has the right to harm
himself, for the right of nature is a right to do what is conducive to one’s preservation.
Fortunately, Hobbes himself recognizes this.” Heyd, “Hobbes on Capital Punishment,” 122,
notes: “the fact that a penalty is psychologically impossible to endure entails that the individual
cannot rationally agree to introduce it into the contract.” Hüning, “Hobbes on the Right to
Punish,” 230, claims that, “[t]he power of punishment cannot be derived from an act of a
renouncing the right of self-defence. As Hobbes says, it is not possible by the terms of the social
contract to give up or relinquish the right of self-defence.” Ristroph, “Respect and Resistance in
Punishment Theory,” 613, maintains that, for Hobbes, punishment “is a form of violence, and as
we have already seen, Hobbes recognized an inalienable right to resist violent assaults.
Accordingly, the commonwealth’s right to punish ‘is not grounded on any concession…of the
subjects’” Schrock, “The Right to Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s
Leviathan,” 873, notes: “[f]orced to grope for a novel account of the right to punish by his own
novel declaration of the right to resist, Hobbes conceives of the right to punish as the right of
war.” Sreedhar, Hobbes on Resistance, 16, notes: “Hobbes makes a strong point of separating the
subject’s right to resist the sovereign in self-defense from the sovereign’s right to punish the
subjects. Indeed, in Chapter 28 of Leviathan, he gives a separate explanation for the sovereign’s
right to punish; it is part of his right of nature and thus independent of the rights transferred to
him in the social contract.” Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas, 97, notes: “No man renounces his
right to defend himself. Thus, the right, which the commonwealth hath to put a man to death for
crimes…remains from the first right of nature.” Lastly, to conclude our sample list, Zarka ,
“Hobbes and the Right to Punish,” 76, claims that “if the right to resist is inalienable, then
subjects have never conceded the right to punish them to the sovereign, and that right cannot be
conceived as an essential attribute of sovereignty emanating from the convention which institutes
the state.”
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persons) who holds the office of the sovereign. Accordingly, and as noted above, Hobbes
scholars takes Hobbes not only as recognizing this antinomy in the second paragraph of
Chapter 28 but also resolving the antinomy by embracing the latter. The right to punish,
as the tradition underscores, was “not given, but left to him [the sovereign], and to him
only.”15 According to proponents of the traditional view, we find Hobbes, here in Chapter
28, identifying the sovereign’s right to punish with the natural right to perpetrate violence
of the person who holds the office of the sovereign.16 As we see next, because of this
identification, Hobbes scholars understand the state of affairs in which the person who
holds the office of the sovereign exercises the right to punish to be identical (in the
relevant sense) to the state of affairs in which one exercises the natural right to wage war.
Since, on the orthodox interpretation of Hobbes’s view, the sovereign’s authority
to punish is not based on the subject’s authorization, the infliction of punishment cannot
be understood to occur within the margins of legitimate juridical authority. Instead, the
infliction of punishment occurs within the state of nature, that is, a state of affairs
defined, in part, by the absence of any juridical relationship between the parties. David
Gauthier argues, for example, that “the person punished, in violating the civil law, has
violated an obligation undertaken in the institution of the sovereign, and so has already
placed himself, in effect, in the state of nature.”17 Again, the tradition concurs,18 as the

15

Leviathan, 28/2, 162.

16

See infra notes 11 and 12 and corresponding text above.

17

Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 148.
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See, e.g., Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, 141, who explains the
consequence in the following way: “we can remark that the covenant between sovereign and
[recalcitrant] subject has been broken. Both are back in the state of nature, that is, in that
condition in which everyone has as much right as he has power.” Cattaneo, “Hobbes’s Theory of
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consequence of identifying the right to punish with the natural right to perpetrate
violence, which all but the person who holds sovereignty relinquishes, is that the exercise
of the right to punish—the infliction of punishment—is not conceived of as the exercise
of a juridical right by an authority over a subject.
Without authorization serving as the basis for the sovereign’s right to punish, as
we have seen, the sovereign is left to exercise his natural right to perpetrate violence. But
the natural right to perpetrate violence is not a right to punish. Punishment is a right that
belongs exclusively to the sovereign representative; it is one of the rights that, as Hobbes
puts it, “make the essence of sovereignty.”19 The sovereign, as a natural person, does not

Punishment,” 282 draws a similar conclusion: “at the moment when the […] penalty is inflicted,
the rights of the sovereign and the subject are placed on the same plane, and there is a return to
the state of nature, whereby at that moment the conflict between the sovereign and subject takes
on the character of a state of war.” Cattaneo’s stated concern is exclusively the death penalty (and
torture), but perhaps we can, without being uncharitable to his view, generalize his remark to
encompass most, if not all, punishments. Andrew Cohen, “Retained Liberties and Absolute
Hobbesian Authorization, 40, notes: “As soon as the sovereign comes to inflict violence on a
subject, the reason for having constituted the sovereign is undone. The person who was once a
subject is now thrown back into the state of nature with the sovereign.” As Heyd, “Hobbes on
Capital Punishment,” 122 claims, “this [the infliction of punishment] means in effect a return to
the state of nature. For no such struggle between the state authority and the convicted individual
could take place within the boundaries of any legal authority.” Norrie, “Thomas Hobbes and the
Philosophy of Punishment,” 308, notes: “if the exercise of punishment is based upon an
unconceded right of nature, then every threat or act of punishment is itself a reversion to the state
of nature. Every such threat or act is a potential or actual act of war.” Ristroph, “Respect and
Resistance in Punishment Theory,” 615, notes that “[o]nce a subject has disobeyed the sovereign,
he and the sovereign are in the state of nature vis-à-vis each other […] the criminal has put
himself and the sovereign into a conflict with no mutually recognized third-party adjudicator.”
Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 239, notes: “The view that punishment rests on the
sovereign’s state-of-nature right of self-defense has some awkward consequences. One is that we
appear to remain in the state of nature vis-à-vis the sovereign.” Lastly, Schrock, “The Right to
Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s Leviathan,” 873, notes, “Hobbes
conceives of the right to punish as the right of war, i.e., as the right which, in another
manifestation, is the right to resist! He orchestrates a face-off within the commonwealth between
two manifestations of the right of nature.”
19

Leviathan, 18/16, 92; emphasis added.

25

have a right to punish. Hobbes, unlike Hugo Grotius20 before him and John Locke21 after
him, does not maintain but, in fact, rejects the view that persons have a pre-political right
to punish. In the absence of a mutually recognized authority, one cannot be accused of
breaching the moral law or of violating another’s rights—contra Locke and Grotius,
respectively. The absence of moral accountability to others in the state of nature is central
to Hobbes’s view of the state of nature as a state of blameless liberty. To be sure, one can
breach the laws of nature, but such violations, according to Hobbes, are only of one’s
conscience.22 Prior to the social covenant, there is no moral accountability to others. A
voluntary undertaking of obligation is the basis of accountability to others, as Hobbes
states, “there being no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own;
for all men equally are by nature free.”23 Accordingly, before the social covenant—before
the mutual voluntary undertaking of accountability—no application of violence can be
understood as maintaining or reinforcing a moral order among persons. The concepts of
guilt and innocence are, to Hobbes’s mind, inapplicable in the state of affairs outside of
civil society. As Hobbes states, “it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war;
20

See Hugo Grotius, On the Rights of War and Peace: An Abridged Translation, Book II, Chap.
20, Sec. 9, paragraph 2: “The right of inflicting such punishment, is also, by Natural Law, in the
hands of every man.” See also Hugo Grotius, De Iure Praedae Commentarius, 92: “Is not the
power to punish essentially a power that pertains to the state? Not at all! On the contrary, just as
every right of the magistrate comes to him from the state, so has the same right come to the state
from private individuals.”
See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, Chap. 2, §7 and Chap. 2, §8: “the
execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has
a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation” and
“every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.”
21

See Leviathan, 27/3, 152: “the civil law ceasing, crimes cease: for there being no other law
remaining but that of nature, there is no place for accusation; every man being his own judge, and
accused only by his own conscience.”
22

23

Leviathan, 21/10, 111.
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wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent and
innocent as to the time past.”24
We are, it seems, confronted with an impasse. To the central role Hobbes assigns
punishment or the threat of punishment in maintaining a state of peace and security, we
find that the identification of the right to punish with the right of war is at cross purposes.
Yves Charles Zarka and Alan Norrie articulate what is at stake here. Zarka notes:
[T]he fundamental difference which Hobbes establishes between
punishment (an evil inflicted upon a citizen by the public authority) and an
act of hostility (an evil inflicted on an enemy of the republic) no longer
holds […] The very notion of punishment loses all meaning.25
Norrie notes:
[W]hile the Sovereign is supposed to protect men from the state of nature,
the Sovereign's primary tool for achieving this is itself a weapon of war
and a logical conduit back into the natural state. […] The whole structure
of Leviathan is shaken if the Sovereign's right of punishment is natural
and not social, for the state of nature has never really been transcended.26
The identification of the right to punish with the natural right to perpetrate violence
exposes the impossibility of establishing punishment as a juridical institution. The
institution of punishment, as an integral institution of the Commonwealth, is an
institution of war—it is an institution whose modus operandi exists external to the
Commonwealth. That the infliction of punishment, according to the orthodox
interpretation, occurs outside the scope of representation or authority reveals a serious
flaw in Hobbes’s social contract theory. Thomas S. Schrock argues that the flaw is so
serious, in fact, that the failure to institute a sovereign with the right to punish
24

Leviathan, 28/23, 165.

25

Zarka, “Hobbes and the Right to Punish,” 83.

26

Norrie, “Thomas Hobbes and the Philosophy of Punishment,” 308.
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“precipitates a crisis in Hobbes’s political theory”27 such that “Hobbes fails to discover
and exhibit a right to punish – therewith also, of course, failing to give us a sovereign and
thus a commonwealth.”28
Fortunately for Hobbes’s political theory no such crisis of this nature exists, or so
I shall argue. Hobbes does not identify the right to punish with the right of war. There is
no crisis because, contrary to the traditional view, the issue that Hobbes addresses in the
second paragraph of Chapter 28 is not an antinomy, the purported solution to which is the
identification of the right to punish with the right of war. The issue Hobbes addresses
with regard to the question of the foundation of the right to punish is how to establish
political representation in punishment given that there is no pre-political right to punish.
That the foundation of the right to punish rests upon the prospective sovereign’s
unrelinquished right of nature does not entail that the sovereign representative’s right to
punish is to be identified as the right of war.

1.3 The Right to Resist Violence
As subjects’ retention of the right to resist violence is taken to be the stumbling block for
subjects granting the sovereign the right to punish, we need to analyze the relationship
between the two rights within the context of authorizing a sovereign representative.29 I do

Schrock, “The Right to Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s Leviathan,”
853.
27

Schrock, “The Right to Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s Leviathan,”
857.
28

29

The antinomy, we must keep in mind, is not found in the inevitable conflict between the
exercise of the right to punish and the exercise of the right to resist; rather, as the tradition
characterizes the problem, the contradiction is understood to be involved in granting the right to
punish given the absolute primacy Hobbes assigns to the right to defend oneself from harm. See
infra notes 13 and 14 and corresponding text above.
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not explore in any great detail Hobbes’s theory of resistance. My focus in this section is
limited to Hobbes’s understanding of subjects’ retention of the right to resist (defend
themselves from) violence.
It is clear that, for Hobbes, the paradigmatic case of the resistance of violence is
against the sovereign.30 Of course, Hobbes does not assume that every exercise of the
right to resist violence is against the sovereign’s lawful infliction of violence. Subjects
possess the right to defend themselves from other subjects’ unlawful infliction of
violence. As Hobbes states,
A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to
escape but by wounding him that assaulteth him; if he wound him to death,
this is no crime, because no man is supposed, at the making of a
Commonwealth to have abandoned the defence of his life or limbs, where
the law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance.31
Be that as it may, it is without doubt that it is against the sovereign that we are to regard
as the paradigmatic case of the resistance of violence.
That the paradigmatic case of the resistance of violence is against the sovereign is
taken to support the tradition’s supposition that an antinomy exists in the social covenant
between subjects granting the sovereign the right to punish and subjects retaining the
right to resist violence. As noted above, we find consensus in the literature that the
retention of the right to resist violence poses an insurmountable obstacle to the sovereign

30

For example, according to Hobbes, a subject may, without injustice, refuse the following: i) to
execute some dangerous office; ii) to kill or wound himself; iii) to abstain from the use of food,
air, medicine or anything else without which he cannot live; iv) to confess to a crime without
assurance of pardon; v) to not resist those who assault him; and vi) to cease defending his life
even upon committing an unjust act, that is to say, to not resist punishment (Leviathan, 21/12-15,
111-113).
31

Leviathan, 27/20, 155.
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being granted the right to punish.32 But the antinomy requires explanation. A number of
commentators have taken up the task of explaining how “it cannot be intended that he
gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person” follows from the fact that
“no man is supposed bound by covenant not to resist violence.”33 And we find uniformity
in the attempts to locate the incompatibility between the two rights.
Commentators contend that the purpose for each subject retaining the right to
defend oneself against violence is that it is to be held against the sovereign. Schrock
remarks: “[c]alled a ‘true liberty of a subject,’ the right to resist is the right [each subject]
has, first, to assure himself that the sovereign has no plans to punish or otherwise harm
him.”34 Claire Finkelstein, in addressing the question “against whom would civil agents
require a right of defensive response?” notes that “the right of self-defense is primarily
necessary against the sovereign, since he is the only person or entity who retains an
entitlement to use the kind of force against which a right of self-defense in civil society
might be necessary.”35 And, as Zarka notes, “[t]he part of the natural right which each
person retains in the civil state defines the sphere of legitimate resistance to the political
power.”36 The right to resist violence is purportedly retained, first and foremost, to
provide recourse against the sovereign’s threat to one’s preservation. And, according to
“[B]ecause,” as Hampton claims, “a person cannot alienate his right to self-defense when he
authorizes the sovereign, Hobbes concludes that the right of the sovereign to punish ‘is not
grounded on any concession, or gifts of the Subjects.’” Again, see infra notes 13 and 14 and
corresponding text above.
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our commentators, it is in the purpose for which the right is retained that we locate the
potential for contradiction in the social covenant that would include granting the
sovereign the right to punish. Alice Ristroph finesses the point well:
There is a sense in which Hobbes’s recognition of a right to resist
punishment is related to his claim that penal power is not grounded on the
consent of those who may face punishment. A desire for security or self
preservation provides the motivation to grant power to the sovereign in the
first place, and whatever else preservation of a person might require, it
cannot require that person’s destruction.37
We find that the purpose for retaining the right to defend oneself against violence is, in
some way, related to the desire to ensure one’s preservation against the sovereign’s
power. If this is the case, then it is contrary to this purpose to grant the sovereign the right
to harm oneself for transgressing the law. According to our commentators, the purpose
for the retention of the right to resist the sovereign’s infliction of violence, as part of that
fundamental right of self-preservation, vitiates the grant to the sovereign of the right to
punish.
While it may be true that the paradigmatic case of the resistance of violence is
against the sovereign’s infliction of violence, this fact does not entail that the right to
resist violence is retained to be primarily or principally held against the sovereign. As I
argue below, the paradigmatic case of resistance does not entail that there is a purpose for
the retention, in civil society, of the right to resist violence. Hobbes does not hold the
view that the right to defend oneself from violence enters society in order to be held
against the sovereign.
The retention of the right to resist the sovereign—and in particular the sovereign’s
infliction of punishment—is derived from the inalienability of the right to self-defense.
37
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Covenanting away the right to resist violence, according to Hobbes, cannot meet the
validating criterion of covenants, as no good can be understood to follow from such
alienation. As Hobbes states,
a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force
to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at
any good to himself. […] And therefore if a man by words, or other signs,
seem to despoil himself of the end for which those signs were intended, he
is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will, but that he
was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.38
Any person who purports to have covenanted away his right to defend himself against
violence—or the sovereign’s infliction of punishment in particular—cannot be morally or
legally held to such an undertaking, as the covenant would be void ab initio. In order for
a covenant to be valid, the particulars of the covenant must be understood to track some
good to the person who transfers or relinquishes a right. For Hobbes, a covenant that
purports to relinquish the right to defend oneself from violence is unintelligible, as there
is, according to Hobbes, no assignable interpretation that could make sense of such a
relinquishment.
For Hobbes, legitimate resistance to the sovereign’s infliction of punishment is a
corollary of the natural right to resist violence simpliciter. Put differently, the specific
right to resist the sovereign’s infliction of punishment is derived from the inalienable
right of self-defense. And we find the derivation in the following passage:
[S]eeing sovereignty by institution is by covenant of every one to every
one [...] it is manifest that every subject has liberty in all those things the
right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred. I have shown before, in
the fourteenth chapter, that covenants not to defend a man's own body are
void. Therefore, If the sovereign command a man (though justly
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condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that
assault him […] that man [has] the liberty to disobey.39
“Therefore,” as Hobbes infers, by virtue of the inalienability of right of self-defense,
subjects have the right to defend themselves from violence on every occasion in which
the need arises, including against the sovereign’s infliction of lawful violence, i.e.,
punishment. Subjects possess the right to resist the sovereign’s infliction of violence
because the right to resist violence is inalienable. Subjects are not understood to refuse to
alienate the right to resist violence so as to hold it against the sovereign; that is to say,
Hobbes does not hold the view that the right to resist enters society in order to be held
against the sovereign. Thus, Finkelstein’s answer to her question, “if everyone has
abandoned a right of offensive attack, against whom would civil agents require a right of
defensive response?”40 mistakenly picks out the sovereign. And contrary to Schrock’s
insistence, it cannot be the case that “the right to resist is the right [each subject] has,
first, to assure himself that the sovereign has no plans to punish or otherwise harm
him.”41
However, there is a way in which an antinomy would arise within the social
covenant if subjects secured the right to resist the sovereign’s infliction of punishment
through the social covenant. A contradiction would arise in the social covenant that
included granting the sovereign the right to punish, namely, when granting the sovereign
such a right subjects also intend to be a recipient of punishment. This would entail a
contradiction of purposes, namely, protection under the law (the purpose for the grant of
39
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the right to punish) and protection against the law (the purpose for retaining the right to
resist punishment); recall, the purpose for retaining the right to resist violence, according
to our commentators, is that the right is retained in civil society in order to be held against
the sovereign’s infliction of punishment. To be sure, a prospective subject who intends to
breach the social covenant would insist on the right to resist being taken to the gallows.
But, we must surely appreciate, subjects do not grant the sovereign the right to punish
with a concurrent expectation, for example, of being hanged for murder.42
A concern remains regarding one of the central statements in the second
paragraph of Chapter 28. Hobbes, recall, insists that “no man is supposed bound by
covenant not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended that he gave any
right to another to lay violent hands upon his person.”43 As we have seen, this claim
serves as the basis for the traditional view that an antinomy exists between granting the
right to punish and retaining the right to resist punishment. We must appreciate that what
follows from this claim that “no man is supposed bound by covenant not to resist
violence” is not simply that “it cannot be intended that he gave any right to another to lay
violent hands upon his person,” but, more precisely, that “it cannot be intended that he
gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person” without the corresponding
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I set aside analysis of the rationale for instituting the practice of punishment for my second
article, “Hobbes on the Rationale of Punishment.” However, a passage from Jean-Jacques
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presumption that he is not obliged to not resist.44 Hobbes is clear on this matter in a
number of places. The most evident case is made in Chapter 14, “Of the First and Second
Natural Laws, and of Contracts” and repeated in Chapter 21, “Of the Liberty of
Subjects”:
A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For
[...] no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death,
wounds, and imprisonment, the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying
down any right; and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no
covenant transferreth any right, nor is obliging. For though a man may
covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus,
unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you when you come to kill me.45
Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these
words, I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no
restriction at all of his own former natural liberty: for by allowing him to
kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one
thing to say, kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will
kill myself, or my fellow.46
It is clear that Hobbes does not think that retention of the right to resist violence entails
that an antinomy exists between the rights in question, or entails a subsequent
renunciation of subjects’ authorization of the sovereign to punish them for transgressing
the law. The two rights, for Hobbes, are not mutually incompatible. I can covenant with
others that the sovereign, “unless I do so or so, kill [harm, or imprison] me.” And, as we

This is confirmed in Hobbes’s claim immediately following the claim above: “In the making of
a Commonwealth every man giveth away the right of defending another, but not of defending
himself. Also he obligeth himself to assist him that hath the sovereignty in the punishing of
another, but of himself not” (Leviathan, 28/2, 161). The right to punish, conferred upon the
sovereign by each subject, is not grounded in each subject obliging himself to carry out his own
punishment; the condemned subject is not obliged, so to speak, to drink the hemlock nor is he
obliged not to resist consuming the hemlock.
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see, I can make this covenant even in light of the presumption of the retention of the right
to resist the sovereign if the sovereign comes to kill, harm, or imprison me.
To conclude this section, we can appreciate that Hobbes holds that prospective
subjects cannot both grant the sovereign the right to punish and renounce the right to
resist violence. As we can now also appreciate, this proposition has been interpreted by
the tradition as follows: prospective subjects cannot both grant the right to punish and
retain the right to resist violence. However, there is, for Hobbes, no antinomy within the
social covenant to institute a sovereign with the right to punish for the simple reason that
he does not hold the view that the right to resist violence (including the sovereign’s
infliction of violence) enters civil society through the social covenant. The right to resist
violence or to defend one’s person from violence is what Hobbes calls a “true liberty of a
subject,”47 but it is a true liberty of a subject because, Hobbes contends, it “cannot by
covenant be transferred.”48 Prospective subjects covenant thus: “unless I do so, or so, [the
sovereign has the right to] kill me.”49 Thus, each prospective subject grants the sovereign
the right to punish him if he transgresses the law. However, each prospective subject
retains the right to resist because, according to Hobbes, “he cannot covenant thus, unless
I do so, or so, I will not resist when [persons] come to kill me.”50
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The antinomy appears to those who mistakenly view the right to resist as secured
through the social covenant in order to be held against the sovereign; and, the
incompatibility between the two rights, as we have seen, lies in the purpose for granting
the right to punish and the purpose for retaining the right to resist, that is, protection of
the sovereign and protection from the sovereign. However, not only is the right to resist
not retained for a purpose, it is not retained through the social covenant. Without an
incompatible purpose set against prospective subjects’ grant of the right to punish, the
social covenant does not suffer from the inclusion of an antinomy. Subjects’ retention, in
civil society, of the right to resist violence of all kinds does not, to Hobbes’s mind, pose
an obstacle to prospective subjects granting the sovereign the right to punish. To attribute
to Hobbes a concern for resolving an antinomy is to misunderstand Hobbes’s concern in
the second paragraph of Chapter 28. As we will later see in section 1.5 below, Hobbes’s
concern is to account for how prospective subjects generate the political right to punish
when no person possesses a pre-political right to punish. Thus, what the tradition takes to
be the resolution of the antinomy—the identification of the sovereign representative’s
right to punish with the right of nature—is unwarranted.

1.4 The Right to Punish
The tradition is mistaken to regard Hobbes as identifying the sovereign representative’s
right to punish with the unsurrendered right of war of the natural person who holds the
office of sovereignty. Furthermore, by making such an identification, the tradition fails to
capture Hobbes’s understanding of punishment as an act of political authority or, what is
the same, the exercise of an artificial right by an artificial person. The second paragraph
of Chapter 28 is situated between articulations of the two central characteristics of
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Hobbes’s account of punishment: i) the act of punishment is performed by an artificial
person or a person granted authority to punish, and ii) acts of punishment are
distinguished from acts of hostility. It would, indeed, be uncharitable to attribute to
Hobbes such a blatant contradiction as one that claims, denies, then claims again that
punishment is a right that follows from subjects’ authorization of the sovereign to punish
them for transgressing the law.51 In section 1.5 below I show that there is no such denial
in the second paragraph. Before that, let us first take note of the contents of the
paragraphs preceding and following the second.
Immediately preceding the second paragraph, Hobbes articulates the first of the
two central characteristics of punishment in his definition:
A PUNISHMENT, is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath
done, or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a
transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the
better be disposed to obedience.52
It is important to note that the infliction of punishment is not merely characterized as a
person with power inflicting harm upon another. Punishment is an act characterized as
“inflicted by public authority.” Hobbes’s way of stating the matter is significant, as it
follows from his understanding of representation and attributable actions.
The qualification of punishment as an act “inflicted by authority” or something
“done by authority” draws on the distinction between actions that are authorized—i.e.,
those actions which are performed by a representative commissioned to so act—and those
actions that do not follow from authorization. As Hobbes claims in Chapter 16 of
51

Showing that Hobbes holds that prospective subjects authorize the sovereign to punish them for
transgressing the law is the focus of the remainder of this article. I attend to the rationale for
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Leviathan, “Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated,” the chapter in which he
presents his theory of authorization, an act “done by authority [is] done by commission or
license from him whose right it is.”53 Acts done by authority are distinguished from acts
of authority. The latter is simply an “original” right—i.e., a right not bestowed upon a
person by another—or what Hobbes also calls a “warrant,” to perform an action.54 Both
acts done by authority and acts of authority are performed by a representative, but only
acts done by authority are performed by an artificial representative. As we will see next,
the compass of representation gives content to Hobbes’s account of personhood.
Hobbes defines a “person” as follows:
A PERSON is he whose words or actions are considered, either as his own,
or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other
thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. When they
are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person: and when
they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then
is he a feigned or artificial person.55
When a person acts on his own behalf—represents himself only—then that person is a
“natural person.” As a natural person, he owns the words and/or the actions that he
performs, that is, he is ascribed responsibility for the act. When a person acts on the
behalf of another—represents another—then that person is an “artificial person.” As an
artificial person, he does not own the words and actions he performs, that is, he is not
ascribed responsibility for the act.
The person (or persons) who occupies the office of the sovereign does not own
the act of punishment. When a subject receives a punishment for which he is liable, that
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subject owns the punishment. As Hobbes notes, “he that attempteth,” for example, “to
depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his
own punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do.”56 And
to be an author of an action is to own that action. As Hobbes states, of “persons artificial,
some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the
[artificial] person is the actor, and he that owneth his words and actions is the AUTHOR,
in which case the actor acteth by authority.”57An action “done by authority,” as noted
above, is “done by commission or license.” Natural persons, who act in the absence of
authorization or commission, simply represent themselves; they are the authors of the
actions they perform. But, as Hobbes clearly implies (in the first quote of this paragraph),
the person who occupies the office of the sovereign is not the author of the punishment.
Hobbes claims that “every man or assembly that hath sovereignty representeth two
persons, or, as the more common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural and another
politic; as a monarch hath the person not only of the Commonwealth, but also of a
man.”58 With regard to punishment specifically, the person who “hath sovereignty” acts
in his capacity as the commissioned representative of the Commonwealth, and not in his
capacity as the representative of his own person, when inflicting punishment on a subject.
Hobbes articulates the second central characteristic of punishment—that acts of
punishment are distinguished from acts of hostility—immediately following the second
paragraph. Of the eleven inferences Hobbes draws from his definition of punishment as
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an “evil inflicted by public authority,” seven explicitly mark a distinction between
punishment and hostility.59 One particular inference, the eleventh, is most relevant for our
purposes here. The final inference that Hobbes draws provides us with the definitive
response to the traditional view. Hobbes, with the final inference, clearly rejects any
identification of the right to punish with the right of war:
Lastly, harm inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy falls not under the
name of punishment: because seeing they were either never subject to the
law, and therefore cannot transgress it; or having been subject to it, and
professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgress it,
all the harms that can be done them must be taken as acts of hostility. […]
For the punishments set down in the law are to subjects, not to enemies.60
Harm inflicted upon another in the absence a juridical relationship, whether that
relationship is severed or never existed, cannot be construed as punishment. Contrary to
the orthodox interpretation, Hobbes does not hold that punishment entails a return to the
state of nature. Only violent acts that are performed by a juridical authority can be
construed as punishment. As Hobbes maintains, “it is of the nature of punishment to be
inflicted by public authority, which is the authority only of the representative itself.”61
The sovereign does not hold authority over an enemy, which is the same as claiming that
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the sovereign neither directly nor indirectly represents an enemy. The sovereign does,
however, hold authority over a criminal.
Not only does the sovereign hold authority over the criminal, they remain in a
juridical relationship—they are tied by penal law. An enemy of the Commonwealth
certainly does not have legal standing to challenge what harms may befall him. As we see
in the following remarks, Hobbes holds that a criminal does have such standing:
If a subject have a controversy with his sovereign [...] concerning any
penalty, corporal or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent law, he hath the
same liberty to sue for his right as if it were against a subject, and before
such judges as are appointed by the sovereign. For seeing the sovereign
demandeth by force of a former law, and not by virtue of his power, he
declareth thereby that he requireth no more than shall appear to be due by
that law. The suit therefore is not contrary to the will of the sovereign, and
consequently the subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his
cause, and sentence according to that law.62
The orthodox interpretation of Hobbes’s account of the right to punish—whereby the
right to punish is identified as the right of war—would have us ignore his theory of penal
law. “Penal [laws],” according to Hobbes, “are those which declare what penalty shall be
inflicted on those that violate the law; and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for
execution.”63 Penal law declares what penalty shall be inflicted. The normative element
that governs punishment is the declared penal law. Punishment is not tied to the
capricious will of the sovereign; rather, the sovereign is held to “punishing with corporal
or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath
formerly made.”64 A criminal is only liable to receive penalties in accordance with penal
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law. An enemy, conversely, “may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the
representative will.”65
The exercise of the right of nature—the right of war—is not bound by public law.
But the institution of punishment, like all the other institutions of the Commonwealth, is
administered through law. The sovereign is authorized to govern through law and, in
particular, to punish through penal law. Subjects transcend the state of nature through the
institution of an artificial person, a person whose will is necessarily tied to law; as
Hobbes states, “the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole
body [of the Commonwealth…] equity and laws [are] an artificial reason and will.”66 The
“public authority” Hobbes refers to in his definition of punishment is the artificial person
specially instituted by prospective subjects with the mandate to uphold the authority of
law over the mutually renounced natural rights.
As I argue in the next section, it is clear that Hobbes, even in the second
paragraph, does not think that the exercise of the right to punish entails the absence of a
juridical relationship; the exercise of the right to punish does not transpire in the state of
nature. In the second paragraph of Chapter 28, Hobbes claims that the sovereign’s
original right of nature provides the foundation of the right to punish, yet he also states
that “this [right of nature] is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised
in every Commonwealth.”67 The right to punish, according to Hobbes, is exercised in the
Commonwealth; it is exercised within the context of a sustained juridical and political
authority over the criminal. What we need, then, is to understand the relationship between
65
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the foundation of the right to punish and the possession by the sovereign, as a
representative authority, of the right to punish. This will be the focus of the next section.

1.5 A Question of Much Importance
It remains to be shown that in the second paragraph of Chapter 28 Hobbes does not
rescind the view that subjects authorize the sovereign to punish them and the right to
punish is not identified as the natural right of war. In this section, I argue that the second
paragraph of Chapter 28 is consistent with the other remarks Hobbes makes regarding
punishment in Leviathan. As the lengthy second paragraph of Chapter 28 is the
centerpiece of this section, it will serve us well to have it before us:
Before I infer anything from this definition, there is a question to be
answered of much importance; which is, by what door the right or
authority of punishing, in any case, came in. For by that which has been
said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant not to resist violence;
and consequently it cannot be intended that he gave any right to another to
lay violent hands upon his person [without the corresponding presumption
that he is not obliged to not resist]. In the making of a Commonwealth
every man giveth away the right of defending another, but not of
defending himself. Also he obligeth himself to assist him that hath the
sovereignty in the punishing of another, but of himself not. But to
covenant to assist the sovereign in doing hurt to another, unless he that so
covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to give him a right to
punish. It is manifest therefore that the right which the Commonwealth
(that is, he or they that represent it) hath to punish is not grounded on any
concession or gift of the subjects. But I have also shown formerly that
before the institution of Commonwealth, every man had a right to
everything, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own
preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto.
And this is the foundation of that right of punishing which is exercised in
every Commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign that
right; but only, in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own as
he should think fit for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given,
but left to him, and to him only; and, excepting the limits set him by
natural law, as entire as in the condition of mere nature, and of war of
every one against his neighbor.68
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As we have seen, for Hobbes, there is no natural or pre-political right to punish.
But this presents us with somewhat of a puzzle: how do persons generate the right to
punish when they themselves do not possess such a right? Hobbes himself contemplates
this very question in the second paragraph of Chapter 28: “there is a question to be
answered of much importance; which is, by what door the right or authority of punishing,
in any case, came in.”69 As we have seen, the tradition understands Hobbes to deny that
punishment is a right that follows from subjects authorizing the sovereign to punish them
for transgressing the law. But, as we have also seen, this view is contrary to Hobbes’s
understanding of punishment throughout Leviathan (and not merely in Chapter 28) as an
act of authority, that is to say, as an act that, in some sense, follows from the process of
authorization.
The answer to Hobbes’s question set out above, simply put, is that the sovereign
representative’s acquisition of the right to punish follows from each subject authorizing
the person (or persons) who will hold the office of sovereignty to exercise his (or their)
own natural right to perpetrate violence. Each subject takes upon himself the sovereign
representative’s infliction of legitimate violence. One scholar recognizes Hobbes’s
harmonizing of the authorization by prospective subjects of the sovereign’s right to
punish and the sovereign’s non-relinquishment of his natural right to perpetrate violence.
Clifford Orwin, after remarking that Hobbes “rests it [the sovereign’s right to punish]
squarely upon his original unsurrendered right to all things,” claims that the “answer to
the question of the right or authority by which the sovereign punishes is that the right by
which he punishes is not authority but that he punishes by authority and by the authority
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of him whom he punishes. The subject has authorized his punishment.”70 The mutual
authorization of the sovereign’s right of nature—his natural right to violence—is the
basis of the artificial right to punish.
This, I think, captures how Hobbes intends us to understand the second paragraph
of Chapter 28. And this view is not ad hoc. We find that Hobbes articulates this view in
an earlier chapter. According to Hobbes, “the consent of a subject to sovereign power is
contained in these words, I authorise, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is
no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty.”71 There are no restrictions on the
sovereign’s exercise of his own former natural liberty—it is a former natural liberty or
right, as the right, insofar as the sovereign representative exercises it, is an artificial right.
There is no restriction “excepting,” as Hobbes reminds us in the second paragraph of
Chapter 28, “the limits set him by natural law,”72 and excepting the duties the prospective
sovereign acquires by virtue of representing the Commonwealth. The prospective
sovereign’s duty is closely tied to political representation: as Hobbes claims, political
representation follows when prospective subjects “appoint one man, or assembly of men,
to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of
whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted,” with the
assumption that such representation is limited to, that is, ownership is limited to, “those
things which concern the common peace and safety.”73 The right of nature is the
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foundation of the right to punish, but the right to punish is not identified as the right of
nature. The artificial right to punish is bound to “salus populi (the people’s safety),”74 and
not to the capricious will of the person who exercises the right of nature.
We must appreciate that the artificial right to punish is not exceptional. There is,
for Hobbes, neither a pre-political right to make law nor a pre-political right to the
judicature (to adjudicate legal controversies).75 There is no pre-political right to make
law, but there is a pre-political right to undertake to coerce another. There is no prepolitical right to the judicature, but there is a pre-political right to pass judgment on what
equity (or the other laws of nature, as the means to peace) requires. And there is no prepolitical right to punish, but there is a pre-political right to perpetrate (retributive)
violence. The natural right to coerce, pass judgment on equity, and perpetrate violence,
respectively, serve as the foundation of the artificial rights of the three principal branches
of government. The tradition’s focus, as we have seen, is placed on the (purported)
failure to authorize punishment. Of course, the focus was predicated upon the (mistaken)
supposition of an antinomy within the social covenant. However, we recognize a similar
puzzle in the right to make law and the right to adjudicate legal controversies when we
recognize that both of these rights belong only to the state as well. Like punishment, the
making of law and the making of judicial decisions are exclusively acts of political
representation. The issue of the foundation of the legislative and judiciary branch of
government is very much tied to the issue of the foundation of the executive branch. As
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Leviathan, Introduction/1, 1.

Nor, for that matter, is there a pre-political right to levy taxes, commit others to war, censor
opinions or doctrines, etc.—such rights all which belong to what Hobbes calls “the essence of
sovereignty” (Leviathan, 18/16, 92).
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we can appreciate, the solution to this particular problem of punishment is intimately tied
to Hobbes’s general account of political representation.
The authorization of the sovereign to punish transgressors is the “door by which
the right or authority of punishing came in.” The right to punish is exercised by the one
person (or assembly of persons) who is authorized to represent the Commonwealth (and,
as we have seen, the right is “exercised in the Commonwealth”). It is when certain
background conditions are met that we construe the sovereign’s infliction of violence as
the exercise of the right to punish. It would, thus, be mistaken to identify the foundation
of the right to punish—the sovereign’s right of nature—with the right to punish. Such
identification entails that all acts of violence that the person (or persons) who occupies
the office of sovereignty perpetrates on subjects are legitimate acts of punishment.
However, as I claimed in section 1.4 above, the juridical context in which the exercise of
the right to punish occurs requires the fulfillment of many conditions for the infliction of
harm or violence to be construed as punishment; and it is the failure to fulfill these
conditions that entails that the harm is to be construed as an act of hostility. To re-iterate,
an act of violence, to be construed as punishment proper, must meet the following
conditions: it must, first and foremost, be inflicted by public (political) authority; it must
be a retributive response to a transgression of known law (thus, there can be no
retroactive punishment or the punishment of the innocent76); it must be inflicted for the
purpose of disposing obedience to the law;77 it can only be inflicted after public

Hobbes’s concern with the punishment of the innocent warrants its own analysis, which I
provide in my third article, “Hobbes on the Punishment of the Innocent.”
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Hobbes’s concern with the purpose of punishment warrants its own analysis, which I provide in
my second article, “Hobbes on the Rationale of Punishment.”
77
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condemnation and trial; its infliction must be consistent with declared penal law; it can
only be inflicted upon rational persons; and it can only be inflicted upon subjects, not
enemies.78 When the person or persons who “hath sovereignty” fulfills this mandate in
punishment, then we understand him (or them) to act in the capacity as the sovereign
representative, and the act of violence is construed as an act of punishment.
The right of nature serves as the foundation of the right to punish because
prospective subjects do not make a gift of the right to punish. As Hobbes contends, “[i]t
is manifest therefore that the right which the Commonwealth (that is, he or they that
represent it) hath to punish is not grounded on any concession or gift of the subjects.”79
Prospective subjects do not possess a right to punish. As noted in section 1.2 above,
Hobbes’s view of punishment does not align with the views of Locke or Grotius.80 For
Hobbes, there is no pre-political right to punish. Hobbes reiterates this position in the
second paragraph of Chapter 28, this time in the context of the generating of an artificial
right. As Hobbes states,
Also he [each prospective subject] obligeth himself to assist him that hath
the sovereignty in the punishing of another, but of himself not. But to
covenant to assist the sovereign in doing hurt to another, unless he that so
covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to give him a right to
punish.81
No prospective subject has a right to do “it” himself; no prospective subject has a prepolitical right to punish. But the fact that the right is not based on a gift or concession

78

See infra note 61 above for the references to each of these requirements of punishment.

79

Leviathan, 28/2, 161.

80

See infra notes 20 and 21 above.

81

Leviathan, 28/2, 161.

49

does not entail that the right is not granted to the prospective sovereign. We have, thus,
come full circle. As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, in Chapter 18 of
Leviathan, “Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution,” Hobbes contends that mutual
authorization by prospective subjects is the means by which “all the rights and faculties
of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people
assembled.”82 The right to punish is included in the catalogue of rights conferred upon
the sovereign, a list which Hobbes provides in the same chapter. Hobbes maintains, “to
the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour; and of
punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject
according to the law he hath formerly made.”83 Authorization, as a process of
commissioning another as a representative, does not require the licence or warrant to
exercise the right; authorization does not require that one gift or transfer to another a right
that one possesses. A grant or commission of authority simply entails that the person of
authority—the representative—is not responsible for those actions that fall within the
commission of authority. As Hobbes makes it clear in the second paragraph—“the right
which the Commonwealth (that is, he or they that represent it) hath to punish”84—
representation (of the Commonwealth) is the central issue in understanding the right to
punish.
Before concluding this paper, we must attend to one final question: why, we may
ask, do subjects not each “gift” the sovereign their respective natural right to perpetrate
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violence? If the natural right to violence serves as the foundation of the political right to
punish, then why do prospective subjects not grant this right, which each of them
possesses in the state of nature, to the prospective sovereign? The answer Hobbes
provides, simply put, is that prospective subjects mutually renounce the natural right to
perpetrate violence. As Hobbes states in the second paragraph of Chapter 28, prospective
subjects, “in laying down theirs [their right to everything], strengthened him to use his
own as he should think fit.”85 The mutual relinquishment by prospective subjects of the
natural right to perpetrate violence is central to Hobbes’s account of transitioning from
the state of nature to a state of peace. As we see, this mutual relinquishment is required
by the second law of nature:
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to
endeavour peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when
others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall
think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things […] For as long as
every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all
men in the condition of war.86
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Leviathan, 28/2, 162. As mentioned in infra note 2 above, to transfer a particular natural right,
according to Hobbes, is to oblige oneself to not interfere with the exercise of the right by the
particular person or persons to whom you transferred. See Leviathan, 14/7, 65: “Right is laid
aside, either by simply renouncing it, or by transferring it to another. By simply RENOUNCING,
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non-defensive violence.
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The right to inflict retributive harm must belong exclusively to the state.87 The state
possesses a monopoly on legitimate retributive violence. To claim otherwise would be to
hold that persons retain, in civil society, something akin to what Hobbes calls the “right
of zeal.”88 This was a right, in Judaic Law, that provided the witness of a killing to stone
to death the killer. This right, exercised in civil society, Hobbes cautions, was not a
private right, or “was not by right of private zeal.”89 According the Hobbes, “the
lawfulness of [the] act [i.e., the stoning] depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification
by Moses.”90 The exercise of the right to kill a killer, although granted by God to his
people, is not an act of punishment until the sovereign determines that capital punishment
should be administered in this fashion. As Hobbes states, “neither private revenges, nor
injuries of private men can properly be styled punishment, because they proceed not from
public authority.”91 It is the prospective sovereign’s own right of nature, in this case, the
right to stone to death a killer, that serves as the foundation of the political or artificial
right to punish a murderer.
Like all rights of sovereignty, the right to punish must be both exclusive and
universal; that is to say, only the sovereign can possess such a right and each subject must
be liable for punishment. Hobbes claims that the right “is left to him and to him only,
and, excepting the limits set him by natural law, [is] as entire as in the condition of mere
Again, the right to punish belong to what Hobbes calls “the essence of sovereignty” (Leviathan,
18/16, 92).
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nature, and of war of every one against his neighbour.”92 The right to punish is “as entire
as in the condition of mere nature.” But, we must note, Hobbes here does not claim that
the right to punish is exercised in the state of nature, as many commentators have taken
him here to imply.93 Hobbes’s claim concerns the universality of scope of the natural
right to perpetrate violence: the possession of the right of nature, as a right to everything,
entails that no person possess an immunity against another’s exercise of the right; in
particular, everyone in the state of nature is liable to be a recipient of violence. It is that
universality of scope of the right to perpetrate violence that is carried over into the
Commonwealth. No subject possesses an immunity against the sovereign’s infliction of
legitimate violence.

1.6 Conclusion
Two seminal seventeenth-century philosophers, John Locke and Samuel Pufendorf,
sketched the contours of the interpretation of Hobbes’s punishment theory that together
have become orthodoxy. In a rather transparent allusion to Hobbes, Locke, almost forty
years after the publication of Leviathan, criticizes his account of the relationship between
sovereign and citizen. Locke writes:
Betwixt subject and subject, they [defenders of absolute monarchies] will
grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and
security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such
circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right
when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on
that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of
faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered
into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the
restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of
92
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nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to
think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs
may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it
safety, to be devoured by lions.94
Law mediates subjects’ relations. But the sovereign is above the law or juridical
accountability. The sovereign alone retains the natural right to all things, and this follows
from the agreement among prospective subjects to relinquish such a right. The
sovereign’s authority to do hurt is simply the product of the monopoly of power.
Accordingly, any hurt inflicted by the sovereign upon a subject, Locke notes, “is right
when he does it.” Locke’s interpretation captures the orthodox interpretation of Hobbes’s
view canvassed in this paper.
This interpretation, however, is at odds with much of what Hobbes has to say
about punishment and the penal law. As noted in section 1.4, those who sentence and
execute punishment, as representative of the sovereign’s authority, are bound by the
declared penalties that shall be inflicted. When addressing the issue of punishment
directly, Hobbes explicitly connects the norms of penal law with the infliction of
penalties: “if a punishment be determined and prescribed in the law itself, and after the
crime committed there be a greater punishment inflicted, the excess is not punishment,
but an act of hostility.”95 For Hobbes, inflicted physical harms, imposed pecuniary fines,
or sentenced prison terms in excess of what the law prescribes do not count as
punishment. The sovereign representative steps beyond the commission or authority to
punish on those occasions when the penal law is ignored or overridden. The criminal, as
we have seen, has the legal standing to challenge an imposed sentence that is greater than
94
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the law prescribes.96 Such recourse takes place within the courts. And although judges are
commissioned by the sovereign, this does not entail that they will be biased. Judges,
according to Hobbes, are required to adjudicate according to “a right understanding of
that principal law of nature called equity.”97 Any adjudicated repeal of an iniquitous
sentence is not contrary to the sovereign’s will. The amended sentence accords with the
sovereign’s declared law.
Samuel Pufendorf, thirty or so years after Hobbes wrote Leviathan, criticizes
Hobbes as trying to derive the right to punish from the sovereign’s right to all things;
Pufendorf writes:
[I]n his Leviathan, chap, xxviii, [Hobbes] lays down that the right held by
a state to punish does not arise from the concession of citizens, but that the
foundation of this right is based upon that other, which, before the
establishment of a state, belongs to every man, namely, to do whatever
seemed to him necessary for self-preservation. And that therefore this right
was not given but left to the state, which [...] it may use at its own
pleasure, supposing it has the strength, in order to preserve all its citizens.
To this reply can be made that the right to exact punishment differs from
that of self-preservation, and that since the former is exercised over
subjects, it is impossible to conceive how it already existed in a state of
nature, where no one man is subject to another.98
Pufendorf, and most Hobbes commentators subsequent to him, interpret Hobbes as
identifying the right to punish as the right of nature. However, instead of attributing to
Hobbes the somewhat perplexing view that the infliction of punishment occurs in the
absence of a juridical relationship, as most Hobbes commentators have done, Pufendorf
does not give any credence to this view. Punishment, as Pufendorf hints at in the passage,
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occurs within the bounds of a legal and political order. We cannot, according to
Pufendorf, generate the artificial right to punish by identifying such a right with the right
of nature. Pufendorf is correct: this identification does not, by itself, generate a right to
punish. But, as we have seen, this reading misrepresents Hobbes’s account. Hobbes, like
Pufendorf after him, does not contend that persons posses a pre-political right to punish.99
The generation of the rights of sovereignty, including the right to punish, like the
generation of the Commonwealth itself, “resemble[s] that fiat, or the let us make man,
pronounced by God in the Creation.”100 The Commonwealth, and all the rights of its
representative, is the product of an artifice or political craftsmanship, built upon a social
convention understood to be made outside of (or prior to) civil society. As Hobbes states:
For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or
STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of
greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and
defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul,
as giving life and motion to the whole body; […] reward and punishment
(by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member
is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body
natural.101
Unlike God, however, persons’ generative powers are limited to their natural capacities
and rights, and these serve as the grounds for the edifice of the Commonwealth. The
natural right to inflict violence serves as the foundation of the juridical right to punish in
the same way that the natural right to coerce serves as the foundation of the juridical
right to make law. As I argued in this paper, it is the juridical context in which the person
See Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, viii, 3, §2: “”For those who live in natural
liberty there is no place for punishment,” and “the enforcement of one’s subjective claims is only
by means of war; but evils inflicted by means of war are not […] punishments in the proper sense
of the word.”
99
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who holds the office of the sovereign and who possesses the full right of nature—the
right to everything—inflicts violence that such violence is to be construed as punishment.
Authorization provides the norms for this juridical context; that is to say, the right to
punish is a political right by virtue of prospective subjects authorizing the prospective
sovereign to represent the Commonwealth when inflicting violence upon one of its
members.
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Article 2

2

Hobbes on the Rationale of Punishment

2.1 Introduction
The threat of punishment plays a central and indispensable role in Thomas Hobbes’s
political theory. Hobbes defines punishment as follows:
A PUNISHMENT is an evil inflicted by public authority on him that hath
done or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a
transgression of the law, to the end that the will of men may thereby the
better be disposed to obedience.1
Punishment involves the deliberate infliction of suffering, by the state, upon its citizens.
Like most theorists who provide a justification for the practice of deliberately inflicting
harm or threatening to inflict harm on a citizen, Hobbes thinks that the practice is
necessary. Punishment, according to Hobbes, “dispos[es] the delinquent or, by his
example, other men to obey the laws.”2 Such remarks seem representative of a
straightforward deterrence theory of punishment. And, in fact, Hobbes is often cast as a
pure or simple deterrent theorist, which bears out in two related views commonly
attributed to him.

1

Leviathan, 28/1, 161. References to Leviathan are by chapter and paragraph(s) in the G.C.A.
Gaskin (1996) edition, followed by page number(s) in the original (1651) edition. Other Hobbes
works will be cited as follows: References to De Cive are by chapter and paragraph(s) followed
by the page number(s) of the Howard Warrender English edition. References to A Dialogue
between a Philosopher & a Student of the Common Laws of England are by page number of the
Joseph Cropsey edition, followed by page number of original (1681) edition. All emphases are in
the original works unless otherwise noted.
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The first view is that, for Hobbes, the rationale of punishment is to deter
transgressions of the law. As Gregory S. Kavka notes, “[t]he general justification,” for
Hobbes, “for applying punishments for law violations is a purely forwardlooking one: to
prevent crime, primarily by deterrence.”3 We find this kind of rationale in the works of
the classical utilitarians to whom Hobbes is often cast as a precursor. As Mario A.
Cattaneo notes, the “outline of the purposes of punishment [prevention and correction]
leads me to conclude that Hobbes’s conception contains in essence the basic principles of
a utilitarian theory of punishment, principles that were later developed and elaborated by
Beccaria and Bentham.”4
The second view is that, for Hobbes, each citizen requires the threat of
punishment to motivate social justice—social justice understood as keeping to the social
covenant that places the authority of the law over renounced natural rights. In other
words, the standard view is that, for Hobbes, the threat of punishment is a necessary
coercive step in motivating each citizen to conform to the law. As Richard Nunan states,
“[m]utually beneficial covenants find their initial justification in the fact that it is
prudentially rational for individuals to agree to them [...] and their continuing justification
in the fact that it is prudentially rational for individuals to adhere to them (because
3

Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 250. See also, e.g., Dieter Hüning,
“Hobbes on the Right to Punish,” 227-228; John Laird, Hobbes, 222; D.D. Raphael, “Hobbes on
Justice,” 169; Alice Ristroph, “Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory,” 603; Johann P.
Sommerville, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context, 101; Howard Warrender,
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation, 184-185; and J.W.N. Watkins,
Hobbes’s System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories, 96-98.
Mario A. Cattaneo, “Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment,” 289. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, The
Rationale of Punishment, Book 1, Chapter 3: “General prevention is effected by the denunciation
of punishment, and by its application, which, according to the common expression, serves for an
example. The punishment suffered by the offender presents to every one an example of what he
himself will have to suffer if he is guilty of the same offense. General prevention ought to be the
chief end of punishment, as it is its real justification.”
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violations are subject to the sovereign’s wrath).”5 In other words, on the traditional view,
it is mutually beneficial for prospective subjects to renounce the right of nature, but it is
individually beneficial to not exercise the renounced right because doing otherwise would
prompt the sovereign to respond with the exercise of his unsurrendered natural right to
violence.
Susanne Sreedhar, a proponent of the traditional view of the source of the
sovereign’s right to punish, notes that “[Hobbes] gives a separate explanation for the
sovereign’s right to punish; it is part of his right of nature and thus independent of the
rights transferred to him in the social contract.”6 Because the right to punish is
“independent of the rights transferred to him in the social contract,” an answer to the
question of the justification of punishment is, on the traditional view, independent of any
appeal to the rationale for the sovereign’s possession of the right to punish. According to
Hobbes, the seventh law of nature requires “that in revenges (that is, retribution of evil
for evil), men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to
follow.”7 The “good to follow” that justifies punishment, on the traditional view, tracks
the rationale for exercising the natural right to retributive violence, namely, to ensure
one’s own future security through deterrence. Accordingly, on the traditional view of
Richard Nunan, “Hobbes on Morality, Rationality, and Foolishness,” 44-45. What we can call
the standard view—that the threat of punishment is necessary to coerce citizens to conform to the
law—is represented in the works of five prominent Hobbes scholars. See David Gauthier, The
Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, 86; Jean Hampton,
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, 133; Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory,
250; Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development, 94; and Warrender,
The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, 143-144. See also Dieter Hüning, “Hobbes on the Right to
Punish,” 229-232; Alan Norrie, “Thomas Hobbes and the Philosophy of Punishment,” 315; and
David van Mill, Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes’s Leviathan, 136.
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Hobbes’s theory of punishment, the rationale for inflicting (or threatening to inflict)
punishment is simply to deter subjects from acting contrary to the will (command) of the
person who does not renounce any natural rights.
In this paper, I argue against the view that Hobbes is a straightforward deterrent
theorist. We risk misunderstanding his theory of punishment if we hold Hobbes to the
view that each citizen requires the threat of punishment as a coercive measure to ensure
conformity to the law. The view that Hobbes is a straightforward deterrent theorist does
not correspond with what Hobbes takes to be the rationale of punishment. That Hobbes
holds the view that prospective subjects grant the sovereign representative the right to
punish prompts us to attend to a question that is naturally overlooked by the tradition: to
what end, according to Hobbes, do prospective subjects establish the institution of
punishment? We ought to avail ourselves of Hobbes’s account of the rationale for
punishment within (and not independent of) the context of the social covenant that
institutes all the rights of a sovereign representative. For Hobbes, persons are obliged in
their conscience—obliged in foro interno—to the laws of nature. But, without assurance
that others will conform to the laws of nature persons are not obliged in foro externo; that
is to say, persons are not obliged in their actions without security.8 In this paper, I argue
that, for Hobbes, the rationale for instituting the practice of punishment is to converge the
two modes of obligation. I argue that, for Hobbes, the rationale for threatening to inflict

See Leviathan, 15/36, 79: “The laws of nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to
a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not always.
For he that should be modest and tractable, and perform all he promises in such time and place
where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own
certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature which tend to nature's preservation. And
again, he that having sufficient security that others shall observe the same laws towards him,
observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war, and consequently the destruction of his
nature by violence.”
8
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punishment is to maintain the convergence of the two modes of obligation in civil
society; put differently, the purpose for threatening punishment for crime, for Hobbes, is
to maintain “the nature of a crime,”9 and not, as generally presumed, to deter crime. As I
argue in this paper, that which takes away the obligation of the law is the lack of
punishment annexed to the law, but not because punishment is a necessary coercive
measure. The force of the law for most citizens, according to Hobbes, is internal and
dispositional. But the conditions for which persons can rationally hold the disposition to
conform to the law are met by the existence of an external and coercive threat of
punishment; the threat is necessary in order that each citizens who has a disposition to
conform for the sake of the law does not believe that such conformity will “make himself
a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin.”10
Hobbes claims that just persons—i.e., those who hold themselves to both modes
of obligation with regard to the third law of nature that dictates persons to perform their
covenants—are “rare.” The claim has given rise to the supposition that, for Hobbes, most
persons are unjust, that is, that most persons require the threat of punishment to coerce
the performance of covenants. In section 2.2, I dispel the basis for this supposition. I
argue that Hobbes’s claim of the rarity of just persons occurs within the context of his
examination of the laws of nature—laws, as we have noted, that do not oblige in foro
externo without security. The rare just person, for Hobbes, is he who performs his
covenants despite the lack of security. I argue that most persons recognize the value in

Leviathan, 27/22, 156. The full proposition reads: “That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes
away from it the nature of a crime, can be none but that which, at the same time, taketh away the
obligation of the law.”
9

10

Leviathan, 15/36, 79.
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the convergence of both modes of obligation but, without trust, most persons will not risk
procuring their ruin by holding themselves to their covenants. Most persons, I argue, are
“proto just citizens.” To hold otherwise—to hold that most persons are essentially
unjust—would leave us without a way to make sense of the rationale for collectively
instituting the sovereign via the social covenant.
The right to punish is granted to the sovereign by each prospective subject. In
section 2.3, I argue that the rationale for granting the sovereign the authority to punish is
to establish trust among the multitude. Each person covenants with each other person to
make himself accountable to the law—i.e., accountable to the law via liability for
punishment for transgressing the law—in order to elicit the trust of his fellow
covenanters. The state of nature is a state of ubiquitous diffidence—mutual distrust—but
not because most others are unjust or wicked persons; rather, the wicked, as Hobbes
claims, are fewer than the righteous but, because the unrighteous are not easily identified,
suspicion of everyone is the norm. By each person making himself liable for punishment,
trust between persons is established, thus enabling the initial convergence of both modes
of obligation to the laws of nature.
In civil society, the threat of punishment is directed to each subject. In section 2.4,
I argue that, for most subjects, the threat does not, as a coercive measure, constitute the
obligation to the law. The threat of punishment has two distinct and mutually exclusive
functions. The first function is to coerce conformity to the law. The second function is to
maintain the in foro externo obligatory status of the law. Many, if not most, subjects view
the promulgation of punishments as the necessary step in maintaining the in foro externo
obligation to the law; the promulgation of punishment gives each subject a reason to
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believe that all other subjects are motivated to conform to the law, thus, continually
reaffirms each subject’s belief that conformity to the law will not procure his ruin.
Because no subject knows with certainty that any other subject is just or unjust, the threat
of punishment is necessary even if there are, in actuality, no unjust subjects.
In section 2.5, the final section of this paper, I argue that Hobbes’s reply to the
foole—who claims that justice is nothing but a vain word—substantiates my claim that
many, if not most, subjects are just, that is, that the majority of subjects do not require the
threat of punishment to coerce the keeping of the social covenant, i.e., social justice. I
argue that Hobbes’s reply to the foole is not to be understood as an attempt to convince
the foole to conform to justice for its own sake; rather, Hobbes’s reply is best understood
as an attempt to silence the foole by threatening him, not with punishment, but with
expulsion or banishment from civil society. Hobbes’s reply to the foole is to silence those
who promote injustice so as to ensure that subjects continue to believe that other subjects
are motivated to conform to the law.

2.2 The Wicked and the Righteous
Justice, the third law of nature, or the third of what Hobbes calls “dictates of reason,”11
prescribes that “men perform their covenants made.”12 The “definition of INJUSTICE,”
according to Hobbes, “is no other than the not performance of covenant.”13 Furthermore,
Hobbes notes, “[t]he names of just and unjust when they are attributed to men, signify

11

Leviathan, 15/41, 80.
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Leviathan, 15/1, 71.

13

Leviathan, 15/2, 71.
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one thing, and when they are attributed to actions, another.”14 The defining characteristics
of the just and unjust person, respectively, according to Hobbes “signify conformity, or
inconformity of manners, to reason.”15 We can draw out the distinction between unjust
and just persons—the wicked and the righteous—by appealing to several passages in
Leviathan and De Cive.
[T]he injustice of manners is the disposition or aptitude to do injury, and is
injustice before it proceed to act, and without supposing any individual
person injured.16
[A]lthough a man should order all his actions (so much as belongs to
externall obedience) just as the Law commands, but not for the Lawes
sake, but by reason of some punishment annext unto it, or out of Vain
glory, yet he is unjust.17
[T]hat man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the Law
commands it, unjust things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is
properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness for fear of the
punishment annext unto the Law, and unrighteousnesse by reason of the
iniquity of his mind.18
[A] righteous man does not lose that title by one or a few unjust actions
that proceed from sudden passion, or mistake of things or persons, nor
does an unrighteous man lose his character for such actions as he does, or
forbears to do, for fear [of punishment]: because his will is not framed by
the justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do.19
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Leviathan, 15/10, 74.
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Leviathan, 15/10, 74.
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Leviathan, 15/12, 74. ‘Injury,’ we should note, is not harm but, rather, a synonym for injustice.
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De Cive, 4/21, 83.
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De Cive, 3/5, 64.
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Leviathan, 15/10, 74.
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We find that the unjust person has the disposition to break his covenant. The unjust
person does not conform his “manner of life”20 to reason; and, as we have seen, reason
dictates that a person perform his covenants made. The just person conforms his manner
of life to reason; that is, the just person is disposed to perform his covenants made.
Hobbes speaks of justice as the keeping of covenants in general. But there is one
covenant in particular that is central to our consideration of conformity to the law. The
fundamental covenant in Hobbes’s political theory is the social covenant. This is the
covenant made by each person to each other that the civil law21 will hold authority over
their renounced natural rights. The erection of a common authority is, Hobbes notes,
made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if
every man should say to every man: I authorize and give up my right of
governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this
condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorize all his actions
in like manner.22
What we can call “social justice”—i.e., the performance of the social covenant—entails
the continued recognition of the sovereign’s laws as holding authority over renounced
natural rights. Conversely, “social injustice”—i.e., the not performance of the social
covenant—entails the denial of the sovereign’s laws as holding authority over renounced
natural rights.23 Unlike the unjust, the just person orders all his action to conform to the
20

Leviathan, 15/10, 74.

The importance of Hobbes’s understanding of civil law with regard to the issue of the reason
for conformity to the law will bear out later in this paper. For now, we can recognize that the civil
law is sovereign’s judgment of what the laws of nature require.
21
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Leviathan, 17/13, 87.

See Tom Sorell, “Hobbes and the Morality Beyond Justice,” 229: “Those who question the
government’s right to regulate their actions by the civil law go back on an agreement that
precisely transfers the right of regulating the actions of agents from the agents to a common or
sovereign power.” The point I will emphasize is that committing social injustice, for Hobbes, is
akin to committing treason or sedition.
23
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law for the law’s sake. That a just person conforms his manner of life to the law for the
law’s sake should not be read in a Kantian light: the law is not understood to be good initself. The law, for Hobbes, has an immutable purpose and to conform to the law for the
law’s sake is to conform for this purpose. According to Hobbes,
The laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude,
arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest can never be
made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace
destroy it.24
Conformity to the law for the law’s sake, for Hobbes, is conformity to the law for the
sake of peace—peace as the surest means to preserve life. Insofar as he does so, the
unjust person acts in conformity with the law not for the law’s sake but, rather, to avoid
punishment for non-conformity. The threat of punishment is, for the unjust person, a
coercive measure that secures conformity to a particular law on a particular occasion.
Lastly, a just person, on the one hand, does not thereby become unjust subsequent
to occasional transgressions of the law or the occasional commitment of unjust acts
(crime) that “proceed from sudden passion, or mistake of things or persons.”25 The
commitment of an unjust act (crime) does not entail the perpetration of social injustice
(treason or sedition, i.e., the denial of the authority of the sovereign). According to
Hobbes, the “source of every crime is some defect of the understanding or some error in
reasoning or some sudden force of the passions.”26 There does not seem to be, for
Hobbes, the seamless conceptual unity between unjust acts (violations of the civil law)
and the violation of social justice (the covenant that establishes the authority of the law
24

Leviathan, 15/28, 79.
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Leviathan, 15/10, 74.
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Leviathan, 27/4, 152; emphasis added.
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over renounced natural rights) that is often attributed to his socio-political theory.27 A
civil transgression that proceeds from a defect of the understanding or some error in
reasoning or some sudden force of the passions does not entail—or, at the very least, does
not necessarily entail—a denial of the authority of the law.28 Crime due to the defect of
the understanding, according to Hobbes, is merely ignorance of the law or ignorance of
the sovereign’s judgment.29 Crime due to sudden forces of the passions is, arguably, the
most common cause of transgressions of the law; as Hobbes notes, “they [passions] are

See Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 148:“the person punished, in violating the civil law, has
violated an obligation undertaken in the institution of the sovereign, and so has already placed
himself, in effect, in the state of nature.” See also Claire Finkelstein, “A Puzzle About Hobbes on
Self-Defense,” 357: “Private citizens who act offensively are violating the terms of their
Covenant. […T]hey have placed themselves in a posture of war towards the rest of civil society.”
Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, 141: “we can remark that the
covenant between sovereign and [recalcitrant] subject has been broken. Both are back in the state
of nature, that is, in that condition in which everyone has as much right as he has power.” And
Alice Ristroph, “Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory,” 615: “[o]nce a subject has
disobeyed the sovereign, he and the sovereign are in the state of nature vis-à-vis each other.
[…T]he criminal has put himself and the sovereign into a conflict with no mutually recognized
third-party adjudicator.”
27
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The second source of crime, for Hobbes, does appear to seamlessly tie together unjust acts and
injustice. Hobbes notes that “[f]rom defect in reasoning (that is to say, from error), men are prone
to violate the laws three ways” (Leviathan, 27/10, 153). It is the first with which we are here
interested. “First,” according to Hobbes, “by presumption of false principles, as when men (from
having observed how, in all places and in all ages, unjust actions have been authorized by the
force and victories of those who have committed them, and that potent men, breaking through the
cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their enterprises, have
been esteemed the only criminals) have thereupon taken for principles, and grounds of their
reasoning, That justice is but a vain word; that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry, and
hazard, is his own; that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust; that examples of former times
are good arguments of doing the like again, and many more of that kind; which being granted, no
act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so (not by the law, but) by the success of them that
commit it” (Leviathan, 27/10, 153). Hobbes is here implying that this particular source of
transgression follows from the presumption that the determination of what constitutes legal
transgressions is not grounded in justice (i.e., the social covenant that holds the authority of the
sovereign’s law over renounced natural rights) but, rather, the determination of those who gain
the kingdom by successful rebellion. This, as we shall see in section 2.5 below, is the foole’s
position, and, accordingly, warrants its own analysis.
29

See Leviathan, 27/4, 152.
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infirmities so annexed to the nature [...] of man.”30 With regard to fear in particular,
Hobbes reflects that “in many cases a crime may be committed through fear.”31
Furthermore, according to Hobbes, only an “extraordinary use of reason”32 can hinder the
manifestation of a sudden passion. Accordingly, one cannot be accused of willfully acting
against reason—against reason’s dictate to recognize the authority of the law—when
one’s reason is overcome by passion.
An unjust person, on the other hand, does not view the law as holding authority
over his renounced natural rights. Conformity to the law does not thereby make an unjust
person just; as Hobbes notes, such a person is not just but, rather, “guiltless.”33 But the
commitment of an unjust act by an unjust person does not entail the commitment of
social injustice. One commits social injustice by denying the authority of the sovereign’s
laws.34 Only the denial of the sovereign’s authority shines a light on the unjust person.35
As we will later see, the infamous foole is the definitive case of the unjust person for
declaring the reasonableness of injustice.
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Leviathan, 27/18, 155.
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Leviathan, 27/19, 155.
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Leviathan, 27/18, 155.
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Leviathan, 15/11, 74.
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We have to be careful not to assume that only voiced denials of sovereign authority are
injustices. Some acts, for Hobbes, count as social injustice or treason, for example, an attempt on
the king’s life. For a fuller list of such treasonous acts, see A Dialogue between a Philosopher &
a Student of the Common Laws of England, 101-110/87-103.
35

The difficulty of ostensibly distinguishing just from unjust persons is, for Hobbes, significant.
As we will see in the next section, it is this difficulty that plays a significant role in the rationale
for instituting punishment.
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With a clearer distinction in hand between just and unjust persons, we can move
on to a central claim I want to defend in this paper. Hobbes, I contend, holds just or
righteous persons to comprise the majority of citizens of a politically stable
Commonwealth. Most citizens, for Hobbes, view the law as reason-giving; that is to say,
that the sovereign legally prescribes (or proscribes) an action provides most citizens with
a sufficient reason for acting (or not acting). The above view stands opposed to the
standard view that the sufficient reason for conforming to the law lies in the avoidance of
punishment for non-conformity. The view I attribute to Hobbes, that most citizens are
just persons, seems countered by Hobbes’s own claim that the just person is “rarely
found.”36 This claim, undoubtedly, has led to or reinforced the (mistaken) supposition
that, for Hobbes, most citizens are unjust, i.e., that most citizens require the threat of
punishment to coerce conformity to the law. However, the context of Hobbes’s claim of
the rarity of just persons, which I examine below, attends to the just person in the state of
nature. Given this context, I argue that we cannot hold Hobbes to imply that the just
person is the exception in civil society.
Martin Harvey, who attends to Hobbes’s considerations of motivating justice,
argues that the ‘just man’ is not a textual aberration, but (what Harvey calls) a “live
option” for Hobbes.37 Hobbes, Harvey argues, allows for the possibility that a person may

Leviathan, 15/10, 74. Commentators who earnestly attend to Hobbes’s just person (just man),
with one exception, emphasize the rarity of such a person. See, e.g., Martin Harvey, “A Defense
of Hobbes’s ‘Just Man,’” 68; F.C Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes, 113; K.R
Minogue, “Hobbes and the Just Man,” 82; Keith Thomas, “Social Origins of Hobbes’s Political
Thought,” 202-203. Cf. A.E. Taylor, “The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes,” Philosophy 13 (1938):
408.
36
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Harvey, “A Defense of Hobbes’s ‘Just Man,’” 68.
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be motivated by justice. However, Harvey claims that such a person is, as he thinks
Hobbes intimates, a rare exception:
A host of sovereign carrots, and much more likely sticks, are necessary to
insure that we physically do as we morally ought. For most of us, “blinded
by self love,” a motivational gap will obtain between what we do and what
we ought to do. Hobbes’s Just Man is a notable, albeit rare, exception.38
Hobbes’s claim that the just person is “rarely found,” however, requires context: the
claim is situated within his treatment of the laws of nature—laws that oblige in foro
interno (one’s conscience), but do not, without security, oblige in foro externo (one’s
actions). Of the just man (the just person), Hobbes claims: “he that should be modest and
tractable, and perform all he promises [covenants] in such time and place where no man
else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others.”39 A person who makes
himself prey to others, Hobbes notes, “procure[s] his own certain ruin, contrary to the
ground of all laws of nature which tend to nature's preservation.”40 Hobbes is here
implying that in the state of affairs outside of civil society it is possible for a just person to
exist, but that such a person would probably not exist for very long. In such a state, only
in breaking one’s promise does a person stand a chance to profit at the expense of
another.41
Hobbes claims that the just person is a rare exception a few paragraphs preceding
the above quotes: according to Hobbes, “[t]hat which gives to human actions the relish of
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Harvey, “A Defense of Hobbes’s ‘Just Man,’” 83.
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Leviathan, 15/36, 79; emphasis added.
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Leviathan, 15/36, 79.
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Not discounting, of course, the option to profit by physical violence, as distinguished from
profit by deception or fraud.
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justice is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man
scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life to fraud, or breach of promise.”42
We can only make sense of this quote, however, if the context is taken to be the same as
the quotes immediately preceding this one, namely, the keeping of promises despite the
absence of security. The kind of just person rarely found is the person who finds the third
law of nature—“that men perform their covenants made”43—to oblige both in foro
interno and in foro externo regardless of the lack of security because, we must recognize,
with the presence or establishment of security there is no need for the contentment of life
to be beholden to gain by fraud or breach of promises. The security the sovereign
provides abolishes such a need to profit by fraud or breach of promises.44 And, almost as
important, the overly moralistic tone implied by the scorn of such behaviour is also toned
down. With the convergence of morality45 and civil law46 that follows from the covenant
to institute a sovereign, the projection of intrinsic value to promise-keeping, which
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Leviathan, 15/10, 74; emphasis added.
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Leviathan, 15/1, 71.
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Of course, the possibility to profit by deception or fraud remains, but the need does not.

That is, the laws of nature, as the “true and only moral philosophy” as “conclusions or
theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves” (Leviathan,
15/41, 79).
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See Leviathan, 26/8, 138: “The law of nature and the civil law contain each other and are of
equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral
virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature (as I have said before in the end of the
fifteenth Chapter), are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to
obedience. When a Commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before; as
being then the commands of the Commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws.”
46
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Harvey attributes to the just person, is no longer the defining characteristic of a just
person.47
As noted, the just person, for Hobbes, is characterized by the determination to
conform one’s manner of life to reason. Conformity to reason in civil society is
conformity to the sovereign’s reason, that is, the sovereign’s determination of what the
laws of nature require or, what is the same, what peace requires. The majority of
prospective subjects, considered in the state of nature, are what we can call “proto just
citizens.” Most prospective subjects recognize the value of the convergence of both
modes of obligation—i.e., in foro interno and in foro externo obligation. The
convergence of both modes of obligation institutes the conditions upon which trust is
based and, as a corollary, the conditions upon which peace is based. It is important for us
to appreciate that if most prospective subjects did not recognize the value of such a
convergence, the fundamental law of nature—“that every man ought to endeavour
peace”48—would not motivate the instituting of a sovereign. As I attempt to show in the
remainder of this paper, once the sovereign is instituted, the just person, for Hobbes, is
not the rare exception but, rather, makes up the majority of citizens. As Hobbes claims,
“[f]or in that they [the laws of nature] require nothing but endeavour, he that
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If it ever was, as pride seems to have been the underlying characteristic of the just person in the
state of nature. See Leviathan, 14/31, 70: “The force of words [in the absence of the force of the
sovereign] being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their
covenants [in the state of nature], there are in man's nature but two imaginable helps to strengthen
it. And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word [e.g., expulsion from
confederations], or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity
too rarely found.”
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endeavoureth their performance fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the law is just.”49 A
politically stable Commonwealth, for Hobbes, entails the majority of its citizens
endeavour justice.
The motivation gap to which Harvey refers—i.e., the gap between what we want
to do and what we ought to do—assumes a view of the citizen commonly attributed to
Hobbes, namely, that most, if not all, citizens require the threat of punishment (or
“sticks,” as opposed to “carrots,” as Harvey puts it) to bridge such a gap. This is the
standard interpretation, but this interpretation does not correspond with Hobbes’s
thinking.50 Attending to Hobbes’s consideration of prospective subjects’ rationale for
introducing the practice of punishment into civil society—i.e., the end for which
prospective subjects establish the institution of punishment—reveals the standard
interpretation of Hobbes’s view of juridical coercion to be mistaken.

2.3 The Rationale for Instituting the Practice of Punishment
In Hobbes’s depiction of the state of nature or state of affair outside of civil society,
persons are not held to account for any transgressions of the laws of nature; no person can
wrong another. As Hobbes states, “for there being no other law remaining [outside of
civil society] but that of nature, there is no place for accusation; every man being his own
judge, and accused only by his own conscience.”51 The obligation to others is absent in
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Leviathan, 15/39, 79; emphasis added.

Brian Barry, “Warrender and his Critics,” 127, is, as far as I am aware, the rare scholar who
challenges the standard interpretation: “it is not that the sovereign obliges you to obey him by
threatening sanctions if you don't, but rather that the sovereign removes the usual excuses which
prevent promises from being obligatory.”
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the state of nature. To be sure, a person can transgress the laws of nature, but the
violation is of his own conscience. What is absent is the voluntary undertaking of
accountability. Without such an undertaking, the obligation to others does not exist; as
Hobbes states, “there being no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of
his own.”52 This accountability is introduced via the social covenant. Each person
covenants with each other that those invasive liberties or rights held in the state of nature
will be renounced. The second law of nature requires—reason dictates—the
renouncement of invasive rights:
[T]hat a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace
and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to
all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he
would allow other men against himself.53
And, Hobbes adds, because “covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no
strength to secure a man at all,”54 it is necessary to introduce a mutual power to hold
persons to their mutual covenant to renounce invasive rights. Each individual makes
himself accountable to the law insofar as each individual is party to the covenant to
institute a sovereign—i.e., the instituting of law that includes punishment for
transgressions.
The above explication requires a bit more precision. Each person is always
already accountable to the laws of nature in the limited sense that each person is obliged
in foro interno—i.e., obliged in the internal forum or in one’s conscience. Accordingly,
each person covenants to hold himself publically accountable to the laws of nature, laws
52
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that become—or serve as the principles underlying—civil law.55 This mutual instituting
of accountability occurs by means of instituting a sovereign with the authority to punish
outward acts or breaches of the in foro externo obligation to the law. The covenant each
person makes to each other “to lay down this right to all things” and recognize the
authority of the law over such renounced rights requires more than the institution of a
juridical authority or an arbiter of “right reason.”56 Each person must also grant the
sovereign the authority to punish; as Hobbes notes,
If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but
trust one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of
war of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion, it is
void: but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and
force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that
performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after.57
The aggregation of the grants of the right to punish is a collective endeavour to overcome
reasonable suspicion, which, as we will see below, is due to the ubiquity of diffidence in
the state of nature.58 The voluntary introduction of the authority to punish is the collective
attempt to establish for each person an in foro externo obligation to the laws of nature—
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See infra note 46 above.

See Leviathan, 5/3, 18-19: “when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their
own accord set up for right reason the reason of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they
will both stand, or their controversy must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a
right reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: and when men
that think themselves wiser than all others clamour and demand right reason for judge, yet seek
no more but that things should be determined by no other men's reason but their own, it is as
intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned to use for trump on every
occasion that suit whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing else, that will have
every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right reason, and that in
their own controversies: bewraying [revealing] their want of right reason by the claim they lay to
it.”
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It is important to note that Hobbes’s use of the word “diffidence” is the archaic meaning of
“distrust of other” and not the contemporary meaning of “lacking confidence in oneself.”
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i.e., obligation in the external forum or overt action. The establishment of in foro externo
obligations is manifested in an original and voluntary act by each prospective subject
making himself accountable to the law for his actions. Instituting punishment is
instituting the holding of oneself accountable to the law.
The original motivation for introducing the holding of oneself accountable to the
law is to vacate the state of nature—a state of ubiquitous diffidence. The limited
epistemic access to the particular passions and motivations of others is the source of the
ubiquitous diffidence and, as a consequence, the (main) cause of strife in the state of
nature.59 Hobbes emphasizes the role skepticism plays in his political philosophy,
articulating the epistemic problem in the introduction to both De Cive and Leviathan:
But this, that men are evill by nature, follows not from this principle [that
every man will distrust and dread each other]; for though the wicked were
fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is
a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, selfdefending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned.60
I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire,
fear, hope, &c; not the similitude of the objects of the passions, which are
the things desired, feared, hoped, &c; for these the constitution individual,
and particular education, do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from
our knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded
as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous
doctrines, are legible only to him [God] that searcheth hearts.61
Even the most honest and fairest conditioned, Hobbes notes, will not project the qualities
of honesty and fairness onto all others. But it is not that each person suspects all other
Marshall Missner, “Skepticism and Hobbes`s Political Philosophy,” provides an account of the
role the opacity of passions and the limited epistemic access to others’ motivations plays in
Hobbes’s political argument. Missner argues, correctly I think, that Hobbes`s skepticism evolves
and plays a more significant role in his later political works. The problem of the state of nature is,
more than anything else, epistemological.
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persons to hold a dishonest or wicked disposition. Rather, it is that each person lacks
direct epistemic access to the particular motivations of others; thus, no one particular
person can be known with anything near certainty to be an honest or righteous person.
Another person’s motivations can, occasionally, be discovered. But such discoveries are
only made after the fact and only insofar as we draw upon our own experience for
comparison while, at the same time, discounting all unrelated circumstances; as Hobbes
notes,
And though by men's actions we do discover their design sometimes; yet
to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all
circumstances by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher
without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust or by
too much diffidence.62
Even though such discoveries are not beyond the faculty of inference, such discoveries
are an insufficient basis for trust. A fellow today may be a competitor tomorrow. That is
to say, for Hobbes, that an object today was one of aversion does not entail that the same
object will not be one of desire tomorrow, or vice-versa; as Hobbes notes, “because the
constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same
things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversion.”63 Persons in the
state of nature are perilously exposed to both trust and diffidence. Too much trust leaves
one exposed to betrayal; too much diffidence leads one to betray.
Persons recognize that such a state of ubiquitous diffidence is not conducive to
self-preservation, as it requires (whether a person likes it or not), at times, to pre-empt
anticipated violence with violence:
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And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to
master the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power
great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own
conservation requireth, and is generally allowed.64
Self-preservation requires one, at times, to risk self-preservation. This somewhat
paradoxical state of internecine hostility is unsustainable. Accordingly, reason dictates to
each person that he “seek peace and follow it.”65 The laws of nature, for Hobbes, are
precepts of reason dictating the means to peace.66 And peace is an end that all persons
agree is good; as Hobbes attests, “so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature,
which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil: and
consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good.”67 However, as we have noted in
the previous section, reason’s dictate to abide by the laws of nature is suspended without
the assurance that conformity to the laws does not risk self-preservation. Most persons
desire peace. All persons agree that peace is good, but not all persons hold themselves
this accord at all times. The vain-glorious, the unjust, and the wicked make up the latter.
Most persons desire the laws of nature to be reason-giving.68 But there is a lack of
trust among the multitude. Without assurances that others can be trusted to keep their
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See Leviathan, 15/41, 80: “These dictates of reason men used to call by the name of laws, but
improperly: for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the
conservation and defence of themselves.”
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We can make the connection between the desire for peace and the desire for the laws of nature
to be reason-giving more explicit by noting that the laws of nature are assertoric hypothetical
imperatives; that is, self-preservation, as a given end, is universally desired, and the law provide
the means for self-preservation. Peace, most people recognize, is the best means to secure one’s
perseveration. But the laws of nature do not provide the means to self-preservation unless all (or

81

covenant not to exercise renounced rights, one is not required to forgo exercising such
rights or, what is essentially the same, one is not required to conform one’s actions to the
laws. Without assurances that others can be trusted to keep their covenant, one has no
reason, so to speak, to regard the law as reason-giving. Moreover, each person also
recognizes that no other person has reason to regard the law as reason-giving, for each
person is aware that no other person has reason to regard him as trustworthy. So, despite
the general desire for peace, because no one can distinguish whether another is one of the
wicked few, the ubiquity of diffidence proves to be an almost insurmountable obstacle.
The only way for a person to genuinely elicit the trust of all others with whom he
covenants to conform to law, and thus reap the rewards of the covenant, is to make
himself accountable to law. The granting of the sovereign the right to punish is, as noted,
a voluntary act, and each voluntary act aims at some good for the agent; as Hobbes states
in the following passage:
Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in
consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some
other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the
voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself.69
The good that is hoped for by granting the sovereign the right to punish is the
establishment of trust among those with whom one covenants. Accordingly, each
prospective subject grants the sovereign the right to punish him for transgressing the law;

most) others with whom one interacts conform to the laws of nature as well. It is only when this
condition is met—the belief that there will be general conformity to the laws—do the laws of
nature provide a reason for acting in conformity with them. Watkins, Hobbes’s System of Ideas,
55-56, as far as I am aware, is the first commentator to cast Hobbes’s laws of nature as assertoric
hypothetical imperatives.
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as Hobbes maintains, “a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me.”70 Each
grant of the authority to punish is best understood as collateral each person puts up in
order to enter civil society. Each grant of authority to punish is a guarantee to each other
prospective subject that one will keep to the covenant to relinquish one’s invasive natural
rights and submit to the adjudication and civil law of the sovereign. As punishment is an
indispensable constituent of law,71 any prospective subject who refuses to grant the
sovereign the authority to punish him refuses both to be governed by law and to be
accountable to law; that is to say, any prospective subject who refuses to grant the
sovereign the authority to punish him exposes himself as untrustworthy.
The justifying aim or rationale for introducing the practice of punishment is to
provide peace and security by means of establishing trust among the multitude. The
establishment of trust requires making the laws of nature in foro externo obligatory.
Recall, for Hobbes, the laws of nature are in foro externo obligatory for a person only
when that person believes others will conform to the laws. One ought not keep one’s
covenants (the third law), show gratitude (the fourth law), be sociable (the fifth law), be
forgiving (the sixth law), etc., when one believes others will not reciprocate. All this is to
say that reason requires a person to not conform to the laws of nature when such
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Leviathan, 14/29, 70. To be more precise, we should understand the grant of the right to punish
as such: each prospective subject “covenant[s] thus, unless I do so, or so, [i.e., unless I comply
with the law, the sovereign has the authority to] kill [or imprison] me.”
See De Cive, 14/7-8, 172: ”But in vain doe they [the laws] also prohibit any men, who doe not
withall strike a fear of punishment into them; in vain therefore is the Law, unlesse it contain both
parts, that which forbids injuries to be done, and that which punisheth the doers of them. The first
of them which is called distributive, is Prohibitory, and speaks to all; the second which is styled
vindicative, or paenary, is mandatory, and onely speaks to publique Ministers. […] From hence
also we may understand, that every civill Law hath a penalty annexed to it, either explicitly, or
implicitly.”
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conformity will “make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin.”72 Each
grant to the sovereign of the right to punish him for transgressing the law reciprocally
provides each other prospective subject assurance that conformity to the law will not
procure his own ruin.
When person A gives such assurance to persons B, C, and D by making himself
accountable to the law by granting the sovereign the right to punish him for
transgressions, persons B, C, and D now have sufficient reason to believe that A has
sufficient motivation to obey the law. When each B, C, and D reciprocate to the other
three with whom each covenants, each person—A, B, C, and D—has sufficient reason to
believe that conformity to the laws will not procure his own ruin, as each person now has
sufficient reason to believe each other is sufficiently motivated to conform to law.
For one to regard the law as in foro externo obligatory, what motivates another
person to conform is irrelevant. All that is required is that one believes that the other
person is so motivated to conform to law. Person B may be one of the so-called wicked
few. But it does not matter for A, C, and D that B conforms to law because of the fear of
punishment. For A, C, and D to regard the law as in foro externo obligatory all that is
required is that each believe that B (and each other, for that matter) is sufficiently
motivated, whether because B fears punishment as the consequence of non-conformity or
because B recognizes the value in universal conformity to the law as the means to peace
and, thus, the surest means to self-preservation. To be sure, most of those involved in the
social contract are motivated by establishing trust in order to achieve peace.
That person B requires the threat of punishment to deter him from committing
crime cannot be the explicit aim for B making himself accountable to law. Nor, as we will
72
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see, can such an explicit aim be generalized. We do not understand each grant of the right
to punish as providing assurance that one will conform to the law by virtue of a coercive
counter-incentive, i.e. the fear of punishment. Hobbes does not hold such a view, and to
attribute such a view to him would make the social contract ineffective at the very least,
and incoherent at worst. For such a view—that each grant of the right to punish serves as
a coercive counter-incentive—implies that each prospective subject does not trust himself
not to breach the covenant. But each grant of the right to punish is taken by each other to
imply that he is trustworthy, that is, that he desires peace. To attribute to each person the
view that the explicit purpose for the grant is to deter himself from committing crime is to
attribute to each person an avowal that he is not trustworthy, that is, that he does not
desire peace. Collectively, the grant to punish transgressors would not serve its stated
purpose, as it would not establish trust, for no one would covenant with another who
implies that he cannot be trusted not to transgress the law. Hobbes intimates as much in
the following passage (a passage whose significance will become even more apparent
later):
He, therefore, that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that
he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society
that unite themselves for peace and defence but by the error of them that
receive him.73
The impossibility of the social contract under such a view becomes apparent: no one
could receive another or be received by another into society (except by error) who
implies that coercive counter-incentive is required for keeping the covenant to hold the
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authority of law over renounced natural rights, that is, that social justice itself as the
means to peace is not motivationally effective.74

2.4 The Threat of Punishment
For punishment to serve its function of maintaining the in foro externo obligatory status
of the law, it may (and certainly does for the unjust minority or wicked few) serve as a
deterrent. But, for Hobbes, deterrence of crime does not provide the principal rationale
for inflicting or threatening to inflict punishment. That said, we should not understand
this claim to imply that a dichotomy exists between two competing purposes for
threatening punishment for transgressions—i.e., between maintaining the in foro externo
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A concern might be raised about my treatment of the justifying aim for granting the sovereign
the right to punish. It might be suggested that a person (or persons) recognizes himself (or
themselves) as (occasionally) weak-willed, thus, although desiring peace, may require the threat
of punishment to ensure, via sufficient counter-incentives, conformity to the law. Accordingly,
each person does not reveal himself to be untrustworthy by revealing that he does not desire
peace. In response, I would point out that even if Hobbes’s theory of voluntary action could
account for weakness of will in some sense, it would not be helpful here, as it would be weakness
of will in the Socratic sense that one is mistaken about one’s judgment of good—i.e., that it is
only apparent good: “And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by
foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate, the
good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which
very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so far as a man seeth, if the good in those
consequences be greater than the evil, the whole chain is that which writers call apparent or
seeming good” (Leviathan, 6/57, 29). Thus, Hobbes’s theory seems to allow for a distinction
between actual and apparent good. But if one was occasionally mistaken about something or
some act as good—say injustice or not keeping one’s covenant—one either i) thinks that the
unjust act is both good and consistent with, or brings about, peace, or ii) thinks that the unjust act
is both good and inconsistent with, or contrary to, peace. Either way, we are back to my initial
position: the latter person reveals himself to be untrustworthy for obvious reasons, thus not
eligible to be received by anyone into civil society. The former is eligible, but the reason that
person will conform to law is not because the threat of punishment will provide counterincentive. Rather, the threat of punishment will correct the misjudgment; the fact that the act is
legally proscribed reveals the act to be contrary to peace. If the person knows that he will act
contrary to what the law prescribes (or in concert with what the law proscribes) because he will
continue to think that the act is consistent with peace—that is, he declares that the law will not
correct his judgment—then that person is not eligible to be received in society, as the person does
not alienate his judgment to the sovereign of what is conducive to peace.
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obligatory nature of the laws and deterring crime. As we will see, the latter, when
necessary, is subsumed under the former.
As noted above, according to Hobbes, punishment is the infliction of evil “to the
end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.”75 Punishment,
furthermore, “dispos[es] the delinquent or, by his example, other men to obey the
laws.”76 Moreover, according to Hobbes, “it is of the nature of punishment to have for
[its] end the disposing of men to obey the law.”77 These remarks certainly seem to imply
that the infliction of punishment, or the threat of punishment, disposes persons to
obedience over disobedience. But this is the case only because it is the failure, on the part
of the sovereign, to inflict punishment or threaten transgressions with punishment that
disposes persons to disobedience over obedience.
Recall, for Hobbes, obedience to the law is not required when the general threat of
punishment for transgressing the law is absent or believed to be empty or impotent. The
actions that are determined to be unlawful when such a condition holds—i.e., that there is
a real threat of punishment—are not unlawful in the absence of such a condition. In fact,
such actions are not acts of disobedience proper; as Hobbes states,
That which totally excuseth a fact, and takes away from it the nature of a
crime, can be none but that which, at the same time, taketh away the
obligation of the law […] for no man is obliged (when the protection of
the law faileth) not to protect himself by the best means he can.78
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Leviathan, 27/22-24, 156; emphasis added. For Hobbes, that which excuses obligation to the
law is fear of the consequences of conformity to the law. Hobbes states, “[i]f a man by the terror
of present death be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused; because no law
can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation” (Leviathan, 27/25, 157).
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When the law does not endeavor to protect those who will conform, then conformity to
law is not obligatory. When the threat of punishment is absent, so too is the obligation to
the law. Again, a subject is not obliged to conform to the law when such conformity will
“make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin,”79 and the basis for this
judgment is that others are not motivated to conform to the law.
Therefore, as stated above, for Hobbes, the principal aim of punishment or the
threat of punishment is to maintain the in foro externo obligatory status of the law. We
can re-state the principal aim as follows: the principal aim of inflicting punishment or
threatening the infliction of punishment is to maintain the prohibitory status of criminal
action, that is, to maintain the “nature of crime.” The principal aim of punishment is not
to deter crime but, rather, to maintain the criminal status of those acts legislated to be
transgressions. As noted above, those actions that would be considered unlawful would
not be so considered without the general threat of punishment. To be sure, deterrence
contingently contributes to maintaining the in foro externo obligatory status of the law,
that is, to maintaining the status of crime as a transgressions. Deterrence, insofar as it is
pertinent, certainly serves the purpose of punishment. But we should not take this
particular means as the end.
Most subjects do not require the threat of a particular punishment to coerce
conformity to a particular law; subjects require that there be the general threat of
punishment for general conformity to the law. We can see that deterrence is not the
principal aim of punishment—and, thus, only contingently contributes to the principal
aim—when we appreciate that the threat of punishment would be necessary even if no
79
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subject required the threat to coerce conformity to any particular law. The limited
epistemic access to other persons’ motivation makes the threat of punishment necessary
for the general conformity to the law, as it provides the necessary condition for
maintaining the trust that each other will not breach the social covenant.
The necessary condition for trust is established by instituting a sovereign with the
power to punish. As Hobbes claims in the following important, but often misunderstood,
passages:
THE final cause, end, or design of men [...] in the introduction of that
restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths,
is the [...] getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war
which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural
passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and
tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants.80
[B]efore the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some
coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their
covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they
expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety
which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right
they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a
Commonwealth.81
When a Commonwealth is once settled, then are they [the laws of nature]
actually laws, and not before; as being then the commands of the
Commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws: for it is the sovereign power
that obliges men to obey them. For the differences of private men, to
declare what is equity, what is justice, and is moral virtue, and to make
them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and
punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them.82
We have to take much care in how we understand these passages. The tendency in the
literature is to conflate Hobbes’s argument for the breadth of the scope of the threat of
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punishment with his position on the pervasiveness of such a threat in coercing lawful
behaviour. On the contrary, as I shall argue, the threat of punishment is necessarily
directed at all subjects, but is necessary for coercing lawful behaviour only for some.
We must first recall that it is not the case that each person introduces punishment
to keep himself in awe, i.e. to tie himself to the performance of his covenant. The
introduction of punishment is not a case writ large of Odysseus insisting on being tied to
the mast. In other words, it is not the case that each prospective subject introduces
accountability to the law as a means to thwart his own short-term, self-interested
motivations by introducing counter-motivation via the threat of punishment. The
introduction of punishment, as we have seen, has a different function. Granting the
sovereign the right to punish is collateral each person puts up in order to secure the trust
of all others with whom he covenants.83 Each grant of the right to punish is a show of
trust; it is not because each person believes that he cannot be trusted. Just as no person
would desire to covenant with what we can call the silent ‘foole’—“who hath said in his
heart, there is no such thing as justice”84 but not said with his tongue—neither would any
person desire to covenant with someone who does not make himself accountable to law.
In other words, granting the sovereign the right to punish one for transgressing the law is
a show of faith that one is not a silent ‘foole’ or one of the wicked few. Put succinctly,

In Chapter 18 of Leviathan, “Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution,” Hobbes contends that
mutual authorization by prospective subjects is the means by which “all the rights and faculties of
him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled”
(Leviathan, 18/2, 88). The right to punish is included in the catalogue of rights conferred upon the
sovereign, a list which of Hobbes provides in the same chapter. Hobbes maintains, “to the
sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour; and of punishing with
corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath
formerly made” (Leviathan, 18/14, 92).
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persons making themselves accountable to law is a collective action solution to the
problem of a few bad persons who, like all others, want to be trusted, but unlike most
others, ought not to be.
We are now in a position to appreciate that there are two distinct functions that
the threat of punishment serves: as we see below, for most subjects—just persons—the
threat of punishment is (for lack of a better word) indirect while for some subjects—
unjust persons—the threat of punishment is (again, for lack of a better word) direct. I
will use the remainder of this section to elucidate this distinction.
We must first note that Hobbes does not conflate but, rather, makes a distinction
between a command and a threat. For Hobbes, the threat of punishment is not issued at
the majority of subjects akin to a gunman threatening someone to hand over his money—
a threat that one surely ought to “obey” if he values his life over his money. Although
Hobbes defines civil law as a command, he does not understand the law as a command
backed by threat. Hobbes defines command as such: “COMMAND is where a man saith,
do this, or do not this, without expecting other reason than the will of him that says it.”85
And the will or intention of the sovereign, as Hobbes states, “is always supposed to be
equity.”86 The sovereign’s will, as we see below, is intimately tied to the reason why the
command is reason-giving. Command is thus distinguished from council: “COUNCIL is
where a man saith, do, or do not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that
arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it.”87 Hobbes, thus, does not view the civil law as
council; the command is not a problematic hypothetical imperative of the following form:
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if you want to avoid punishment, then conform to the civil law—as we see below, some
subjects, however, take the command as council of this form. The civil laws, for most
subjects, are assertoric hypothetical imperatives of the following form: because you want
peace—because you instituted a sovereign to whom you covenanted to obey—do this, or
do not this. Insofar as a subject takes the sovereign’s imperative—do this, or do not
this—as a command and not council, it is viewed by that subject as an assertoric
hypothetical imperative.88
“Civil law,” for Hobbes, “is to every subject, those rules, which the
Commonwealth hath commanded him, by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the
will, to make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong.”89 The command is an
imperative, but the obligatory nature of the imperative, for most subjects, does not come
from a coercive threat behind the command. As Hobbes implies, the command is a
determination of the rules for peace—the distinction of right and wrong. Making such
determinations is the mandate conferred upon the sovereign by subjects to provide a
standard of interpretation of the laws of nature that counts as right reason.90 Hobbes
claims, “it is manifest that [civil] law in general is not counsel, but command; nor a
command of any man to any man, but only of him whose command is addressed to one
88

See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, second section, 25. Kant
divides imperatives into categorical imperatives (which prescribe morally necessary actions) and
hypothetical imperatives (which prescribe actions as means to some end). Hypothetical
imperatives are further divided into problematic hypothetical imperatives (which prescribe means
to a possible end) and assertoric hypothetical imperatives (which prescribe means to a given end).
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formerly obliged to obey him.”91 The distinction between threat and command is now
apparent: the threat (insofar as it is genuine) generates an obligation insofar as one desires
to avoid the harm threatened; the command does not generate an obligation but already
entails an obligation via the covenant to recognize the authority of the sovereign’s law
(the distinction of right and wrong), as the command “is addressed to one formerly
obliged to obey him.” When a subject regards the law as a command it is because he
acknowledges the sovereign’s authority. Put differently, when a subject regards the law
as a command, he does not regard it as a threat.
Civil law is, strictly speaking, not a command backed by the threat of punishment,
but punishments are, nonetheless, necessarily annexed to civil laws. And such annexation
is necessarily perspicuous and publicized; as noted in Hobbes’s conception of penal law:
Penal [laws] are those which declare what penalty shall be inflicted on
those that violate the [civil] law; and speak to the ministers and officers
ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be informed of the
punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; nevertheless the
command is not addressed to the delinquent (who cannot be supposed will
faithfully punish himself), but to public ministers appointed to see the
penalty executed.92
Subjects ought to be informed of what punishments are tied to crimes, and this is
incumbent upon the sovereign making laws public. As Hobbes states,
Nor is it enough the law be written and published, but also that there be
manifest signs that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign. [...] There
is therefore requisite, not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient
signs of the author and authority.”93
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As I argue below, it is the informative aspect of the promulgation of punishment that
plays a necessary role in making the civil law in foro externo obligatory. The informative
element involved in promulgation of punishments, for most subjects, bridges the
epistemic gap that is the cause of diffidence in the state of nature and, as such, bridges the
gap between in foro interno and in foro externo obligation.
Once more, each subject ought to be informed of the punishments ordained. But
this requirement of the promulgation of punishments is part and parcel of the conditions
necessary for each subject to accept that the laws of nature—laws that become civil
laws—oblige in foro externo. For, recall, one is not obliged to follow the dictates of the
laws of nature when one believes that others will not follow suit (or one has no reason to
believe that others will follow suit). The limited epistemic access to other persons’
passions and motivations is not overcome in civil society; as such, it is necessary that
each subject believes that every other subject knows what punishments are attached to
transgressions. In other words, each subject must be made aware that each other subject is
made aware what punishments follow particular crimes. This awareness is accomplished
by the sufficient promulgation of punishments. The “threat” of punishment is indirectly
issued at most subjects. What I mean by this is that the promulgation of punishments
ordained fulfills a necessary condition for making the civil law in foro externo obligatory.
The law becomes in foro externo obligatory, not through fear of punishment, but rather
through acknowledging the reasonableness of following the law—reasonableness
couched in the belief that all others are motivated to conform as well.
Importantly, it is such a belief of general conformity to the law, generally held,
that maps onto Hobbes’s distinction between war and peace:
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For WAR consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract
of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and
therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is
in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a
shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together:
so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known
disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.
All other time is PEACE.94
Peace requires that each person believe that each other person does not have a disposition
to hostility (i.e., a disposition to exercise the invasive rights renounced via the social
covenant). The threat of punishment is not, generally, to provide motivation for the
subject to conform to one particular law or another such that the obligatory character of
the particular law is couched in fear of the consequences of non-conformity. To be sure,
there are unjust subjects (silent fooles) for whom the threat of punishment works in this
manner. The threat of punishment is, then, directly issued to unjust subjects so that they
can reliably predict what punishment will follow particular transgressions (thus,
hopefully, sufficiently deter). To be clear, the difference between indirectly and directly
issued threats of punishments should not be taken to rest on a distinction in the intended
object of the threat. As noted, it cannot be known, with certainty (save for the explicit
foole who “declares” there is no such thing as justice) who is just and unjust. The
distinction between indirectly and directly issued threats of punishments lies in how the
person takes the threat—that is, whether the person takes it as the final step in making the
law a reason for action (i.e., the final step in making the law in foro externo obligatory),
or whether the person takes it as the pertinent or decisive information in calculating what
action to take with regard to a possible transgression (i.e., whether the punishment
outweighs the benefit to be gained by the crime).
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Peace, Hobbes notes, is the universally agreed upon good.95 Most subjects
recognize the law as the means for peace and most conform their “manner of life” to what
is the most reasonable means to achieve peace. Hobbes claims that, “[o]f all passions,
that which inclineth men least to break the laws is fear.”96 We must recognize that, for
most subjects, the content of the passion that motivates the keeping of covenants is not
fear of punishment but, rather, fear of a return to the state of nature, as a return to the
state of nature is contrary to the universally agreed upon good. As Hobbes states, “[t]he
passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as are
necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them;”97 all which
serve to transcend the state of nature or the state of war. The state of nature casts a large
and ominous shadow over civil society. Alan Ryan articulates this very point: “Hobbes
relies heavily on his subjects’ fear of the return of the state of nature to motivate them to
keep their covenant of obedience; as he says, fear is the motive to rely on, and he spent
much of Leviathan trying to persuade them to keep their eyes on the object of that fear.”98
The principal function of law, for Hobbes, is none other than to keep persons from the
state of nature. This function of law makes law reasonable to obey. Most subjects do not
see profit, and most do not see pleasure, to be derived from crime. For Hobbes, most
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98

Alan Ryan, “Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 225.

96

subjects are just persons as most subjects view the law as the stabilizing force for the
protection of their person and civil liberties.

2.5 The Foole
We will now turn our attention to Hobbes’s reply to the foole. There has been much ink
spilled by commentators focusing on the success or failure of Hobbes’s reply to the foole,
Hobbes’s interlocutor who “hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice, and
sometimes also with his tongue, seriously alleging that every man's conservation and
contentment being committed to his own care.”99 I do not set out to answer the question
of whether Hobbes’s reply is successful. S.A. Lloyd argues, quite rightly I think, that this
is the wrong question to ask.100 Instead, in this paper, I argue that attention to Hobbes’s
reply reveals a particular view of citizens with regard to the reasonableness of social
justice—i.e., keeping to the social covenant that institutes the law as holding authority
over renounced natural rights. Hobbes’s reply to the foole is significant, as it is indicative
of what I argue to be his view of the citizen as motivated to conform to the law for the
law’s sake. This view is in contrast to the view commonly attributed to Hobbes, namely,
that the avoidance of punishment is what motivates social justice.101 Closer attention to
Hobbes’s reply to the foole, I argue, reveals a different picture of the Hobbesian citizen
than the one painted by the tradition. Hobbes, I argue, distinguishes between crime (an
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to notice that Hobbes’s discussion of the Foole is not intended to constitute proof of the third law
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unjust act) and treason or sedition (social injustice); this distinction draws on the
distinction between the response to crime and the response to treason or sedition: the
former is punishment and the latter is exile. Hobbes, as we see, in his reply to the foole,
does not argue that the fear of punishment is what motivates social justice.
The foole’s position is problematic as it seems to follow, at least formally, from
Hobbes’s theory of practical rationality: “seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to
the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most reasonable that conduce most to
their ends.”102 Hobbes articulates the foole’s position in the following passage: “that
[according to the foole] there could be no reason why every man might not do what he
thought conduced thereunto [his own care]: and therefore also to make, or not make;
keep, or not keep, covenants was not against reason when it conduced to one's benefit.”103
Thus, the foole “questioneth whether injustice, taking away the fear of God (for the same
fool hath said in his heart there is no God), not sometimes stand with that reason which
dictateth to every man his own good.”104 Reason, the foole contends, may dictate one to
dismiss the social covenant that institutes the sovereign’s law as authoritative.
As I noted in section 2.2 above, there is, for Hobbes, a distinction between social
injustice and an unjust act; that is to say, again, Hobbes does not hold there to be a
seamless conceptual unity between social injustice and an unjust act. A transgression of
the law—the commitment of a crime or an unjust act—does not necessarily entail social
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injustice or the denial of the authority of the sovereign’s law over renounced natural
rights. Put another way, Hobbes does not conflate crime with treason.105
An instructive way to draw out this distinction between crime and treason is to
elucidate the divergent responses to crime (unjust acts crime) and treason (social
injustice). On the one hand, the determination to not conform one’s “manner of life” to
the sovereign’s determination of right and wrong—i.e., the sovereign’s judgment of what
peace requires—is to imply that one determines to not be ruled by law. To deny the
authority of the law over renounced natural right is, in essence, a design to return to the
state of nature within which the right of nature rules. According to Hobbes, the available
(and appropriate) response to confirmed unjust persons is precisely what they design:
[I]f a subject shall by fact or word wittingly and deliberately deny the
authority of the representative of the Commonwealth (whatsoever penalty
hath been formerly ordained for treason), he may lawfully be made to
suffer whatsoever the representative will: for in denying subjection, he
denies such punishment as by the law hath been ordained, and therefore
Hobbes’s use of the term “sin,” although instructive, does not, without further clarification,
capture the distinction between treason (injustice) and crime (unjust acts). Hobbes claims i) that a
“SIN is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such
contempt is a breach of all his laws at once, and therefore may consist, not only in the
commission of a fact, or in the speaking of words by the laws forbidden, or in the omission of
what the law commandeth, but also in the intention or purpose to transgress. For the purpose to
break the law is some degree of contempt of him to whom it belonged to see it executed”
(Leviathan, 27/1, 151); and ii) that a “CRIME is a sin consisting in the committing by deed or
word of that which the law forbiddeth. […] So that every crime is a sin, but not every sin is a
crime” (Leviathan, 27/2, 151). I take Hobbes to imply with the first claim that a sin may merely
be a transgression of the law without being contempt of the legislator; that is to say, crime does
not necessarily involve the intention or purpose to transgress. Recall, the “source of every crime
is some defect of the understanding or some error in reasoning or some sudden force of the
passions” (Leviathan, 27/4, 152); thus, one may commit an act that is a transgression, yet the
intention or purpose of such an act is not to transgress. That is to say, there is not “the resolving to
put some act in execution that tendeth thereto [i.e. the representation of the breach the law, e.g.
“being possessed of another man's goods” (Leviathan, 27/1, 151)].” As such, with regard to the
second claim, every crime is a sin in that it is a transgression of the law but not—or, at least not
necessarily—contempt for the legislator. Treason, however, is both a transgression and
necessarily contempt for the legislator; that is to say, treason is understood to be the breach of all
the sovereign’s laws at once.
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suffers as an enemy of the Commonwealth; that is, according to the will of
the representative. For the punishments set down in the law are to subjects,
not to enemies; such as are they that, having been by their own act
subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the sovereign power.106
As the design of treason is a return to hostilities, the sovereign has the prerogative to
respond accordingly. The response to crime, on the other hand, is punishment; and the
purpose of inflicting punishment, according to Hobbes, is to ensure that “the will of men
may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.”107 The response to crime is to ensure
better obedience of subjects who are already disposed to obedience; punishment is not
for those who reveal themselves to have no such disposition, i.e., confirmed unjust
persons, explicit fooles, or the blatant vain-glorious.108 Recall, for Hobbes, “a righteous
man does not lose that title by one or a few unjust actions that proceed from sudden
passion, or mistake of things or persons.”109 And recall, for Hobbes, the “source of every
crime is some defect of the understanding or some error in reasoning or some sudden
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The vain-glorious, like fooles, do not view social justice as a curb on their own natural
liberties. The relevant difference between the vain-glorious and fooles lies in that the vainglorious view social justice as a curb on others’ natural liberties, while fooles do not: it is a
presumption of their own worth that lead the vain-glorious to view themselves as exempted from
the law, while it is the reasonableness of social injustice that lead fooles to think that every
person, when it is to his benefit, may be exempt from the law. The vain-glorious hold that, even if
they are party to covenant to renounce some natural liberties, they are exempt from such restraint;
or, at the very least, they hold themselves exempt from the same punishment owed to others, of
purportedly less worth, for the same breach. See Leviathan, 27/13, 154: “From whence [i.e., the
foolish overrating of their own worth] proceedeth a presumption that the punishments ordained
by the laws, and extended generally to all subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them with the
same rigor they are inflicted on poor, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of
the vulgar.” The vain-glorious are so convinced by their own estimation of worth and subsequent
exemption from justice that they, like fooles, explicitly “call in question the authority of them that
govern, and so to unsettle the laws with their public discourse, as that nothing shall be a crime but
what their own designs require should be so” (Leviathan, 27/16, 154; emphases added).
109

Leviathan, 15/10, 74.

100

force of the passions.”110 With regard to the response to the criminal, better obedience is
ensured through correction of ignorance, correction of reasoning, and correction of
passions; as Hobbes states, “the end of punishing is not revenge and discharge of choler,
but correction either of the offender or of others by his example.”111 Put succinctly,
insofar as the causes of crime are impediments to lawful behaviour, the object of
punishment is the correction of such impediments; the object of punishment is not the
subject’s commitment to the sovereign’s law as authoritative.
We must appreciate that is not fear of punishment that Hobbes, in his reply to the
foole, argues ought to serve as sufficient reason or motivation to keep one’s social
covenant (to hold the authority of the law over renounced natural liberties). Rather,
Hobbes argues that it is either i) fear of not being received into the collective covenant to
generate civil society or, more significantly for our purpose, ii) the fear of not remaining
in civil society that ought to serve as sufficient reason or motivation to keep one’s
covenant. As Hobbes claims:
He, therefore, that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that
he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society
that unite themselves for peace and defence but by the error of them that
receive him; nor when he is received be retained in it without seeing the
danger of their error; which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon
as the means of his security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of
society, he perisheth.112
The foole “declareth” that he is not committed to the sovereign’s laws, but is only
committed to those actions that serve his own immediate benefit. Justifying injustice,
Hobbes warns, will almost certainly be interpreted as a renunciation of the social
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covenant to hold the sovereign’s laws as authoritative; one will be “cast out of society”
and returned to the state of hostilities, as is the appropriate response to one who reveals
himself as not disposed to adhere to the social covenant.
S.A. Lloyd recognizes that a declaration or alleging of the reasonableness of
injustice is an appeal to justification. Lloyd argues:
I am inclined to read all this language [“with his tongue”, “seriously
alleging”, “declares”, and “consequently declareth”] as showing, not that
the Foole is someone who prospectively advertises his intentions to act
unjustly [...] but rather that he is simply one who, if caught, tries to defend
his unjust actions ex post. Someone who “breaketh his covenant, and
consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so”, is one
who breaks his covenant and subsequently tries to justify his having done
so as reasonable.113
Lloyd’s position rests on Hobbes’s use of “consequently declareth” as to imply a
temporal succession of transgression and then declaration of injustice as justified. I am
inclined to accept Lloyd’s interpretation of Hobbes’s account of the foole justifying the
injustice, but nothing in my treatment of the foole (as an unjust person or traitor) rests on
the temporal sequence of the transgression and declaration. All that my treatment requires
is that the judgment underlying the declarations motivates the transgression, regardless of
the place in the sequence in which the declaration falls. Nothing in Hobbes’s treatment of
traitors’ actions excludes a declaration prior to the treasonous act. More to the point, in A
Dialogue between a Philosopher & a Student of the Common Laws of England, Hobbes
makes it clear that a declaration, in words or writing, is sufficient for accusation of
treason. According to Hobbes:
Seeing then the crime is the design and purpose to kill the King, or cause
him to be killed, and lieth hidden in the breast of him that is accused; what
other proof can there be had of it than words spoken or written? And
113
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therefore, if there be sufficient witness that he by words declared that he
had such a design, there can be no question, but that he is comprehended
within the statute [that maketh Treason].114
Hobbes does not imply in the above passage that the writing or declaration (with a
witness) must follow the act of treason, only that the writing or declaration itself
constitutes sufficient proof that the design of treason motivated the act. In other words,
the writing or declaration is sufficient proof that one does not respect the authority of the
law.115
In his reply to the foole, Hobbes argues that the possibility of being returned to
the state of nature serves to adjoin what we ought to do and what we want to do. That is
to say, the possibility of being returned to the state of nature serves to adjoin what we
ought to do with what we want to do only if we desire peace and security; the purpose of
the covenant, for Hobbes, is none other than the instituting of the authority of the law
over the exercise of renounced natural rights. But Hobbes’s reasoning here, we must
surely recognize, is merely a rehashing of the argument for generating civil society.116
Hobbes does not council the foole to avoid (the potential infliction of) punishment.
Rather, Hobbes counsels the foole to avoid the (potential) annulment of the social
covenant by appealing to the purpose of the social covenant. Hobbes exhorts that the fear
of a return to the state of nature, within which one most likely “perisheth,” makes social
justice reasonable. The rationale for the social covenant, for most subjects, is to transcend
the state of nature. The so-called penalty for social injustice is inexorably tied to the
rationale for the social covenant: those who advocate social injustice (i.e., those who
114
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explicitly deny the authority of the law) ought not to reap the benefits of social justice. As
Hobbes intimates, the response to a declaratory justification of the reasonableness of
injustice is banishment or the “cast[ing] out of society” and, according to Hobbes, “a
banished man is a lawful enemy of the Commonwealth that banished him, as being no
more a member of the same.”117 Banishment, Hobbes explains, is not punishment proper:
Exile (banishment) is when a man is for a crime condemned to depart out
of the dominion of the Commonwealth, or out of a certain part thereof, and
during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it; and seemeth not in
its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a punishment, but rather
an escape, or a public commandment to avoid punishment by flight. [...]
For if a man banished be nevertheless permitted to enjoy his goods, and
the revenue of his lands, the mere change of air is no punishment; nor does
it tend to that benefit of the commonwealth for which all punishments are
ordained, that is to say, to the forming of men's wills to the observation of
the law; but many times to the damage of the commonwealth. For a
banished man is a lawful enemy of the commonwealth that banished him,
as being no more a member of the same.118
The foole deliberately denies the authority of the sovereign by declaring that injustice is
reasonable. To risk being cast out of society for injustice—for explicitly denying the
authority of the law—is to risk being treated as an enemy. And an enemy is subject to
hostilities but not to punishment.

Leviathan, 28/21, 165. See also Leviathan, 21/24, 114: “If the sovereign banish his subject,
during the banishment he is not subject.”
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The foole is, arguably, most foolish for dismissing the goodness of peace.119 To
deny the reasonableness of justice is to deny the end that justice serves as its means; it is
to deny what Hobbes adamantly attests, namely, that “peace is good, and therefore also
the way or means of peace, which (as I have shown before) are justice [...] and the rest of
the laws of nature.”120 It does not, generally speaking, follow that one who denies the
means to a particular end also denies that end as a good. It does, however, follow that one
who denies the only means to a particular end also denies that end as a good. And this,
the latter, is how Hobbes understands the foole, as justice is the only means for ensuring
peace.
Granting, as Hobbes does, that the foole is received in civil society, a crucial
question arises: if Hobbes holds that citizens require the threat of punishment to coerce
the keeping of their covenant (to recognize the authority of the sovereign’s law), then
why does he not, in replying to the foole, simply appeal to the prospects of punishment as
that which makes social injustice unreasonable? I have argued that the underlying
assumption is false; Hobbes does not hold that most citizens require the threat of

We must not overlook that the foole’s foolishness is also to be attributed to his explicitness.
That the foole is so foolish as to explicitly justify his view, however, is taken by some in the
literature to be a straw-man and that Hobbes’s actual antagonist is (or, rather, should be) the
‘silent’ foole who says only in his heart that there is no such thing as justice. Moreover, these
same commentators contend that Hobbes’s reply misses the point, in part, because he does not
adequately address the problem of the ‘silent’ foole who believes that an absolute curb on selfinterest is contrary to reason. See, e.g. David Gauthier, “Three Against Justice: The Foole, the
Sensible Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd,” 17; F.C. Hood, The Divine Politics of Thomas
Hobbes, 110; Olli Loukola, “Combining Mortality and Rationality: Hobbes on contracts and
covenants,” 82; and Alan Zaitchik, “Hobbes’s Reply to the Fool: The Problem of Consent and
Obligation,” 246-247. In response to this allegation, see Kinch Hoekstra, “Hobbes and the Foole.”
Hoekstra argues, I think convincingly, against the traditional interpretation: we should not view
the ‘silent’ foole as Hobbes’s antagonist but, rather and only, the ‘explicit’ foole. For a brief
explication of Hoekstra’s argument, see infra note 126 below.
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punishment to coerce the keeping of their social covenant. Beyond dismissing the
antecedent, I do not see an answer. It is important to recall that, for Hobbes, banishment
is not punishment proper, as such a penalty severs the juridical relationship between the
commonwealth and banished subject. As the end of punishment is to correct the offender,
“thereby the better be disposed to obedience,”121 banishment cannot properly endeavour
this end, for “a banished man is a lawful enemy of the commonwealth that banished
him”122 and an enemy cannot be viewed as eligible for “better obedience.” And it is
important to recognize that, for most citizens, it is the fear of a return to the state of
nature via the dissolution of the Commonwealth and not simply the fear of individually
being returned to the state of nature that motivates social justice. The quote from Alan
Ryan merits repeating: “Hobbes relies heavily on his subjects’ fear of the return of the
state of nature to motivate them to keep their covenant of obedience; as he says, fear is
the motive to rely on, and he spent much of Leviathan trying to persuade them to keep
their eyes on the object of that fear.”123 Put another way, it is not, for most subjects, the
fear of being cast out of society but, rather, the fear of the collapse of the social covenant
as the foundation of a legal order that establishes peace that motivates social justice.
There is a lingering worry that, in his reply to the explicit foole, Hobbes merely
counsels the foole to be a silent foole: that one ought not to declare one’s view that
injustice is (or can be) reasonable. This worry is well-founded, but only before we
explore two explanations that point in Hobbes’s favour for offering this seemingly
imprudent council to the foole to be more prudent with his contempt of the legislator’s
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authority. That is to say, there are two explanations that go some way in addressing
Hobbes’s resignation that if fooles or unjust persons cannot come to acknowledge the
dictate of reason that calls for social justice, then no fear of punishment can make such
persons just. Hobbes states:
the grounds of these rights [of sovereignty] have the rather need to be
diligently and truly taught, because they cannot be maintained by any civil
law or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law that shall forbid rebellion
[or treason] (and such is all resistance to the essential rights of
sovereignty) is not, as a civil law, any obligation but by virtue only of the
law of nature that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which natural
obligation, if men know not, they cannot know the right of any law the
sovereign maketh.124
Hobbes is here implying that the threat of punishment cannot, and does not, provide
external motivation for most citizens’ recognition of their duty to the civil law via their
duty to the first three laws of nature (i.e., to seek peace, to renounce invasive rights
insofar as others are also willing, and, most importantly, to keep one’s covenant granting
authority to the sovereign’s judgment). Hobbes, I think, is also here implying a stronger
claim: civil society cannot securely remain in a state of peace—cannot remain a
Commonwealth—if citizens require the threat of punishment to see reason in social
justice. For if the grounds of the sovereign’s right to make law are not accepted by
citizens, then the reason for the sovereign’s possession of the right to make law cannot be
accepted by citizens (i.e., to ensure peace and security).
Returning to Hobbes’s reply to the foole, Hobbes’s concern lies with the
consequences of the foole’s explicit declaration for the maintaining of peace and security
within civil society. Kinch Hoekstra provides one explanation along this line, which I
will briefly address. I provide an alternate explanation along the same line that
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(somewhat) deviates from Hoekstra’s. Hoekstra argues that Hobbes’s council points to a
concern to quell the possibility of rebellion or civil war. Hoekstra claims:
In the answer to the Foole, Hobbes show that his greatest enemies—the
greater for sharing the principle that it is reasonable to seek one’s own
advantage—are those who publicly teach disobedience or governance that
will induce disobedience. From his first writings to his last, Hobbes has a
consuming preoccupation with those who would incite disobedience. If
these can be controlled, civil war may be avoided, although the rest of
Hobbes’s political program be ignored.125
Hoekstra, to my mind, is correct to emphasize the explicitness of the foole’s position as
that which occupies Hobbes’s concern.126 Hoekstra’s claim that Hobbes is concerned
with the consequences of disobedience is correct, but we have to recognize that (perhaps
too) much weight is placed on a view of citizens on the precipice of rebellion or civil war,
which Hoekstra seems to acknowledge in quoting Hobbes that citizens may be “much
wounded and torne with affronts, and calamities, by them who are in Authority.”127
While I am, of course, not denying that Hobbes held a great distaste for rebellious
fervour, Hobbes’s other principal concern in his reply to the foole is to silence
declarations of the reasonableness of injustice. In other words, Hobbes’s other principal
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First, Hobbes’s reply to the foole takes the foole to be explicit in his view, that he “declareth
[and not merely sayeth in his heart] he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him can in
reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power”
(Leviathan, 15/5, 73). As Hoekstra notes, “[i]f Hobbes’s refutation of the Foole depends on the
fact of the Foole’s declaration, then such declaration is integral to the Foole’s position” (“Hobbes
and the Foole,” 623). Second, Hobbes’s reworking of the argument with the foole in the Latin
edition of Leviathan, (published in 1668, seventeen years after the English edition, published
1651) is purged of all reference to the foole as saying something in his heart (“Hobbes and the
Foole,” 626). Third, Hoekstra points out that Hobbes remarks that etymologies are not
definitions, yet he (Hobbes) concedes that when accurate they give much assistance in finding out
a definition; and that foole comes from the Latin follis, meaning a bellow or windbag (“Hobbes
and the Foole,” 642, n. 10). Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, error cannot be attributed to
those who receive into civil society the ‘silent’ foole; that is to say, error can only be attributed to
those who receive into civil society the ‘explicit’ foole (“Hobbes and the Foole,” 629-630).
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concern, in his reply to the foole, is with seditious declarations (i.e., speech or writings
that undermine the authority of the state) and not exclusively with rebellious fervour (i.e.,
calls to overthrow the state). The importance of silencing sedition bears out in Hobbes’s
list of “Those Things that Weaken or Tend to the Dissolution of the Commonwealth,” the
topic title of Chapter 29 of Leviathan:
I observe the diseases of a Commonwealth that proceed from the poison of
seditious doctrines, whereof one is that every private man is judge of good
and evil actions. This is true in the condition of mere nature, where there
are no civil laws; and also under civil government in such cases as are not
determined by the law. But otherwise, it is manifest that the measure of
good and evil actions is the civil law; and the judge the legislator, who is
always representative of the Commonwealth. From this false doctrine,
men are disposed to debate with themselves and dispute the commands of
the Commonwealth, and afterwards to obey or disobey them as in their
private judgments they shall think fit; whereby the Commonwealth is
distracted and weakened.128
To be sure, Hobbes, in his reply to the foole, addresses the concern of attaining
sovereignty by rebellion.129 Indeed, the “successful wickedness,”130 according to Hobbes,
that follows from social injustice (i.e., the rejection of the authority of the law over
renounced rights) is “the getting of a kingdom.”131 Such successful wickedness, Hobbes
warns, is disquieted, as “others are taught to gain the same in like manner.”132

128

Leviathan, 29/6, 168. Hobbes draws the above distinction between sedition and rebellion, the
latter which he addresses a few paragraphs preceding this one. See Leviathan, 29/3, 167-168.
See Leviathan, 15/7, 73: “And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion; it is
manifest that, though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather
the contrary, and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the
attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, keeping of covenant, is a rule of
reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law
of nature.”
129

130

Leviathan, 15/4, 72.

131

Leviathan, 15/4, 72.

132

Leviathan, 15/7, 73.
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That said, Hobbes’s longer and more nuanced reply to the foole takes the foole’s
position to be more general, namely, that social justice (i.e., holding true to the social
covenant that maintains the authority of the law over renounced natural rights) is but a
vain word (i.e., a covenant that ought not to have any real weight): “to make, or not
make; keep, or not keep, covenants was not against reason when it conduced to one's
benefit.”133 Thus, Hobbes’s concern, as Hoekstra notes, is to silence “those who publicly
teach disobedience or governance that will induce disobedience.”134 But what motivates
Hobbes’s concern is not merely, as Hoekstra contends, to quell the prospects of civil war
or rebellion but also to ensure that the necessary condition that makes the law obligatory
is satisfied. That is to say, Hobbes’s concern in silencing fooles, I contend, is to ensure
that subjects believe that all other subjects are committed to social justice in order that the
laws of nature—the principles which underlie civil laws—remain in foro externo
obligatory. Thus, silencing fooles is necessary, not merely to avoid civil war, but also to
avoid the state of war simpliciter; that is to say, silencing fooles is necessary to avoid the
state of affairs in which personal or private judgment, and not law, determines what
counts as right reason.

2.6 Conclusion
As we see in the detail of the title-page for the first edition of Leviathan, Hobbes’s
“COMMONWEALTH,” or “that great LEVIATHAN,” cuts an imposing figure.135
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Leviathan, 15/4, 72.
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Hoekstra, “Hobbes and the Foole,” 640.
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Detail of title-page for the first edition of Leviathan, 1651: Mansell Collection. The engraving
is by Abraham Bosse. The Latin inscription reads Non est potestas Super Terram quae
Comparetur ei Job 41:24 [There is no power on earth which can be compared to him].
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The Commonwealth, for Hobbes, is an artificial person. As an artifice, the person of the
Commonwealth is a product of the will, that is, a product of mutual covenant, of those
who shall be ruled. Hobbes defines the Commonwealth as follows:
[T]he multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in
Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather
(to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God to which we owe, under the
Immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by
every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much
power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled
to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against
their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the
Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great
multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves
every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of
them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common
defence.136
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Leviathan, 17/13, 87.
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By terror thereof, the person of the Commonwealth conforms the will of them all to
peace. But the unity of the Commonwealth—the multitude, as depicted above, who
collectively comprise the person of the Commonwealth—is not constituted through the
terror of the Commonwealth itself. The will of them all conforms to peace because each
citizen knows that those who do not have a will to conform know they will suffer the
wrath of the Commonwealth, that is, suffer the wrath of “he that carryeth this person
[who] is called SOVEREIGN.”137 The terror of the Commonwealth enables each person
who has a will to peace to conform his will to peace.
The person of the Commonwealth is imposing, but he is also mortal. In fact, as
Hobbes notes, “he is mortal and subject to decay, as all other earthly creatures are.”138
According to Hobbes,
THOUGH nothing can be immortal which mortals make; yet, if men had
the use of reason they pretend to, their Commonwealths might be secured,
at least, from perishing by internal diseases. For by the nature of their
institution, they are designed to live as long as mankind, or as the laws of
nature, or as justice itself, which gives them life.139
The significance of these remarks are clear: justice, the endeavour to keep the covenant
that holds the authority of the law over renounced natural rights, is what gives continued
life to the Commonwealth. As noted in the previous section, sedition, or the questioning
of the authority of the sovereign’s laws, is poison to the Commonwealth; again, as
Hobbes states, “the poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is that every private man is
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Leviathan, 17/14, 88.
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Leviathan, 28/27, 167.
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Leviathan, 29/1, 167.
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judge of good and evil actions”140 tends to the dissolution, to the death, of the
Commonwealth. The Commonwealth cannot stand if many or most of its subjects do not
endeavour justice, that is, the recognition of the authority of the sovereign’s laws. Put
another way, the Commonwealth, insofar as it has had any permanence, must have had
the majority of its citizens endeavouring justice. The Commonwealth cannot rely on
force or fear of punishment if it is to have any sustained life. A “defectuous
procreation”141 is one in which the majority of its original subjects are unjust. A diseased
Commonwealth is one in which the majority of its present subjects are unjust. As Hobbes
claims, the grounds of authority of sovereignty, particularly the authority to make law,
“cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment.”142 The terror that
maintains the sovereign authority is not legal punishment but, rather, the prospects of the
lack of sovereign authority, that is to say, the prospects of the state of war or the state of
affairs wherein “every private man is judge of good and evil actions.”
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Article 3

3

Hobbes on the Punishment of the Innocent

3.1 Introduction
Thomas Hobbes explicitly addresses the issue of the punishment of the innocent in only a
handful of passages in Leviathan.1 In the following lengthy passage—a passage to which
I will repeatedly refer back throughout this paper—Hobbes gives his most sustained
attention to the issue:
All punishments of innocent subjects, be they great or little, are against the
law of nature: for punishment is only for transgression of the law, and
therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent. It is therefore a
violation, first, of that law of nature which forbiddeth all men, in their
revenges, to look at anything but some future good: for there can arrive no
good to the Commonwealth by punishing the innocent. Secondly, of that
which forbiddeth ingratitude: for seeing all sovereign power is originally
given by the consent of every one of the subjects, to the end they should as
long as they are obedient be protected thereby, the punishment of the
innocent is a rendering of evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that
commandeth equity; that is to say, an equal distribution of justice, which
in punishing the innocent is not observed.2
Hobbes’s concern with the punishment of the innocent focuses on the scope of the
distribution of punishment, that is, upon whom punishment ought to be (or can be)
inflicted. The principal question I address in this paper is how ought we to understand,

1

References to Leviathan are by chapter and paragraph(s) in the G.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996) edition, followed by page number(s) in the original (1651) edition.
References to De Cive are by chapter and paragraph(s) followed by the page number(s) of the
Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) edition. All emphases are in the original
work unless otherwise noted.
2

Leviathan, 28/22, 165
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within his theory of punishment, Hobbes’s claim that “there can be no punishment of the
innocent.”
Hobbes’s position against the punishment of the innocent has received modest
attention in the literature. Those who address Hobbes’s concern correctly hold the view
that the laws of nature prohibiting cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity,3 as “articles of
peace,”4 ground the principle that “there can be no punishment of the innocent,” thus, to
breach the laws of nature is to introduce war.5

There are nineteen laws of nature that Hobbes considers in Leviathan as “dictating peace, for a
means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which only concern the doctrine of civil
society” (Leviathan, 15/34, 78). The laws of nature prohibiting cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity
are relevant to the issue of the punishment of the innocent. In this article, I explore the manner in
which these three particular laws of nature are relevant to the issue.
3

4

Leviathan, 13/14, 63.

There is a school of thought that deviates from reading Hobbes’s claim that “there can be no
punishment of the innocent” a prescriptive. We find a number of scholars attributing to Hobbes a
view we find in punishment theory called “logical retributivism” whereby the proposition “the
punishment of the innocent” is a contradiction or nonsensical, or, conversely, the proposition
“punishment is for the guilty” is a tautology. As A.M. Quinton claims, “retributivism, properly
understood, is not a moral but logical doctrine, and that it does not provide a moral justification of
the infliction of punishment but an elucidation of the use of the word. Utilitarianism, on the other
hand, embraces a number of possible moral attitudes towards punishment, none of which
necessarily involves the objectionable consequences commonly adduced by retributivists
provided that the word ‘punishment’ is understood in the way that the essential retributivist thesis
lays down. […] In brief, the two theories answer different questions: retributivism the question
‘when (logically) can we punish?’; utilitarianism the question ‘when (morally) may we or ought
we to punish?’” (“On Punishment,” 134). Guilt, as such, is not a principled requirement for
punishment but, rather, a logical requirement. As noted, a number of scholar attribute this view to
Hobbes. See Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation,
184: “Hobbes saw that by definition, punishment is retributive or penal. There can be no
punishment properly called, where there has been no transgression of the law and such a
description cannot therefore be applied to actions against the innocent.” John Laird argues that
Hobbes’s claim that “there can be no punishment of the innocent” implies that any contrary claim
must be nonsensical: “a profoundly simple consideration that makes nonsense of one of the usual
objections to a utilitarian or deterrent theory of punishment, i.e. that such theories might justify
unjust ‘punishments’” (Hobbes, 221-222; additional emphasis added). Dieter Hüning argues that
“Hobbes attaches to the principle of guilt [...] the simple idea that punishment necessarily
presupposes guilt” (“Hobbes on the Right to Punish,” 225; emphases added). Alan Ryan claims
that “Hobbes’s argument [that punishment is only for the guilty] was indeed simply re-invented
three hundred years later [in] the 1950s attempt to deal with the issue of unjust ‘punishment’ by
5
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Edward G. Andrew, a proponent of the view that the laws of nature ground the
principle that the innocent ought not to be punished, notes that the
Hobbesian sovereign cannot punish subjects without a public trial, based on
precedent law: to do so is to wage war on subjects; it is an act of hostility,
not of punishment, and reintroduces the state of war that sovereignty served
to supercede. Punishment of the innocent is thus contrary to the law of
nature.6
Andrew understands Hobbes’s concern with the punishment of the innocent as relevant to
the sovereign’s duty, grounded in the laws of nature, to maintain peace; because the
punishment of the innocent reintroduces the state of war, it is contrary to the laws of
nature. Norberto Bobbio notes that, for Hobbes,
If the sovereign violates a law of nature—for example, by sentencing an
innocent person to death—he commits a wrong towards God, but not his
subject […] Hobbes explains in another passage that the punishment of
subjects who are innocent constitutes the violation of three laws of nature.7

the definitional manoeuvre of pointing out that only a penalty inflicted on the guilty for a crime
could count as ‘punishment.’ Here, Hobbes’s Chapter 28 surely is three hundred years ahead of
its time” (“Hobbes’s Political Philosophy,” 244, n. 71). And J.W.N. Watkins notes that “Hobbes’s
point has been developed independently by A.M. Quinton” (Hobbes’s System of Ideas: A Study in
the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories, 97). In response to the attribution of “logical
retributivism” to Hobbes, we can note that he follows his claim that “there can be no punishment
of the innocent” with three arguments, each appealing to a particular law of nature as providing
reasons for the sovereign to only punish those who are found guilty. If the claim that “there can
be no punishment of the innocent” is merely a logical or definitional one about punishment, then
we must dismiss Hobbes’s supportive arguments as confused or nonsensical. It would be akin to
answering the question “why are no bachelors married?” that is a response to the logical or
conceptual claim that “all bachelors are unmarried men” with an appeal, say, to the benefits of
remaining single. Accordingly, we ought to read each appeal to a particular law of nature as
Hobbes clearly intends, namely, as a prescription: one ought not to be cruel, ungrateful, and/or
iniquitous with retribution. The laws of nature are prescriptions for establishing and maintaining
domestic peace.
6

Edward G. Andrew, “Hobbes on Conscience within the Law and without,” 218.

7

Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, 139.
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The punishment of the innocent, according to Bobbio, constitutes the violation of three
laws of nature; the appeal to the laws of nature fully encompasses the issue of the
punishment of the innocent. Mario A. Cattaneo notes that, for Hobbes,
[E]vil inflicted by the authority [the sovereign] without precedent public
condemnation is not a true punishment but an act of hostility, and [Hobbes]
makes the interesting and important observation that for this reason ‘the safe
custody of a man accused.... is not Punishment’, [and] any hurt he may
suffer in this case constituting a violation of the law of nature.8
In company with Andrew and Bobbio, Cattaneo reduces Hobbes’s concern with the
punishment of the innocent to the violation of the law of nature. S.A. Lloyd notes that, for
Hobbes,
Because no good can come to the commonwealth from punishing the
innocent, the seventh Law of Nature forbids punishing the innocent, as does
the fourth Law of Nature forbidding ingratitude or the returning of evil for
good, and the eleventh requiring equity.9
Lloyd’s view directly links the punishment of the innocent to the laws of nature, as the
seventh law of nature itself (the law that prohibits cruelty) “forbids punishing the
innocent.” F.S. McNeilly claims that,
Equity [for Hobbes] is the equal distribution of justice in criminal
prosecutions, giving no special favour to the rich or powerful, and punishing
only the guilty and not the innocent. The justification of this as a law of
nature […] is that it is clearly a necessary mean to peace, since to treat men
inequitably is to deprive them of the benefits of law and order and therefore
invite them to war.10
Equity requires only punishing the guilty. The justification for not punishing the
innocent, for McNeilly, is that such inequity is contrary to peace. Again, appeal to peace,

8

Mario A. Cattaneo, “Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment,” 286.

9

S.A. Lloyd, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature, 37.

10

F.S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan, 246.
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via the law of nature, is the governing norm for “punishing only the guilty and not the
innocent.” Lastly, D.D. Raphael notes that, for Hobbes,
[I]f the sovereign orders a citizen to be arrested and executed, he does no
injustice or injury since he has the full right to do it. But he may be acting
inequitably. If the citizen has not broken any laws or, in breaking a law,
has not done anything that merits so severe a penalty as death, the
sovereign, in his capacity as supreme judge of the State, is not dealing
equitably with that citizen as compared with others. The sovereign is
bound by the laws of nature, which prescribe measures to avoid slipping
back into the condition of war. He therefore has a natural duty of equity.11
In company with McNeilly, Raphael limits his considerations to the requirements of
equity as grounding the principles of punishment, including the punishment of the
innocent. And in company with McNeilly, Raphael thinks that the justification of the law
of nature prohibiting inequity as grounding the principle that “there can be no punishment
of the innocent,” lies in the avoidance of “slipping back into the condition of war.”
What we find in the above accounts, either implicitly or explicitly, is that cruelty,
ingratitude, and/or inequity in punishment—the punishment of the innocent—is contrary
to domestic peace. As Andrew and Cattaneo explicitly note, the sovereign’s punishing of
the innocent is an act of hostility. As Andrew, McNeilly, and Raphael explicitly note, the
sovereign’s punishing of the innocent risks war. Our commentators are correct that the
punishing of the innocent is an act of hostility and risks war. But, as I argue in this paper,
each account that we find in the literature attending to Hobbes’s principled concern with
the punishment of the innocent is incomplete.12 The tradition cannot explain why cruelty,

11

D.D. Raphael, “Hobbes on Justice,” 168.

My view, as it will become clearer, is that the tradition’s analysis of Hobbes’s concern with the
punishment of the innocent is incomplete due the tradition’s failure to acknowledge that Hobbes
holds that prospective subjects’ granting the sovereign the authority to punish them is the basis by
which the sovereign acquires the right to punish. That Hobbes holds this view is confirmed in the
forthcoming analysis of his concern with the punishment of the innocent.
12
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ingratitude, and inequity in punishment (manifested in the punishment of the innocent) is
an act of hostility as opposed to punishment proper or properly explain why the habitual
practice of cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in punishment (manifested in the habitual
practice of punishing the innocent) risks reintroducing the state of war.
In this paper, I argue that to understand the claim that cruelty, ingratitude, and
inequity in punishment—punishing the innocent—introduces hostilities we must
understand i) what it is about cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in particular that, for
Hobbes, captures the punishment of the innocent, ii) why Hobbes holds that cruelty,
ingratitude, and inequity in punishment is an act of hostility, and iii) why Hobbes holds
that the habitual practice of cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in punishment—the habitual
practice of punishing the innocent—risks reintroducing the state of war.
Commentators are correct to note that, for Hobbes, the laws of nature prohibiting
cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity ground the principle that the innocent ought not to be
punished. But, as I argue in this paper, it is through prospective subjects’ authorizing the
sovereign to punish them for (and only for) transgressing the law that the laws of nature
prohibiting cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity are germane to the issue of punishment.13
The sovereign is authorized to only punish those who transgress the law. In Chapter 18 of
A passage from De Cive may be somewhat instructive here: according to Hobbes, “Theft,
Murther, Adultery, and all injuries are forbid by the Lawes of nature; but what is to be called
Theft, what Murther, what Adultery, what injury in a Citizen, this is not to be determined by the
naturall, but by the civill Law: for not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth,
but onely another mans goods is theft; but what is ours, and what anothers, is a question
belonging to the civill Law. In like manner, not every killing of a man is Murther, but onely that
which the civill Law forbids; neither is all encounter with women Adultery, but onely that which
the civill Law prohibits.” (De Cive, 6/16, 101). In a somewhat similar vein, we can acknowledge
that the laws of nature prohibit cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity. But before prospective subjects
authorize the sovereign to punish them for transgressing the law, there is no sense in which
cruelty, ingratitude, or inequity is germane to the issues of punishment, particularly the issue of
the punishment of the innocent.
13
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Leviathan, “Of the Rights of Sovereigns by Institution,” Hobbes contends that mutual
authorization by prospective subjects is the means by which “all the rights and faculties
of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people
assembled.”14 The right to punish is included in the catalogue of rights conferred upon
the sovereign, a list of which Hobbes provides in the same chapter; as Hobbes claims, “to
the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour; and of
punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject
according to the law he hath formerly made.”15
There is, for Hobbes, no guilt or innocence before prospective subjects make
themselves accountable to the law via the social covenant. For Hobbes, the concepts of
guilt and innocence are inapplicable in the state of nature; as Hobbes attests, “it is lawful
by the original right of nature to make war; wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the
victor make distinction of nocent and innocent as to the time past.”16 Moreover, for
Hobbes, there is no punishment before a political or public person is instituted to
represent the multitude (the Commonwealth); as Hobbes maintains, “it is of the nature of
punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority only of the
representative itself.”17
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Leviathan, 18/2, 88.

15

Leviathan, 18/14, 92; emphasis added.

16

Leviathan, 28/23, 165.

17

Leviathan, 28/12, 163; emphasis added. Unlike Hugo Grotius before him or John Locke after
him, Hobbes does not hold the view that persons (including the person who holds the office of the
sovereign) have a pre-political or natural right to punish. See my first article, “The Right to
Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” note 20 and 21 and corresponding text.
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Answering the first question—what it is about cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in
particular that, for Hobbes, captures the punishment of the innocent—requires extending
our analysis beyond the three arguments offered in the passage quoted at the beginning of
this paper. We must attend to Hobbes’s general understanding of cruelty, ingratitude, and
inequity in order to address how these three particular laws of nature are germane to the
punishment of the innocent. I argue that the law of nature prohibiting cruelty captures the
punishment of the innocent because the act is contrary to the purpose for which subjects
authorize the sovereign to punish them for transgressing the law. The law of nature
prohibiting ingratitude captures the punishment of the innocent because the act is
contrary to the expectation subjects have following their authorization of the sovereign to
punish them for transgressing the law. The law of nature prohibiting inequity captures the
punishment of the innocent because the act is contrary to the trust for which the
sovereign is authorized to punish transgressors of the law.
I argue that the punishment of the innocent is an act of hostility because is it an
unauthorized (illegitimate) exercise of sovereign authority; it is represented as an act of
hostility because it is not to be attributed to the office of sovereignty but, rather and only,
to the person (or persons) who holds the office of sovereignty. As I have argued
elsewhere, prospective subjects’ authorization of the sovereign to punish them for
transgressing the law, for Hobbes, provides the distinction between acts of punishment
and acts of hostility; violent acts that are not attributed to the public authority cannot be
construed as punishment but, rather, are construed as acts of hostility.18 The punishment
of the innocent is an act of hostility because the person holding the office of sovereignty
18

See my first article, “The Right to Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan.”
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acts beyond his commission to only punish the guilty. This is a conceptual claim based on
Hobbes’s theory of authorization.19
The habitual practice of cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in punishment (the
habitual practice of punishing the innocent) leads to war because, as an unauthorized
(illegitimate) exercise of sovereign authority, it will likely be viewed as a declaration of
war against the citizenry en masse. The claim that the habitual practice of cruelty,
ingratitude, and inequity in punishment—the habitual practice of punishing the
innocent—leads to (or reintroduces) the state of war is an empirical claim, but one that
draws on the above conceptual claim. Subjects will most likely revolt due to the habitual
practice of cruelty, ingratitude, and inequity in punishment when i) they recognize that
their own accountability to law is absent when the purpose of the institution of
punishment—i.e., maintaining the in foro externo obligation to the law—is negated; ii)
they recognize that their expectation for granting the sovereign the right to punish—i.e.,
protection under the law—is habitually unmet; and iii) they recognize that the trust for
which the sovereign is authorized to distribute retributive justice—i.e., proper ownership
in punishment—is habitually breached.
19

Accordingly, we can appreciate that, for Hobbes, harm inflicted by the sovereign upon the
innocent is not punishment proper but hostility. Yet to argue that the claim “punishment is
inflicted upon the guilty” is a tautology or true by definition, as Hüning, Laird, Ryan, Warrender,
and Watkins each attribute such a view to Hobbes, is to ignore the contractual grounds Hobbes
provides for an account of punishment: the distinction between punishment and hostility draws on
the distinction between the exercise of an artificial right as an act of political representation and
the exercise of the right of nature as a private act. Hobbes’s definition of punishment that he
offers in Chapter 28 of Leviathan, “Of Punishments and Rewards,” and all but one of the eleven
inferences he draws from it—that to be neglected by public favour is not punishment—reiterate
the norms of an institution that is politically constituted through each prospective subject
authorizing the sovereign to punish him for transgressing the law. “A PUNISHMENT,” according
to Hobbes, “is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which
is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law” (Leviathan, 28/1, 161). Hobbes
adds, “[f]rom the definition of punishment, I infer, first, that neither private revenges nor injuries
of private men can properly be styled punishment, because they proceed not from public
authority” (Leviathan, 28/3, 162).
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Each of Hobbes’s three arguments that appeal to a particular law of nature draws
upon this concern for legitimacy in punishment. Hobbes’s appeals to the three particular
laws of nature as the means for maintaining domestic peace should be read as appeals to
the maintaining legitimacy in punishment. The punishment of the innocent would be
viewed as contrary to the norms of authorization or, what is the same, as an unauthorized
exercise of sovereign power.

3.2 Inequity (Against the Eleventh Law of Nature)
Since Hobbes’s appeal to maintaining legitimacy in punishment is, I believe, most
apparent in the third argument in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper, I will
begin my account with it. According to Hobbes, “the law [of nature] that commandeth
equity; that is to say, an equal distribution of justice, which in punishing the innocent is
not observed.”20 The objective at hand is to understand how, for Hobbes, the law of
nature prohibiting inequity captures the punishment of the innocent.
Each prospective subject grants the sovereign the right to punish him in order that
each prospective subject establishes himself to be accountable to the law.21 Put somewhat
differently, prospective subjects contract that there be some actions the committing of
which ought to be punished. Breaches of the laws of nature and the exercise of invasive
natural rights that were renounced serve as the starting point for giving substantive
content to crime. But granting the sovereign the right to punish transgressors does not, by
itself, provide the scope of legitimacy in punishment. Without qualification, granting the
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Leviathan, 28/22, 165

For an extended analysis of this theme, see my second article, “Hobbes on the Rationale of
Punishment.”
21
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right to punish simply makes one accountable for transgressing the law. Unqualified, the
grant simply states that “if I commit a crime, then the sovereign has the right to punish
me.” The grant indicates nothing about a limiting condition on the right to punish. Thus,
we must ask the following question: if a subject does not commit a crime, does Hobbes
hold the view that the sovereign still has the right to punish him?
When we survey Hobbes’s remarks regarding the biblical story of David and
Uriah,22 it seems that he intimates that the sovereign does have the right to punish the
innocent. Hobbes notes:
[N]othing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what
pretence soever, can properly be called injustice or injury; because every
subject is author of every act the sovereign doth [to him], so that he never
wanteth right to any thing, otherwise than as he himself is the subject of
God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature. And therefore it
may and doth often happen in Commonwealths that a subject may be put
to death by the command of the sovereign power, and yet neither do the
other wrong […] And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince that
putteth to death an innocent subject. For though the action be against the
law of nature, as being contrary to equity (as was the killing of Uriah by
David); yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God. Not to Uriah, because
the right to do what he pleased was given him by Uriah himself; and yet to
God, because David was God's subject and prohibited all iniquity by the
law of nature.23

22

For those unfamiliar with the biblical story, a brief account of the story from the 11th Chapter of
the 2nd Book of Samuel in The Old Testament will be helpful: Upon seeing Bathsheba from the
roof of his palace, and unaware that she was the Wife of Uriah, King David seduced her, resulting
in a pregnancy. When David was informed that Bathsheba was Uriah’s wife, he summoned Uriah
from battle, suggesting that he go home and “attend” to his wife, with the hope that the pregnancy
would appear legitimate. However, Uriah refused, claiming a code of honour to remain with his
fellow warriors while they were in battle. After repeatedly refusing to see his wife, David sent
Uriah to his commanding officer Joab with a letter, the content of which was unbeknownst to
Uriah, that secretly ordered Joab to put Uriah at the head of the battle and then have the soldiers
move away from him so that he would be the sole target. Uriah is killed in battle. Upon Uriah’s
death, David made Bathsheba his wife.
23

Leviathan, 21/7, 109; emphasis added.
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It seems that Hobbes holds that an innocent subject can rightfully be put to death by the
sovereign. This claim appears incompatible with the claim I am attributing to Hobbes that
the authority to punish a subject is granted the sovereign representative only so far as that
subject is guilty of transgressing the sovereign’s law. There is a way to reconcile the two
claims, but this first requires us to answer our query set out above; that is, how, for
Hobbes, does the law of nature prohibiting inequity capture the punishment of the
innocent?
We must first appreciate that the grant of the right to punish is limited. Hobbes
implies that each prospective subject, in authorizing punishment, “covenant[s] thus,
unless I do so, or so, kill me.”24 Or, to be more precise, each prospective subject
“covenant[s] thus, unless I do so, or so, [the sovereign has the authority to] kill
[imprison, or fine] me.” We can recognize that the sovereign is not merely granted the
right to punish a subject for transgressing the law, but only for transgressing the law. The
qualification adds to the grant “only if I commit a crime, then the sovereign has the right
to punish me.” The sovereign is given the authority to punish the prospective subject
unless the subject is obedient to the law; i.e., unless the subject does not transgress the
law. The authority to punish granted the sovereign has a very significant provision
attached. The authority to punish is granted for only those cases for which the subject is
found guilty of committing a crime. One is liable for punishment only so far as one has
committed a crime. Here guilt is to be uniquely or exclusively determined by reference to
the wrong act(s) that a person performed. Guilt and punishment are, thus, inexorably and
exclusively linked. But it is important to appreciate that, for Hobbes, guilt and
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Leviathan, 14/29, 70.
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punishment are linked by virtue of the above stipulation made by prospective subjects in
granting the sovereign the authority to punish.
This limitation placed on sovereign authority to only punish the guilty—to only
punish those who have transgressed the law—draws upon Hobbes’s general treatment of
authorization. Hobbes claims that a limitation may be placed on authorization in the
following passage:
[E]very man giving their common representer authority from himself in
particular, and owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they
give him authority without stint: otherwise, when they limit him in what
and how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they
gave him commission to act.25
Prospective subjects do not give the sovereign the authority to punish without stint;
rather, we see that liability for punishment is limited only to those who commit
transgressions of the law. The punishment of the innocent is an act of hostility, although
not because it breaches the law of nature requiring equity; the punishment of the innocent
is an act of hostility because the sovereign fails to act within the scope of his commission
or, what is the same, the scope of authorization. As we see below, Hobbes’s argument
against inequity in punishment is best understood as appealing to the limiting condition
of authorization of the right to punish.
Regarding the eleventh law of nature, Hobbes claims that one who is
commissioned or entrusted to judge between persons is required to “distribute to every
man his own.”26 To this claim Hobbes adds, “this is indeed just distribution, and may be
called, though improperly, distributive justice, but more properly equity, which also is a
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Leviathan, 16/14, 82; emphasis added.
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Leviathan, 15/15, 75; emphasis added.

129

law of nature.”27 Elsewhere Hobbes remarks that equity requires “the equal distribution
to each man of that which in reason belonged to him.”28 Accordingly, from these remarks
we can infer the norm that governs equity or distributive justice is ownership: that each
person is to be distributed “his own.” To punish the innocent, then, is not to give that
subject “his own.” To put it another way, punishment does not “belong” to the innocent.
Hobbes, we should note, understands the act of punishment to be owned by the
subject condemned. Hobbes claims that “he that attempteth,” for example, “to depose his
sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own
punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do.”29 And to be
an author of an action is to own that action: Hobbes states, of “persons artificial, some
have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent. And then the person
is the actor, and he that owneth his words and actions is the AUTHOR, in which case the
actor acteth by authority.”30 Ownership of punishment arises through the subject’s
authorization of the sovereign to punish him for transgressing the law.
We cannot understand the attribution of ownership in punishment without an
appeal to authorization. Again, equity requires that the sovereign “distribute to every man
his own” and, as we must understand Hobbes here to further intimate, to punish the
innocent is not to give that subject his own. But we cannot understand the misattribution
of ownership in punishment except by an appeal to the limiting scope or the limiting
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Leviathan, 15/15, 75.
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Leviathan, 15/24, 77
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Leviathan, 18/3, 89; emphasis added.
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condition of authorization. If we ask why an innocent subject does not own the
punishment inflicted upon him, the only response available requires an appeal to the
authorization of the right to punish or, more specifically, the limiting condition of the
authorization of the right to punish.
As we have already noted above, Hobbes claims of those who authorize another
to act upon their behalf, “none of them owneth more than they gave him commission to
act.”31 No subject owns the punishment of a crime for which he is not guilty. If a subject
is accused, found not guilty, but then punished by the sovereign despite the acquittal, the
innocent subject does not own the punishment for the simple reason that the sovereign
acts beyond his commission as representative of the people to punish only those who are
guilty. The sovereign may have a personal vendetta with the subject condemned, but the
sovereign does not act as the public representative when, after the acquittal, he harms the
subject (or brings about harm to that subject through the pretence of authority). Not every
action the sovereign performs is an act of political representation; as Hobbes claims,
“every man or assembly that hath sovereignty representeth two persons, or, as the more
common phrase is, has two capacities, one natural and another politic; as a monarch hath
the person not only of the Commonwealth, but also of a man.”32 The case in which the
sovereign inflicts harm on an innocent subject, the sovereign—not the subject—owns the
action; that is to say, the sovereign acts in his capacity as a natural person, not in his
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capacity as an artificial person. As such, the harm inflicted is not an act of punishment,
but rather an act of hostility.33
Hobbes’s appeal to the law of nature prohibiting inequity in arguing against the
punishment of innocent is best understood when we appreciate that the appeal to equity
involves an appeal to maintaining legitimacy in punishment, i.e., maintaining proper
ownership in the distribution of justice. F.S. McNeilly argues that, for Hobbes, equity,
particularly the equitable distribution of punishment, is necessary for domestic peace, as
the iniquitous distribution of punishment invites war. McNeilly articulates this view in a
passage that bears repeating:
Equity is the equal distribution of justice in criminal prosecutions, giving no
special favour to the rich or powerful, and punishing only the guilty and not
the innocent. The justification of this as a law of nature, which also must be
observed in the provisions and administration of civil law, is that it is clearly
a necessary means to peace, since to treat men inequitably is to deprive
them of the benefits of law and order and therefore invite them to war.34
McNeilly is by no means mistaken to claim that Hobbes appeals to the law of nature in
prohibiting the punishment of the innocent as the means to domestic peace.
Nevertheless, his analysis is incomplete in an important way. The fact that the sovereign
breaches the law of nature—treats subjects inequitably— by depriving subjects of the
benefits of law and order does not, by itself, capture Hobbes’s explanation of why

Returning to a passage quoted above, Hobbes notes, “he that attempteth,” for example,
“to depose his sovereign be killed or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own
punishment, as being, by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do” (Leviathan, 18/3,
89). We can now understand Hobbes’s claim that the subject is “author of all his sovereign shall
do” refers to those actions that the person who holds the office of the sovereign performs as the
sovereign representative. The subject is not author of, has not authorized, those actions that the
person who holds the office of the sovereignty performs as representative of his own person. For
extended analysis of Hobbes’s account of representation, see my first article, “The Right to
Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan.”
33
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McNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan, 246.
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inequitable punishment in particular invites subjects to war against the sovereign. In other
words, the claim that persons, when deprived of the benefits of law and order, will war
against the sovereign is certainly significant, but it is missing a crucial step in Hobbes’s
argument. To fully appreciate Hobbes’s third argument—that inequitable punishment, in
particular, invites war—we must appeal to the underlying trust that was breached with
the punishment of the innocent.
The sovereign, according to Hobbes, is “trusted to judge between man and man,
[and] it is a precept of the law of nature [requiring equity] that he deal equally between
them.”35 Equity draws on this trust, not merely to judge impartially, but to ensure the
determinations of retributive justice align with “that which in reason belonged to him
[i.e., in this case, the accused].”36 As Hobbes notes, the equitable distribution of justice is
not observed with the punishment of the innocent. The inequitable treatment will be
viewed as the breach of trust to distribute justice according to what “belonged to him,”
that is, to what the subject “owneth.” As noted above, that which a subject owns follows
from the actions he authorized the sovereign to perform as the representative of the
people. Subjects do not authorize—subjects do not own—those harms that are not a
retributive response to a transgression of the law. Those harms, as we also noted above,
are owned by the sovereign as a natural or private person; accordingly, the punishment of
the innocent is an act of hostility.
35

Leviathan, 15/23, 77; original emphasis omitted. We must not overlook the juridical context of
this relationship. The trust is established by each prospective subject (the trustors) authorizing the
sovereign (the trustee) to distribute retributive justice, in accord with equity, to the benefit of the
people or the Commonwealth (the beneficiary). The sovereign owes a fiduciary duty to the
Commonwealth, although we must recognize that even if the sovereign fails to discharge this
duty, the fiduciary relationship is irrevocable through jurispolitical means. Of course, as we see in
section 3.4 below, the want of a right to rebel does not preclude the possibility of rebellion.
36
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Hobbes’s specific concern with inequitable punishment is not, as McNeilly
argues, simply that depriving subjects of the benefits of law and order is an invitation to
war. We must draw out Hobbes’s reasoning here, as his argument is more discerning: the
sovereign is entrusted to distribute the benefits and burdens of law according to what one
is owed, that is, according to “what in reason belonged to him,” and to deprive subjects of
the benefits of law and order by punishing them despite their innocence is to breach this
trust.
Hobbes’s reasoning why inequity in punishment in particular is an invitation to
war is now available to us. Hobbes notes that “[h]e therefore that is partial in judgement,
doth what in him lies to deter men from the use of judges and arbitrators, and
consequently, against the fundamental law of nature, is the cause of war.”37 The judgment
that one ought to be punished despite an acquittal displays not only a prejudice against
the particular subject condemned but also a rejection of the principle that determines
ownership in punishment. The acquittal is the judicial determination that punishment
does not “belong to him,” that is, punishment does not belong to the accused. To punish
despite the judicial determination does not override the judgment of innocence; rather, it
overrides the principle that governs the distribution of retributive justice—that guilt is a
necessary requirement for punishment. The sovereign is entrusted as the sole arbiter of
justice, including retributive justice. The practice of habitual inequity in punishment—the
habitual punishment of the innocent—will be contrary to domestic peace because the
distribution of retributive justice to whom it does not belong will be viewed as a breach
of this trust. Such prejudice will “deter men from the use of judges and arbitrators,” and
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the punishment of the innocent in particular, as I think Hobbes further intimates, deters
subjects from viewing the sovereign as the entrusted arbiter of justice.
Equity in punishment, as we have seen, concerns ownership in punishment, or
“distribut[ing] to every man his own.” And ownership in punishment follows from each
subject’s authorization of the sovereign to punish him for transgressing the law. An
innocent subject, as we have noted, does not own the punishment. Hobbes’s appeal to
equity in punishment is an appeal to maintaining legitimacy in punishment, that is,
maintaining proper ownership in punishment. Eschewing inequity in punishment as a
means to domestic peace requires the sovereign to maintain legitimacy in punishment,
that is, it requires the sovereign to only punish the guilty.
Returning to Hobbes’s treatment of David and Uriah, we can now see that his
position here is consistent with the above account; that is, it is consistent with his account
that authorizing the sovereign the right to punish provides the limiting condition on
legitimate punishment. When we scrutinize the passage in which David is said to put
Uriah (an innocent subject) to death, we are told that such an act, although within David’s
right, is iniquitous. We have to ask the following: why does Hobbes think that the killing
of Uriah by David is iniquitous? The first thing to note is that the putting to death of
Uriah is not iniquitous because it is a case of punishing the innocent. Uriah’s
condemnation does not follow being publically accused and subsequently acquitted;
Uriah’s death is neither brought about before a public court nor after a public acquittal.
Uriah death is brought about in a clandestine fashion, calculated to occur on the
battlefield. Accordingly, Hobbes’s does not say that David “punishes” Uriah, only that
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Uriah, an innocent subject, is put to death.38 But Uriah’s death is not iniquitous because
he was innocent of any wrongdoing. Rather, Uriah’s death is iniquitous because he was
singled out by David (and killed in order that David could marry Uriah’s wife,
Bathsheba). As we see, it is a particular case of prosopolepsia of which David is guilty:
Also, if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of
the law of nature that he deal equally between them.[…] The observance
of this law, from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason
belonged to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have said before) distributive
justice: the violation, acception of persons, prosopolepsia.39
David, thus, treats Uriah inequitably by singling him out for death. David’s singling out
Uriah for death during battle is iniquitous because it has nothing to do with soldiery or
the requirements of military success; it is only because of David’s illicit affair with
Bathsheba that Uriah is purposely placed in peril.40 As we have seen, the punishment of
the innocent is against equity. But the case of David bringing about the death of Uriah
does not constitute the punishment of the innocent. Punishing the innocent is not a right
the sovereign representative possesses.

David Dyzenhaus, “How Hobbes met the ‘Hobbes Challenge,’” The Modern Law Review 72
(2009): 499, draws the same conclusion: “it is significant that Hobbes characterizes the story as
one about putting to death an innocent. He does not and cannot say that it is about ‘punishing’ an
innocent, since punishment for Hobbes is by definition an act that follows a proper finding of
guilt for a crime that was set out in a public law before the act was done.” In accordance with the
biblical story, Hobbes does not say David punishes Uriah because the bringing about the death of
Uriah fails to accord with the juridical rules of criminal procedure. As Hobbes states, “the evil
inflicted by public authority, without precedent public condemnation, is not to be styled by the
name of punishment, but of a hostile act, because the fact for which a man is punished ought first
to be judged by public authority to be a transgression of the law” (Leviathan, 28/5,162).
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Leviathan, 15/23-24, 77.

In this case, the distribution of military burdens—to be the sole target of the enemy—was
unrelated to the burdens for which soldiers may expect to assume. A soldier may expect, say, to
“stand in the breach” (a tactic employed to defend the incursion by the enemy of a breach in the
fortress). If a commander singles out a particular soldier to perform this task, such a distribution
of burdens is not iniquitous insofar as the particular soldier is singled out for military, and not
personal, reasons.
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3.3 Ingratitude (Against the Fourth Law of Nature)
Hobbes presents the second argument against the punishment of the innocent as follows:
the punishment of the innocent “is a rendering of evil for good,” thus in violation of the
law of nature “which forbiddeth ingratitude.”41 For “seeing all sovereign power is
originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects” and “as long as they are
obedient” to the sovereign’s law subjects should be “protected thereby.”42 The objective
at hand is to understand how, for Hobbes, the law of nature prohibiting ingratitude
captures the punishment of the innocent.
The punishment of the innocent is an act of ingratitude. Again, the claim
commentators accurately attribute to Hobbes is that the laws of nature—in this case, the
law of nature prohibiting ingratitude—ground the principle that guilt is a necessary
requirement for punishment. Ingratitude in punishment, as a violation of the fourth law of
nature, invites war. To understand the latter claim, however, we must understand what it
is about the punishment of the innocent in particular that ingratitude captures. This
analysis first requires a better understanding of the fourth law of nature.
Hobbes articulates the fourth law of nature—the law requiring gratitude—as
follows:
GRATITUDE depend[s] on antecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free
gift: and is the fourth law of nature, which may be conceived in this form;
that a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour
that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good
will. For no man giveth, but with intention of good to himself; because gift
is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own
good.43
41

Leviathan, 28/22, 165.
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If I give you a sword to protect me—the good to myself that is behind the intention of the
gift—and, without provocation, you use that sword against me, I will very much regret
the gift as you act in a manner that exemplifies ingratitude. My regret exposes an
expectation that you will not wantonly attack me with the gift. Your failure to exhibit
gratitude follows from the failure to keep track of my expectation of good to follow from
the gift. However, your use of the sword against me certainly does not exhibit ingratitude
if I provoke the attack. If I attack you, I certainly cannot expect that you will not use the
sword against me; put differently, I have “no reasonable cause” to regret the gift. We can
appreciate that the mere use of the sword does not capture Hobbes’s concern with
gratitude; rather, Hobbes’s concern with gratitude tracks whether the endeavour behind
the employment of the gift—in this case, the use of the gifted sword—betrays the
expectation of the good to the benefactor.
Prefacing his second argument against the punishment of the innocent, Hobbes
claims that “all sovereign power is originally given by the consent of every one of the
subjects.”44 The sovereign “receiveth” from all prospective subjects the “benefit of mere
grace” in the authority to make law and the authority to punish transgressors of the law.
Each prospective subject recognizes that it is “good to himself” that he (and everyone
with whom he covenants) be subject to laws, the breaking of which necessitates penalties.
As Hobbes claims, “it is necessary for all men that seek peace to lay down certain rights
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Leviathan, 28/22, 165; emphasis added. Hobbes is here re-iterating the position presented
earlier in Leviathan. Hobbes contends that mutual authorization by prospective subjects is the
means by which “all the rights and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is
conferred by the consent of the people assembled” (Leviathan, 18/2, 88), including the right to
punish; as Hobbes maintains, “to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches
or honour; and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every
subject according to the law he hath formerly made” (Leviathan, 18/14, 92; emphasis added).
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of nature; that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list.”45 Each prospective subject
authorizing the sovereign to punish him for exercising renounced rights establishes trust
among the multitude. But no person recognizes any good to come from being subject to
laws that do not require a breach for one to be liable for penalties; such a state of affairs
too closely resembles the state of nature.
Just as it is necessary for peace for prospective subjects to renounce some natural
rights, the exercising of which necessitates penalties, Hobbes adds “so is it necessary for
man's life to retain some [natural rights]: as right to govern their own bodies; enjoy air,
water, motion, ways to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man
cannot live, or not live well.”46 The proper return for the gift of sovereignty, that is, the
sovereign’s proper expression of gratitude, is to maintain sufficient security—i.e., the
authority of the law over renounced natural rights—while maximizing liberty—i.e., the
free exercise of retained natural rights.47 The proper expression of gratitude for the gift of
the right to make law is to make good laws, that is, to maximize the liberty of each
subject consistent with the liberty of all subjects.48 The proper expression of gratitude for
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As Hobbes claims in the dedication to Francis Godolphin in Leviathan, the aim of the treatise is
to show how one could pass “unwounded” between those “that contend, on one side for too great
liberty, and on the other side for too much authority.”
See Leviathan, 26/20-21, 181-182: “To the care of the sovereign belongeth the making of good
laws. But what is a good law? [...] A good law is that which is needful, for the good of the people,
and withal perspicuous. For the use of laws (which are but rules authorized) is not to bind the
people from all voluntary actions, but to direct and keep them in such a motion as not to hurt
themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to
stop travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a law that is not needful, having not
the true end of a law, is not good.”
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the gift of the right to punish is to maintain the authority of law over the exercise of
renounced natural rights.49
Ingratitude in punishment—the deprivation of a subject’s right to govern his own
body, his enjoyment of air, water or motion in the absence of a prior unlawful exercise of
renounced rights—betrays the expectation of the good to follow from granting the
sovereign the authority to punish him for, and only for, transgressing the law. The
punishment of the innocent betrays the expectation of protection by the law “as long as
they are obedient.”50 The infliction of punishment per se (or the use of what Hobbes calls
“the sword of justice” per se) does not capture the concern of ingratitude in punishment.51
Ingratitude in punishment concerns whether the punishment betrays the expectation of
legitimacy in punishment—legitimacy grounded in prospective subjects’ authorization of
the sovereign to punish them for transgressing the law.
It would be wrong to complain that Hobbes argues in the second paragraph of Chapter 28, “Of
Punishments and Rewards,” that subjects do not “gift” the sovereign the right to punish as a
reason to disregard the applicability of gratitude to punishment in particular. Hobbes does make
this claim, but it is just as applicable to all the rights the sovereign representative possesses, as
there is no pre-political right to make law or adjudicate legal controversies. Authorization of a
sovereign provides the political context in which the natural right to violence is construed as a
jurispolitical or artificial right. It is the grant of authority that we ought to regard as the benefit of
grace bestowed upon the sovereign.
49

50

51

Leviathan, 28/22, 165.

The criminal, to be sure, will likely not take (nor is required to take) his punishment stoically.
As Hobbes intimates below, the criminal is expected to resist punishment: “man by nature
chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is
certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they
lead criminals to execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals
have consented to the law by which they are condemned” (Leviathan, 14/29, 70). Despite the
expectation of resistance, the criminal should not be expected to resent the fact that breaches of
the law necessitate punishment. That is to say, the criminal will have “no reasonable cause” to
regret authorizing the sovereign the right to punish him for transgressing the law. To resent the
fact that he is punished for transgressing the law is to resent the existence of the Commonwealth
as an institution ruled by law or an institution that holds the authority of the law over renounced
natural rights. As Hobbes recognizes, even though the criminal will be expected to resist, the
criminal is the author of—has authorized—the laws by which he is condemned.
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As noted above, the claim commentators attribute to Hobbes is that ingratitude in
punishment, as a violation of the fourth law of nature, invites war. Also noted above, to
understand this claim we have to attend to the mandate of gratitude and why exhibiting
ingratitude in punishment by punishing the innocent invites war. We can now appeal to
the preceding analysis: an explanation of ingratitude in punishment as an invitation to
war requires appreciation of the fact that prospective subjects make themselves liable for
punishment through authorizing the sovereign to punish them for transgressing the law,
and there is a certain expectation—protection under the law as long as they do not
transgress the law—that accompanies the wielding of the sword of justice. The habitual
failure to meet this expectation—an expectation to which gratitude is prescribed to
attend—introduces hostilities motivated by regret. The habitual punishment of the
innocent as the exemplification of ingratitude in punishment “is a rendering of [the] evil
[of punishment] for [the] good [of obedience].”52 Nothing, for Hobbes, short of the
sovereign’s dissolution of the Commonwealth, is a more grievous cause of subjects’
regret than such a rendering. Travis Smith, in the following passage, conveys Hobbes’s
concern with gratitude as keeping track of subjects’ expectations:
Gratitude, for Hobbes, requires substantially more than an expression of
friendly fellow-feeling […] If the sovereign does not meet his subjects’
expectations they may well attempt to withdraw their gift [of sovereignty],
even if they have no right to do so.53
52

Leviathan, 28/22, 165.

Travis Smith, “On the Fourth Law of Nature,” 89; emphasis added. Despite his insightful
analysis of the fourth law of nature as tracking expectations following from a gift, Smith fails to
see that Hobbes’s concern with ingratitude in punishment tracks the expectations following from
the grant of the authority to punish. Although Smith contends that the “punishment of the
innocent constitutes a grievous offense against the fourth law of nature” (“On the Fourth Law of
Nature,” 90), by denying that, for Hobbes, the right to punish is bestowed upon the sovereign
(“On the Fourth Law of Nature,” 88), Smith is unable to explain why the punishment of the
innocent in particular constitutes a grievous offense against the fourth law of nature.
53
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If ingratitude in punishment is contrary to domestic peace, that is, if ingratitude in
punishment invites subjects to attempt to “withdraw their gift,” again, it is because
ungrateful acts of punishment fail to meet the expectations of the gift of sovereign’s
authority to punish, or what Hobbes calls the “antecedent grace.”54
The sovereign’s duty of gratitude is discharged by keeping track of subjects’
expectation that they will not be punished “as long as they are obedient.” Appeal to
gratitude in punishment is an appeal to maintain legitimacy in punishment. Eschewing
ingratitude in punishment as a means to domestic peace requires the sovereign to
maintain legitimacy in punishment, that is, it requires the sovereign to only punish the
guilty.

3.4 Cruelty (Against the Seventh Law of Nature)
The first argument in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper is, admittedly, the
most difficult to reconcile with a clear appeal to legitimacy in punishment. The problem
lies in the vagueness of the argument: the law of nature that prohibits cruelty requires that
good consequences follow punishment and, as Hobbes states, “there can arrive no good
to the Commonwealth by punishing the innocent.”55 As it stands, the claim that “there
can arrive no good to the Commonwealth by punishing the innocent” is unconvincing.
If what Hobbes means by punishing the innocent is simply the manufacturing of
fraudulent evidence by the state, or scapegoating a subject, say, in order to appease the
fears of the population, then, the above argument is dubious. There can arise some good
to the Commonwealth by (fraudulently) punishing the innocent, granting that a
54

Leviathan, 15/16, 75.

55

Leviathan, 28/22, 165.
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sufficiently large number of the citizenry is convinced of the condemned subject’s guilt.
However, it is doubtful that Hobbes had concealed state fraud in mind as a way in which
the issue of the punishment of the innocent arises.
Hobbes explicitly addresses the way in which the punishment of an innocent
subject arises, and this concerns the punishment of a subject who was acquitted by a
judge: as Hobbes claims, “it is against the law of nature to punish the innocent; and
innocent is he that acquitteth himself judicially and is acknowledged for innocent by the
judge.”56 Again, Hobbes’s claim is that no good to the Commonwealth can result from
the punishment of the innocent. The concern must be that the infliction of punishment
upon a person after a public acquittal cannot bring about any good consequences for the
Commonwealth.
According to the first argument, the punishment of the innocent—he that
acquitteth himself judicially—is “a violation, first, of that law of nature which forbiddeth
all men, in their revenges, to look at anything but some future good: for there can arrive
no good to the Commonwealth by punishing the innocent.”57 If we are to understand the
claim that cruelty in punishment invites war, we must understand what it is about the
punishment of the innocent in particular that cruelty captures. This analysis first requires
a better understanding of the seventh law of nature. Hobbes’s full statement of the law of
nature prohibiting cruelty is as follows:
A seventh [law of nature] is, that in revenges (that is, retribution of evil for
evil), men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the
good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any
other design than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For
this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon upon
56

Leviathan, 26/24, 144; emphasis added.
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Leviathan, 28/22, 165.
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security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example
and profit to come is a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to
no end (for the end is always somewhat to come); and glorying to no end is
vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason tendeth to the
introduction of war, which is against the law of nature, and is commonly
styled by the name of cruelty.58
As Hobbes implies, cruelty leads to war because cruelty is the infliction of harm without
reason; that is to say, cruelty invites war because cruelty does not have a purpose or tends
to no end. Of course, the reason retribution inflicted without purpose “tendeth to the
introduction of war” needs to be drawn out.
The sovereign, in punishing an innocent subject—“he that acquitteth himself
judicially and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge”—cannot appeal to the
correction of the subject condemned for the obvious reason: the subject, having been
found not guilty of committing a transgression, does not require correction; the
punishment does not address this reason.59 Moreover, there is no profit or good to come
from the punishment of the innocent, as the punishment does not provide “direction of
others.”60 But failing to provide direction of others or precluding the attribution of
correction to the harm inflicted, that is, failing to promote the good of the
Commonwealth, does not yet capture the reason purposeless harm introduces war.
Simply put, failing to promote the good of the Commonwealth—peace and security—
does not explain why inflicting purposeless harm would be contrary to domestic peace
and security by inviting war. To answer this question, I contend that we must appeal to
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Leviathan, 15/19, 76.
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This is not to claim that, for Hobbes, the sovereign must justify his actions to his subjects. All I
imply here is that subjects will not attribute to the sovereign’s infliction of harm the correction of
the accused offender.
60

Leviathan, 15/19, 76.

144

the purpose for which subjects grant the sovereign the right to punish. As we see below,
the sovereign’s failure to promote this good does capture the reason purposeless harm—
the punishment of the innocent—would be contrary to domestic peace and security.
As I have argued elsewhere, the good that authorizing the sovereign the right to
punish transgressors of the law promotes is the establishment of the in foro externo
obligatory status of the law.61 That is to say, each prospective subject making himself
accountable to the law via liability for punishment for transgressions, makes the law
obligatory in one’s action as opposed to merely obligatory in one’s conscience (in foro
interno obligatory).62 Each prospective subject, making himself liable for punishment for
transgressing the law, is a kind of collateral each person puts up in order to be party to
the social covenant. That all persons are held accountable to the law gives each and every
person a reason to conform to the law. Without general accountability to the law,
conformity to law is unreasonable, thus the law does not oblige in foro externo.
Authorizing the sovereign to punish transgressors of the law and the corresponding
punishment of transgressions of the law provides for the assurance that the law holds
authority over renounced natural rights, thus, gives each subject as reason to conform to
the law.
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See my second article, “Hobbes on the Rationale of Punishment.”

See Leviathan, 15/36, 79: “The laws of nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to
a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not always.
For he that should be modest and tractable, and perform all he promises in such time and place
where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own
certain ruin, contrary to the ground of all laws of nature which tend to nature's preservation. And
again, he that having sufficient security that others shall observe the same laws towards him,
observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war, and consequently the destruction of his
nature by violence.”
62
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However, if each subject discerns that anyone is liable for punishment regardless
of a judicial finding of innocence, then each subject no longer has reason to think that all
others will be motivated to conform their actions to the law. Once liability for the
infliction of punishment passes to the arbitrary or capricious determination of the
sovereign, each subject no longer has any reason to believe that other subjects view
themselves as accountable to the law. Accordingly, each subject no longer has a reason to
view the law as in foro externo obligatory. The reason for not exercising those natural
liberties that each subject renounced upon entering civil society no longer applies: the
law no longer protects subjects. When the law fails to protect, the law fails to be
obligatory; as Hobbes states, “for no man is obliged [to the law] (when the protection of
the law faileth) not to protect himself by the best means he can.”63 But more than that, if a
subject discerns that he is liable for punishment regardless of a judicial finding of
innocence, then he no longer holds any political allegiance to the sovereign. As Hobbes
states, “[t]he obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no
longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.”64 In the starkest
terms, the sovereign’s habitual practice of punishing the innocent exhibits to all those
liable for punishment a breakdown of law and order.
The sovereign is not liable to be punished if he breaches the laws of nature. If the
sovereign acts with cruelty in punishment—if the sovereign punishes the innocent—the

63

Leviathan, 27/22-24, 156.

Leviathan, 21/21, 114. I take Hobbes here to imply that not only is “the obligation of subjects
to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is
able to protect them,” but also the obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as
long as the sovereign has the will to protect them.
64
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sovereign is, nevertheless, immune from being punished by his subjects.65 Subjects do
not have the right to punish the sovereign, nor do subjects have a right to rebel, regardless
of how routinely the sovereign practices punishing the innocent. However, from
Hobbes’s following remarks, we can appreciate that the sovereign routinely punishing the
innocent after public acquittal would “naturally” lead to rebellion: according to Hobbes,
“seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of laws, natural punishments must be
naturally consequent to the breach of the laws of nature, and therefore follow them as
their natural, not arbitrary, effects.”66 Immediately preceding this passage Hobbes notes,
“negligent government [is naturally punished] with rebellion.”67 Arguably, what makes
punishing the innocent in particular negligent governance, thus, leads to rebellion, is that
the sovereign fails to adhere to the purpose for each prospective subject authorizing the
sovereign the right to punish him for transgressing the law.
According to the seventh law of nature, “to hurt without reason tendeth to the
introduction of war, which is against the law of nature, and is commonly styled by the
name of cruelty.”68 We cannot appreciate Hobbes’s argument against cruelty in
punishment as an appeal to domestic peace without appreciating why cruelty in
punishment—punishing the innocent—will be contrary to domestic peace. Cruelty in
punishment fails to keep track of the purpose of punishment, or the reason for introducing
the practice of punishment. The punishment of the innocent “tendeth to the introduction
According to Hobbes, “hurt inflicted on the representative of the Commonwealth is not
punishment, but an act of hostility: because it is of the nature of punishment to be inflicted by
public authority, which is the authority only of the representative itself” (Leviathan, 28/12, 163).
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Leviathan, 31/40, 193.
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Leviathan, 31/40, 193.
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Leviathan, 15/19, 76.
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of war” because subjects will no longer regard themselves as obliged to the sovereign’s
laws if they regard themselves to be liable for punishment regardless of the judicial
finding of innocence. The prohibition on cruelty in punishment, as mandated by the
seventh law of nature, requires the sovereign to keep track of the purpose of punishment.
As I have argued, the purpose for punishment is found in the purpose for each
prospective subject authorizing the sovereign the right to punish him for transgressing the
law. The purpose, as noted, is to establish and maintain the law in foro externo
obligatory, and this requires that only the guilty be punished. Appeal to the prohibition on
cruelty in punishment is an appeal to maintain legitimacy in punishment. Eschewing
cruelty in punishment as a means to domestic peace requires the sovereign to maintain
legitimacy in punishment, that is, it requires the sovereign to only punish the guilty.

3.5 Conclusion
With a rare exception,69 Hobbes scholars reject the view that, for Hobbes, the sovereign’s
possession of the right to punish is based on its authorization by prospective subjects. 70
What I see as an oversight has consequences for understanding Hobbes’s arguments
against the punishment of the innocent. The authorization of the sovereign to punish
transgressors of the law links punishment to wrongdoing. Prior to prospective subjects

See Clifford Orwin, “On the Sovereign Authorization,” Political Theory 3 (1975): 31, who
notes that the “answer to the question of the right or authority by which the sovereign punishes is
that the right by which he punishes is not authority but that he punishes by authority and by the
authority of him whom he punishes. The subject has authorized his punishment.”
69

See my first article, “The Right to Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” infra notes 11 and
12 and corresponding text.
70
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making themselves accountable to the laws of nature—laws that become civil laws71—
via the social covenant, there is no wrong-doing.72 Prior to prospective subjects
instituting a political representative, there is no punishment.73 I have argued in this paper
that we cannot appreciate why the laws of nature prohibiting inequity, ingratitude, and
cruelty are germane to the issue of the punishment of the innocent without first
appreciating that prospective subjects authorize the sovereign to punish them for
transgressing the law. Without appreciating that prospective subjects authorize the
sovereign to punish them for transgressing the law, we cannot appreciate why inequity,
ingratitude, and cruelty in punishment is contrary to domestic peace or invites war.
Accordingly, Hobbes’s appeals to the laws of nature prohibiting inequity, ingratitude, and
cruelty in punishment are best understood as appeals to maintaining legitimacy in
punishment grounded in each subject authorizing the sovereign to punish him for
transgressing the law.
As I argued in section 3.2, inequity, for Hobbes, is a breach of trust to distribute
justice impartially and deters persons from the use of arbitrators, which sends them back
to a state of war. Inequity in punishment—the punishment of the innocent—betrays the
trust for which the sovereign is authorized to distribute punishment for transgressions of
See Leviathan, 26/8, 138: “The law of nature and the civil law contain each other and are of
equal extent. For the laws of nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude, and other moral
virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature (as I have said before in the end of the
fifteenth Chapter), are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to peace and to
obedience. When a Commonwealth is once settled, then are they actually laws, and not before; as
being then the commands of the Commonwealth; and therefore also civil laws.”
71

See Leviathan, 27/3, 152: “the civil law ceasing, crime cease; for there being no other law
remaining but that of nature, there is no place for accusation; every man being his own judge, and
accused only by his own conscience.”
72

As mentioned earlier, according to Hobbes, “it is of the nature of punishment to be inflicted by
public authority, which is the authority only of the [political] representative itself” (Leviathan,
28/12, 163).
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the law and causes subjects to reject the sovereign as the arbiter of justice. As I argued in
section 3.3, ingratitude, for Hobbes, is the failure to keep track of the expectation of
benefit to be derived from a gift and causes one to repent one’s good will. Ingratitude in
punishment—the punishment of the innocent—is the failure to keep track of the
expectation of protection under the law for which the sovereign is authorized to punish
transgressors of the law and causes subjects to regret the gift of sovereign authority. As I
argued in section 3.4, cruelty, for Hobbes, is the infliction of violence without reason or
purpose, which is an invitation to war. Cruelty in punishment—the punishment of the
innocent—fails to attend to the purpose for which the sovereign is authorized to punish
transgressors of the law. The purpose of granting the sovereign the right to punish is to
make the laws of nature in foro externo obligatory. The punishment of the innocent
annuls the in foro externo obligatory status of the law and thus reintroduces a state of
affair in which one’s actions are not bound by law.
However, the fact that legitimate authority to punish is limited by the commission
of the right to punish does not, for Hobbes, entail that the sovereign’s duty to only punish
the guilty arises by virtue of the limitation placed on the authority to punish. The
sovereign is only indirectly obliged to maintain legitimacy in punishment. Routinely
inflicting illegitimate punishment on subjects is, potentially, a cause of rebellion or an
annulment of the obligatory status of the law. The fact that subjects do not have a right to
rebel against the sovereign or a right to cast off political allegiance does not preclude the
possibility of revolt or civil war, as Hobbes was intimately aware.
The instigation of rebellion or the annulment of the in foro externo obligatory
status of the law is, obviously, contrary to domestic peace and the safety of the people—
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an end to which the sovereign is obliged by virtue of his obligation, not to his subjects
directly, but to the laws of nature. According to Hobbes, “[t]he office of the sovereign, be
it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end for which he was trusted with the
sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is
obliged by the law of nature.”74 And as Hobbes adds, “[t]he safety of the people requireth
further, from him or them that have the sovereign power, that justice be equally
administered to all degrees of people.”75 Because the sovereign is directly obliged to
maintain domestic peace, the sovereign is indirectly obliged to maintain legitimacy in
punishment.
The sovereign cannot procure or facilitate the stability or internal security of the
commonwealth without the general confidence of his subjects that the law is a refuge
from the uncertainty of the state of nature. A society in which subjects are liable for
punishment after having been found innocent of transgressing the law will, inevitably,
cease to be viewed by its subjects as a society ruled by law. It would be the sovereign, not
the people, who instigates war. Once this threshold is passed—once the citizenry no
longer views its society as ruled by law—it is no longer a society but rather a reversion of
the multitude back to the state of nature.
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Concluding Remarks
When we survey the literature on Hobbes’s political theory, we find three accounts of the
source of the sovereign’s right to punish: i) each subject authorizes (or is understood to
have authorized) the sovereign to punish him for transgressing the law;1 ii) each subject
authorizes the sovereign to punish all others but not himself;2 and, iii) the sovereign’s
right to punish is not based on authorization; rather, the right to punish is identified as the
unsurrendered natural right of violence of the person who holds the office of the
sovereign. As noted throughout this dissertation, the overwhelming majority of Hobbes
scholars attribute the third view to Hobbes.3 Hobbes’s definitive view, on my account, is
the first—i.e., each prospective subject authorizes the sovereign to punish him for
transgressing the law. I argued for this view in the first article of my dissertation, “The
Right to Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan.” Significantly, the latter two accounts
fail to attend to Hobbes’s distinction between punishment and hostility, a distinction to
which I have attended in my first article, and elaborated upon in my third article,
1

This is the account I attribute to Hobbes. As I mentioned in the first article of my dissertation, so
far as I am aware, only Clifford Orwin, “On the Sovereign Authorization,” 31, explicitly holds
this view: see “The Right to Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” section 1.5, note 65 and
corresponding text.
2

For the original development of this view, see David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan, 146148. Andrew Cohen, “Retained Liberties and Absolute Hobbesian Authorization,” 42, adopts this
view. Gauthier, it should be noted, does not attribute this view to Hobbes. Rather, he recommends
the view as a way to overcome the inconsistencies he finds in Hobbes’s account of punishment
and authorization—as no person has a right to harm himself, no person can transfer such a right to
the sovereign. There is no such inconsistency in Hobbes’s account, however. Authorization, for
Hobbes, does not require the possession of the right that is authorized. Prospective subjects, for
example, do not have a natural right to make law, but they authorize the sovereign to make law;
the right to punish, like the right to make law, is an artificial right.
See my first article, “The Right to Punish in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan,” section 1.2, infra
notes 11 and 12 and corresponding text.
3
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“Hobbes on the Punishment of the Innocent.” As I have argued, the distinction between
punishment and hostility, for Hobbes, draws on the distinction between acts of political
representation and acts of what we can call natural representation. Political
authorization—that is, commissioning a representative to act on behalf of the unified
multitude or, what is the same, the Commonwealth—grounds legitimacy in punishment.
The institution of punishment, for Hobbes, is not merely the product of a power vacuum;
it has a normative foundation, which authorization provides. Failing to attend to the
normative foundation of the sovereign representative’s acquisition of the right to
punish—acquisition through each subject authorizing the sovereign to punish him for
(and only for) transgressing the law—entails failing to attend to Hobbes’s explicit
distinction between punishment and hostility. Accordingly, as I argue in this conclusion,
failing to attend to Hobbes’s view that each subject authorizes the sovereign to punish
him for transgressing the law entails failing to attend to Hobbes’s theory of punishment.
Hobbes conceives of punishment as comprised of a number of essential features.
Firstly, for an act to be construed as punishment, it must have been inflicted by a
recognized representative authority over a subordinate; as Hobbes claims, “it is of the
nature of punishment to be inflicted by public authority, which is the authority only of the
representative itself”4 and “neither private revenges nor injuries of private men can
properly be styled punishment, because they proceed not from public authority.”5
Secondly, punishment can only be a retributive response to a known law; as Hobbes
claims, “[n]o law made after a fact done can make it a crime: because if the fact be
4

Leviathan, 28/12, 163. References to Leviathan are by chapter and paragraph(s) in the G.C.A.
Gaskin (1996) edition, followed by page number(s) in the original (1651) edition. All emphases
are in the original work unless otherwise noted.
5

Leviathan, 28/3, 162.
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against the law of nature, the law was before the fact; and a positive law cannot be taken
notice of before it be made, and therefore cannot be obligatory” 6 and “harm inflicted for a
fact done before there was a law that forbade it is not punishment, but an act of hostility:
for before the law, there is no transgression of the law.”7 Thirdly, punishment must be
consistently applied and consistent with the declared penal law; as Hobbes states “when a
penalty is either annexed to the crime in the law itself, or hath been usually inflicted in
the like cases, there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty”8 and “if a
punishment be determined and prescribed in the law itself, and after the crime committed
there be a greater punishment inflicted, the excess is not punishment, but an act of
hostility.”9 Lastly, punishment can only be inflicted after public trial and finding of guilt;
as Hobbes states, “evil inflicted by public authority, without precedent public
condemnation, is not to be styled by the name of punishment, but of a hostile act, because
the fact for which a man is punished ought first to be judged by public authority to be a
transgression of the law”10 and “punishment supposeth a fact judged to have been a
transgression of the law.”11
Hobbes defines punishment as follows: “A PUNISHMENT is an evil inflicted by
public authority on him that hath done or omitted that which is judged by the same

6

Leviathan, 27/9, 153.

7

Leviathan, 28/11, 163.

8

Leviathan, 27/8, 153.

9

Leviathan, 28/10, 162.

10

Leviathan, 28/5, 162.

11

Leviathan, 28/11, 163.
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authority to be a transgression of the law.”12 Contrary to the traditional view, Hobbes’s
theory of punishment is not independent of his political theory. His theory of punishment
is, indeed, subordinate to his political theory. Accordingly, Hobbes’s definition of
punishment simply reiterates the features of a juridical institution that is politically
constituted through authorization. Violence inflicted upon a subject is, for Hobbes,
punishment proper when (and only when) the act conforms to the features noted above:
that it follows the public finding of guilt of transgression of a known law; that it accords
with penal law; and, most significantly, that it is performed by the person (or persons)
who is granted the authority to punish. Each of these features reflects a core idea that runs
through Hobbes’s conception of punishment, namely, that it is governed through law. The
distinction between punishment as necessarily governed through law and the capricious
exercise of the natural right to violence draws on the distinction between violent acts of
political representation and violent acts of what we can call natural representation. The
sovereign is authorized as the artificial representative of the person of the
Commonwealth, i.e., the unified multitude; as Hobbes states, “he that carryeth this person
[of the Commonwealth] is called SOVEREIGN.”13 Prospective subjects transcend the state
of nature through the institution of an artificial person, a person whose will is necessarily
tied to law; as Hobbes states, “the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and
motion to the whole body [of the Commonwealth],” and, as Hobbes adds, “[e]quity and
laws [are] an artificial reason and will.”14

12

Leviathan, 28/1, 161.

13

Leviathan, 17/14, 88.

14

Leviathan, Introduction/1, 1; original emphases omitted.
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The second account of the source of the sovereign’s right to punish—i.e., each
prospective subject authorizes the punishment of all others but not himself—does not
trace representation back to the person being punished. Although the sovereign is
authorized to represent the person of the Commonwealth in punishing a subject, in order
for the punishment to be an act of political representation, that very subject must have
authorized the sovereign to punish him for transgressing the law. The act of
authorization, for Hobbes, entails that one takes upon oneself—takes responsibility for—
the actions of another. Authorization draws on authorship: as Hobbes states, “he that
owneth his [the actor’s or representative’s] words and actions is the AUTHOR, in which
case the actor acteth by authority.”15 The authorization of the punishment of another—
and not oneself—entails that the act of punishment does not have as the author of the act
the person upon whom harm is inflicted. But if this is the case, then the act is not
punishment but, rather, an act of hostility; as Hobbes declares, “evil inflicted by usurped
power [...] is not punishment, but an act of hostility, because the acts of power usurped
have not for author the person condemned.”16 While the context of this quote is the issue
of usurped power—perhaps, for example, through rebellion—the underlying principle of
Hobbes’s claim is clear: without prior authorization by the would-be condemned, the evil
inflicted upon that person does not count as punishment. Thus, one may, perhaps as an
act of treachery, purport to “authorize” the rebellion leader(s) to “punish” other subjects
who, holding their allegiance to their exiled sovereign, have not submitted to the usurped
power. The acquisition of sovereignty by treachery notwithstanding, any subsequent
infliction of harm by the so-called “authorized” usurped power on one that did not submit
15

Leviathan, 16/4, 81.

16

Leviathan, 28/6, 162; emphasis added.
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does not count as punishment.17 The power to punish, we see here, is not a sufficient
condition for legitimacy in punishment. Vicarious authorization,18 in attempting to
account for the basis of the sovereign’s possession of the right to punish, fails to attend to
Hobbes’s distinction between punishment and hostility. As such, this second account fails
to attend to the basis of legitimacy in Hobbes’s theory of punishment. This second
account, despite its alleged appeal to authorization, does not attend to Hobbes’s important
claim that the person condemned is “author of his own punishment.”19
The tradition almost unanimously holds Hobbes to the third account of the source
of the sovereign’s right to punish: the right to punish is identified with the unsurrendered
natural right to violence. As we have seen, the tradition holds that it is only through the
natural right to violence, which all persons naturally enjoy but only the person who holds
the office of sovereignty retains, that the sovereign possesses the authority to enforce the
law. On this account, insofar as a person possesses the power to enforce the law, the
authority to punish is legitimate; de jure authority to punish, on this account, is reduced
to de facto power to enforce the law—power that is understood by the traditional view to
be the product of a mass relinquishment of natural rights. This reduction of de jure
authority to punish to de facto power to enforce the law is the natural consequence of the
view that the source of the sovereign’s right to punish is simply the product of the power
vacuum created by the mass relinquishment of natural rights. The authority to punish, on
17

We should note that an unjustly acquired sovereignty, for Hobbes, does not disqualify the victor
of the rebellion from becoming sovereign. But, as we see below, the victor is sovereign over the
subjects of the deposed sovereign only when the victor is authorized by the subjects of the
deposed sovereign.
Thomas S. Schrock, in “The Right to Punish and the Right to Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s
Leviathan,” 873-877, uses this term in describing Gauthier’s view.
18

19

Leviathan, 18/3, 89; emphasis added.
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the traditional view, is legitimate when the practice of punishment is sufficiently effective
in coercing conformity to the law. That is to say, the authority to punish, on the
traditional view, is grounded in the realities of power which enable the threat and/or the
infliction of violence to effectively discourage potential acts of non-conformity.
However, as I will emphasize below, for Hobbes, simply possessing the monopoly on
power to enforce the law is insufficient for legitimacy in punishment.
Dominion over subjects, according to Hobbes, can be acquired in two ways: the
first, which Hobbes takes to be the paradigmatic way, is sovereignty by institution; the
second is sovereignty acquired by force. I have noted a number of times in this
dissertation that, for Hobbes, included in the list of rights conferred upon the sovereign
by institution is the right to punish: once more, according to Hobbes, mutual
authorization by prospective subjects is the means by which “all the rights and faculties
of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people
assembled.”20 The right to punish is included in the catalogue of rights conferred upon
the sovereign; as Hobbes maintains, “to the sovereign is committed the power of
rewarding with riches or honour; and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy, every subject according to the law he hath formerly
made.”21 The other source of dominion—sovereignty by force—may be thought to give
credence to the traditional view of the sovereign’s right to punish, as the traditional view
reduces the authority to punish to the possession of the monopoly on power to enforce the
law, a monopoly which a successful acquisition surely gains. However, the traditional
view of the right to punish identified as the right of war does not find support in Hobbes’s
20

Leviathan, 18/2, 88.

21

Leviathan, 18/14, 92; emphasis added.
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considerations of sovereignty by acquisition. Sovereignty by force, as with sovereignty
by institution, fails to exercise de jure authority over subjects absent the authorization of
that force. Appeal to the mere possession of the power to unilaterally enforce conformity
to the law, absent the authorization of the sovereign by each prospective subject, fails to
attend to Hobbes’s distinction between punishment and hostility.
Regarding sovereignty by acquisition or conquest, Hobbes claims that those who
are captive—and, in the case of sovereignty by rebellion, we can also characterize those
who sided with the deposed sovereign as captives—in order to be subject to the law, must
be understood to have authorized the new sovereign. According to Hobbes,
A COMMONWEALTH by acquisition is that where the sovereign power is
acquired by force; and it is acquired by force when men singly, or many
together by plurality of voices, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorize all
the actions of that man, or assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his
power.22
Hobbes’s distinction between those who authorize the victor and those who do not draws
on the distinction between servants and slaves. The victorious sovereign does not hold
dominion over the slave. Dominion, according to Hobbes,
is acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke
of death, covenanteth, either in express words or by other sufficient signs
of the will, that so long as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed
him, the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure. And after such
covenant made, the vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before.23
The vanquished “covenanteth” with the victor; that is, the vanquished “authorize all the
actions” of the victor. The victor does not hold dominion or authority over the
vanquished until “after such covenant made,” and, as Hobbes attests, “not before” such
authorization. Thus, whether prospective subjects covenant to relinquish their natural
22

Leviathan, 20/1, 103; latter emphasis added.

23

Leviathan, 20/10, 103-104.
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right to everything to one another or surrender their natural right to everything to the
conquering sovereign, the sovereign’s possession of the authority to punish has a
normative foundation in authorization. The monopoly on force through the
relinquishment or surrender of the right to violence is enveloped in a process of
legitimation. Absent the requisite legitimation through authorization, the vanquished are
not servants of the Commonwealth but, rather, slaves held by the Commonwealth. And
any infliction of harm on the slave does not count as punishment.
As I mentioned above, the distinction between servants and slaves draws on the
distinction between those who authorize the sovereign and those who do not; i.e., those
who take upon themselves accountability or obligation to the law and those who do not.
As Hobbes states,
for by the word servant […] is not meant a captive, which is kept in
prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one
that did, shall consider what to do with him: for such men, commonly
called slaves, have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the
prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly.24
Detainment of captives—those captives “kept in prison, or bonds”—is not punishment
proper. Imprisonment of those who are not subjects—those who, for example, still
consider themselves bound to, or have allegiance to, the vanquished sovereign—is not
punishment. For Hobbes, punishment, by definition, has for its “end that the will of men
may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.”25 I argued in my second article,
“Hobbes on the Rationale of Punishment,” that the harm (or threat of harm) inflicted
upon enemies cannot be understood to endeavour better obedience to those who are not
disposed to obedience. Likewise, any harm inflicted upon captives is not intended to
24

Leviathan, 20/10, 104.

25

Leviathan, 28/1, 161; emphasis added.
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dispose better obedience to the law, as captives have no obligations to obey the victor
before authorization; thus, any harm inflicted is not to be construed as punishment but,
rather, hostility. As Hobbes states, “all evil which is inflicted without intention or
possibility of disposing the delinquent or, by his example, other men to obey the laws is
not punishment, but an act of hostility, because without such an end no hurt done is
contained under that name.”26 Whipping a captive, for example, does not dispose that
captive to obey laws that he is not obliged to obey. And the infliction of such harm does
not, by example, dispose those who are already obliged to obey, as the infliction of evil
on a captive does not maintain the authority of law over relinquished natural rights.
Captives do not relinquish (or have yet to relinquish) any natural rights; as such, the harm
inflicted upon captives does not reaffirm the authority of the law over renounced natural
rights.
I argued in my second article, “Hobbes on the Rationale of Punishment,” that, for
Hobbes, the threat of punishment does not generate the obligation to the law; the threat
may generate an obligation to act in conformity with a particular law insofar as the threat
is taken to be genuine but, again, the threat does not generate an obligation to the law as
such. Akin to the view that the threat of punishment does not generate the obligation to
the law, we can appreciate that it is not because the vanquished is under the sword that he
is obliged to obey the law. As Hobbes states, “[i]t is not therefore the victory that giveth
the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged
because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he

26

Leviathan, 28/7, 162.
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cometh in and submitteth to the victor.”27 The threat of harm for transgressing the law
maintains obedience because one is already obliged to obey the law through “his own
covenant” or his own grant of authority.28 The victorious leader of the rebellion or the
conquest, absent subsequent authorization by each captive, does not have the authority to
punish. Once more, as Hobbes states, “evil inflicted by usurped power [...] is not
punishment, but an act of hostility, because [without authorization] the acts of power
usurped have not for author the person condemned.”29
We must not acquiesce to the traditional view that Hobbes’s theory of punishment
is independent of his theory of political authority. The concern regarding the power to
enforce the law through the threat of punishment is not independent of the concern
regarding the political lineage of the force that possesses the power to enforce the law; to
establish de jure authority to punish, the lineage of the force that possesses the power to
enforce the law must be traced back to authorization. Without the proper lineage, de facto
power to enforce one’s imposed laws is not de facto power to punish, as any such
enforcement is not punishment but, rather, acts of hostility. Indeed, as I stated above,
Hobbes’s theory of punishment is subordinate to his political theory. Hobbes’s definition
of punishment simply reiterates the norms of an institution that is politically constituted
through the authorization by each subject the sovereign to punish him for transgressing
the law. The sovereign is authorized to punish according to law; again, as Hobbes
maintains, “to the sovereign is committed the power of rewarding with riches or honour;
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As I have argued in my second article, “Hobbes on the Rationale of Punishment,” the general
threat maintains obedience by assuring that conformity to the law will not procure one’s ruin.
28
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Leviathan, 28/6, 162.
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and of punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject
according to the law he hath formerly made.”30 This authorization of a representative
duty-bound to law follows from the general view of sovereignty as the artificial person
who wills through law. Neither the sovereign nor any of its agents, as representative of
the Commonwealth, have the freedom to act outside of the law. Those who are
commissioned by the sovereign to execute punishment only have the authority to punish
in accordance with the law. “Public ministers,” according to Hobbes, “are also all those
that have authority from the sovereign to […] apprehend and imprison malefactors; and
other acts tending to the conservation of the peace. For every act they do by such
authority is the act of the Commonwealth.”31 Commissioned ministers of the executive
do not have the authority to exercise the unrestrained right of nature. Public ministers are
bound to inflict only those punishments that the penal law determines shall be inflicted
for the particular transgression; as Hobbes claims, “Penal [laws] are those which declare
what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law; and speak to the ministers
and officers ordained for execution.”32
If we subscribe to the traditional view of Hobbes’s account of punishment as an
act of war or the exercise of the right of nature, we cannot account for the essential
features that Hobbes assigns to punishment. Advocates of the traditional account of
Hobbes’s treatment of punishment deny that punishment is inflicted by an authority over
a subordinate. As one commentator notes, “[o]nce a subject has disobeyed the sovereign,
he and the sovereign are in the state of nature vis-à-vis each other. […T]he criminal has
30

Leviathan, 18/14, 92; emphasis added.
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Leviathan, 23/10, 126.
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Leviathan, 26/38, 148; latter emphasis added.
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put himself and the sovereign into a conflict with no mutually recognized third-party
adjudicator.”33 This view is in contrast to Hobbes’s claim that punishment is “an evil
inflicted by public authority.”34 Advocates of the traditional account of Hobbes’s
treatment of punishment deny that the infliction of punishment is bound by penal law; as
one commentator notes, “[Hobbes] thus made the right of domestic punishment the same
kind of thing as the right to wage foreign war.”35 The right of nature or the right of war,
for Hobbes, is the right of “doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he
shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto [his own preservation].”36 This view is in
contrast to Hobbes’s claim that “to the sovereign is committed the power […] of
punishing with corporal or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy, every subject
according to the [penal] law he hath formerly made.”37 These significant points of
contrast are the consequence of the view that Hobbes denies a normative foundation for
the institution of punishment, specifically, that Hobbes rejects authorization as the basis
of the sovereign representative’s possession of the right to punish; as one commentator
notes, “[Hobbes] gives a separate explanation for the sovereign’s right to punish; it is part
of his right of nature and thus independent of the rights transferred to him in the social
contract.”38
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The sovereign exercises the right of war only against an enemy, not against a
subject. While the sovereign is certainly bound by the laws of nature, whether in
punishing or exercising his right of war, in punishing that the sovereign is also bound to
the civil or penal law. The sovereign is required to punish by law, not by caprice; not all
infliction of evil on a subject is lawful. On the traditional interpretation, the clear
distinction Hobbes draws between the harm inflicted upon a subject and the harm
inflicted upon an enemy cannot be accounted for; nor, for that matter, can the juridical
constraint on the harm inflicted upon subjects be accounted for.
It can be the case that the sovereign commits acts of cruelty against subjects as
well as against enemies; in doing so, the sovereign does not do injury to either (does not
commit injustice) but, rather, offends against his own conscience (or sins against God).
With regard to punishment in particular, it may be the case that the sovereign acts with
cruelty against or acts inequitably towards a subject, for example, with the imposition of
a prison term longer than the penal law calls for or, the concern that I address in the third
article, “Hobbes on the Punishment of the Innocent,” continuing to imprison a subject
who has been acquitted by a judge. However, only in acting with cruelty against or acting
inequitably towards a subject can we say that something more than a moral wrong
occurs. The sovereign offends against the office of sovereignty. According to Hobbes,
the iniquitous imprisonment, as a kind of offence against the office of sovereignty, is
attributed to the sovereign as a private individual (or as a natural, as opposed to artificial,
person). In addition to the moral wrong, there is a certain mien of illegitimacy that
Hobbes recognizes to be involved in iniquitous prison terms, punishments harsher than
the law prescribes, or the punishment of the innocent. Only when we understand and
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appreciate the central role authorization plays in Hobbes’s theory of punishment are we
able to fully understand and appreciate Hobbes’s concern with legitimacy in punishment.
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